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Short Executive Summary 
 
1. The UK agri-food sector will be one of the most seriously affected by Brexit.  Not only is it 
dependent on trade relations both with the European Union and with the Rest of the World, but 
it is also a sector dependent on migrant labour, and the most heavily subsidised and regulated 
under the present Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
 
2. The research shows that under selected trade scenarios the impact of Brexit on UK agriculture will 
be far from uniform.  
 
3. The trade scenario effects depend on the net trade position, and/or world prices. Under a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU, agricultural impacts are relatively modest.  By contrast, 
unilateral removal of import tariffs (UTL) has significant negative impacts on prices, production 
and incomes.  Adoption of the current EU’s WTO tariff schedule for all imports (including those 
from the EU) favours net importer sectors (e.g., dairy) and harms net exporter sectors (e.g., 
sheep).  
 
4. These trade effects, however, might be overshadowed by the foreign exchange rate and possible 
labour market changes and other non-tariff barriers.  
 
5. Given the dependence of many UK farms on CAP direct payments, their removal, predictably, 
worsens the negative impacts of new trade arrangements and offsets positive impacts. Indeed, 
the elimination of direct payments will affect most farm businesses, but the magnitude varies 
significantly by enterprise and devolved administration. 
 
6. The research shows differences in effects at farm and sector level, implying that although the 
agricultural industry can survive and adapt there is likely to be considerable hardship for 
individuals, families and businesses.  
 
7. Changes in the agricultural industry could have more far reaching effects in other sectors, such as 
food processing.  
 
8. Changes in land use may relieve environmental pressures, for example in areas experiencing over 
grazing, but could increase risks of pollution in others.  Consideration will be needed for policies 
to manage any transition.  
 
9. The Westminster and devolved governments may need to consider the implications of such 
changes for people, the food supply, land use and the countryside, and their responses and policy 
approaches to managing this may vary.  
 
10. However, uncertainty during negotiations regarding the Withdrawal Agreement has been (and 
continues to be at the time of writing) a major problem, making it extremely difficult for farmers 
and the agri-food industry to plan for the future.  
7 
Executive Summary 
 
Research Objectives, Scenarios and Models  
• The UK agri-food sector will be one of the most seriously affected by Brexit.  Not only is it 
dependent on trade relations both with the European Union and with the Rest of the World, but 
it is also a sector dependent on migrant labour, and the most heavily subsidised and regulated 
under the present Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). UK farmers are guaranteed to receive the 
same level of subsidy as under the CAP until the end of 2022.  Despite these efforts, the lack of 
concrete policy decisions and the uncertainty that surrounds the terms of negotiations with the 
EU make this period difficult for farm business planning.  
 
• This report assesses the economic impacts of a selected number of UK trade and domestic 
agricultural policy scenarios following Brexit by integrating state of the art economic modelling 
approaches at macro, sector and farm levels. It provides the UK Government, its devolved 
administrations and other stakeholders (e.g. levy boards, farmers and farmers’ organisations) with 
a cohesive and robust analytic capacity to support future policy decision making.  
 
• The project harnesses existing model frameworks and expertise to integrate trade and 
macroeconomic relationships with the structure and performance of the UK agricultural sector 
and to disaggregate macro and sector projections to the farm level.  
 
• The possible effects of selected trade and domestic policy alternatives are estimated using both 
an agriculture specific variant of the well-known Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) multi-region 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and the UK-FAPRI partial equilibrium (PE) model. 
Both approaches are employed to provide sector-wide economic estimates of the possible 
consequences of Brexit (e.g. supply, demand, prices, exports, imports and welfare). Macro-
economic projections provided by Global Insight, supplemented by data sources from the World 
Bank as necessary were used in both CGE and FAPRI models. 
 
• Sectoral projections were disaggregated using farm-level models to assess impacts of Brexit 
scenarios on production decisions and farm household incomes.  Two modelling frameworks (i.e., 
a farm level dynamic linear programming model, ScotFarm, and a static budgetary simulation 
using UK Farm Business Survey data for 2013/14 -2105/16 for 2,803 farms) were employed to 
estimate potential effects (e.g. financial performance) of Brexit scenarios on commercial farms 
across the UK as a whole, the devolved administrations and farm types.  
 
• By individually modelling all farm businesses in the combined FBS samples for England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland we consider the inherent heterogeneity within the UK farm 
population and, using FBS weights, simulated scenario impacts for the individual farm businesses 
could be ‘raised’ to provide a robust assessment of those impacts across the farm population as a 
whole. 
 
• The FBS sample was weighted using calibrated inverse sampling fractions to provide statistically 
representative data for a population of approximately 100,000 commercial farming businesses 
with output of at least €25,000 per annum and at least 0.5 Standard Labour Requirement (SLR).  
These businesses represent about half (47%) of UK holdings in 2015/16 but they account for more 
than 90 percent of total agricultural output.  
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• Further analysis at the farm level decomposes the estimated impacts to ascertain characteristics 
of more vulnerable segments of the farm population.  Sensitivity analysis to investigate mitigating 
factors such as farm productivity improvements, reduction in land rents and the Sterling 
devaluation was also carried out. It also estimates the impact of the selected Brexit policy 
scenarios on the viability, sustainability and vulnerability of UK farm households by devolved 
administration, farm type and farmer’s age.  
 
• The report also explores how to reconcile and interpret the macro, sector and farm level results, 
and their implications for UK agricultural policy development post Brexit. 
 
• A literature review and the opening workshop with the project’s Advisory Panel (May 2017) led to 
the selection of a limited number of trade and domestic policy scenarios. The scenarios were 
chosen to represent a broad range of feasible options for: i) trade relations with the EU and the 
Rest of World; ii) domestic UK policy for direct payments to farmers (currently the Basic Payments 
Scheme).  
 
• To distinguish between the trade and domestic policy effects, the report estimates the potential 
effects of different trade agreements by modelling three scenarios with (+) and without Direct 
Payments (-) (i.e. Basic Payment Scheme) as follows: 
 
Free Trade Agreement  
(FTA) 
Unilateral Trade Liberalisation 
(UTL) 
World Trade Organisation  
(WTO) 
• comprehensive UK/EU Free 
Trade Agreement with UK-
EU tariffs at zero 
• UK adopts the EU common 
tariff schedule on Rest of 
World imports 
• UK maintains share of EU 
Tariff Rate Quotas applying 
to Rest of World imports 
• additional trade costs of 5 
per cent (livestock) and 2 
per cent (crops) for 
UK↔EU trade flows 
• an extreme free-trade 
scenario  
• elimination of all UK 
import tariffs for Rest of 
World including imports 
from the EU 
• UK-EU exports subject to 
EU Common Custom 
Tariffs (CCT) 
• TRQs on UK-EU exports 
• additional trade costs of 
10 per cent (livestock) and 
5 per cent (crops) for 
UK↔EU trade flows 
• no agreement by March 
2019, hence a fall back to 
WTO rules and current EU 
tariff schedules 
• UK trading with EU and Rest 
of World under WTO Most 
Favoured Nation tariffs 
• requires a UK allocation of a 
share of the current EU tariff 
rate quotas with Rest of the 
World 
• additional trade costs of 8 
per cent (livestock) and 4 per 
cent (crops) for UK↔EU 
trade flows 
 
 
• These six scenarios were compared with a Baseline which assumes continued membership of an 
unchanged EU Single Market and CAP as envisaged in 2019/20, but with no projected changes to 
the CAP or EU or UK trade relations beyond 2019.  Each scenario is run over a modelling period 
from 2017 to 2026, with Brexit scenarios beginning in 2019. A phased-out of direct payments over 
a 5-year period (2020-2025) involving a straight-line reduction of current payment levels to zero 
in 2025, was considered as appropriate.  The outcomes in the final year (2026) represent the 
longer-run projections of the consequences of the scenarios.  
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• There are two major conditioning factors for the economic effects of Brexit policy scenarios on UK 
agriculture:  i) the increased restrictions on migrant labour; and ii) the sterling exchange rate, both 
with the Euro and with the US dollar. Given the resources available for this project, and of the 
major aim of providing clear and understandable policy analysis for public debate and policy 
decision-making, the report treats both these major considerations through some limited 
sensitivity analysis. 
 
Estimated impacts on the wider economy and at the sector level: CGE results  
• The UK is a net importer of agricultural and food products. The impact of the scenarios is 
heterogeneous across individual UK agricultural and food activities. It is conditioned by the degree 
of relative trade competitiveness (i.e., relative tariffs) and trade openness in each UK sector. A 
decomposition of the results compared with the Baseline by the underlying trade shocks drivers, 
reveals that each policy tool (e.g., EU/UK trade costs, UK/ROW import tariffs) can have conflicting 
impacts on production and prices. 
 
• All three trade scenarios are unfavourable for UK macro growth. WTO reduces UK macro growth 
the most (0.42% per annum average), UTL the least (0.22% per annum average). The detrimental 
impact to the EU27 is relatively minor – 0.04% of GDP in all three scenarios. As expected, in 
macroeconomic terms, the removal of Pillar 1 CAP support is beneficial to UK macro growth, 
although negligible. 
 
• Under FTA scenario, the rising protection afforded to domestic UK industries (increased UK trade 
costs on EU imports) benefits domestic primary agriculture and food processing production. Given 
the assumptions regarding trade costs, livestock sectors benefit more than the crops sector, 
particularly the white meat supply chain.  
 
• Under UTL scenario, the effect of opening up the UK’s agri-food sectors to the non-EU regions has 
a detrimental impact on the vertical supply chains of red meat, white meat and sugar, as well as 
wheat production. On the other hand, the ‘large’ sectors of horticulture, dairy and ‘other food’ 
benefit, whilst ‘vegetable oils and fats’ production (small sector) almost doubles in size, with 
concomitant increases in upstream oilseeds. Overall, primary agricultural output falls slightly 
compared with the Baseline (due to livestock output contractions), whilst food processing output 
rises by 2%.  
 
• In the WTO scenario, the driver of rising UK protectionism on UK agri-food activities is very strong 
for the UK red and white meat vertical supply chains. On the other hand, in the UK’s primary and 
processed sugar activities, the loss of tariff-free access to the EU market has a detrimental effect 
on production. In this scenario, agricultural and processed food output rises compared with the 
Baseline are driven by the production rises in the livestock and meat sectors. 
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• Based on estimates from the literature, a proportion of the single farm payment is coupled to 
production. As a result, the removal of direct payments in each of the scenarios has an additional 
detrimental impact on primary agricultural and processed food production – a further production 
decline of approximately 3% and 1%, respectively.  
 
• The market price effect under FTA is slightly inflationary for the UK. Most notably, dairy and white 
meat prices rise 1.2% and 1.5%, respectively. In general, however, mutual UK/EU trade cost shocks 
broadly cancel one another.  
 
• In UTL, there are important relative market price falls in red meat, sugar and rice. Similar, although 
moderate, price falls also occur in cereals. The dairy price rise recorded under FTA is stronger 
(2.5%) given the assumption of stronger trade costs under this scenario. 
 
• In Brexit-WTO, there are clear inflationary price effects resulting from the adjustment to WTO 
MFN tariffs. In meat sectors and dairy, the UK market price rises are between 7-8% compared with 
the Baseline, whilst for primary agriculture and processed food, the corresponding price indices 
rise 2% and 3.7%, respectively. 
 
• The removal of direct payments support increases the unit cost of agricultural production and, by 
vertical price transmission, the food sector. There is a concomitant impact on agricultural and food 
prices of approximately 3% and 0.5% in each scenario.  
 
• Agricultural employment and land usage shadow agricultural output trends, although in both 
cases the responsiveness is limited. The biggest relative agricultural employment increase of 1.7% 
occurs under the WTO scenario. Moreover, with a highly inelastic land supply curve in the UK, 
average land yields must rise to meet the agricultural output in this scenario. Comparing with the 
Baseline, average UK land rents rise by as much as 5% under WTO and fall by 2.8% in UTL.  
 
• Comparing with each scenario when the CAP is present, the removal of the direct payments 
depresses average land rents by between 15-16% in each of the scenarios. Similarly, 
corresponding results for agricultural wages show that the removal of first pillar agricultural 
support has a depressing impact of between 3.5% to 4% in each of the scenarios.  
 
• Under FTA, UK-EU trade costs lead to a small relative improvement in the UK trade balance with 
the EU as relative UK imports from the EU drop off quicker than relative UK exports to the EU. The 
biggest relative trade balance improvements are for UK white meat and dairy. There is, however, 
an additional price substitution effect as more imports now come from the non-EU region, which 
implies a worsening UK trade balance with the non-EU region. Overall, the effect is a slight 
deterioration in the UK’s total trade balances with the exception of white meat and dairy sectors. 
 
• Under UTL, the stronger trade cost assumptions (vs FTA) generate stronger relative UK trade 
balance improvements compared with Brexit-Lite. On the other hand, eliminating tariffs on trade 
between the UK and the non-EU region worsens the UK’s trade balances with the non-EU region, 
particularly in red and white meat sectors. With the notable exception of cattle and sheep, dairy, 
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vegetable oils and fats and other food processing, in general, the UK’s trade balances worsen 
(particularly in meat) compared with the Baseline (and FTA). 
 
• A return to WTO MFN tariffs on the UK’s trade arrangements generates strong relative 
improvements in the UK’s trade balances with the EU in meat and dairy due to the stifling effect 
on imports (and increasing domestic production). The shortfall between domestic production rises 
on the one hand, and the loss of UK imports from the EU on the other hand, must be met by 
imports from the non-EU region. This trade displacement effect slows the fall in UK imports from 
the non-EU region (due to rising UK tariffs), such that there are further trade balance 
deteriorations with the non-EU region in a number of sectors. 
 
• In comparison with each corresponding scenario where first pillar CAP support is in place, the loss 
of direct payments reduces self-sufficiency in the UK, thereby leading to a relative worsening in 
the trade balance.   
 
• Reducing the UK agricultural unskilled labour force in the post-Brexit period by 10% and 30% 
reduces UK agricultural output by an additional 3% and 11-12%, respectively. As a more unskilled 
labour-intensive activity, crop sector output falls by slightly more than the agricultural sector 
average. 
 
• In each of the scenarios, primary agricultural and food market prices increase by an additional 11-
12% and 1%. Unskilled agricultural sector wages rise by an additional 5% and 17% under 10% and 
30% reductions in the unskilled agricultural labour force. The macroeconomic impact is very 
limited since agriculture is a ‘small’ sector, whilst non-agricultural sectors mitigate the contraction 
in primary agriculture. 
 
• In the medium term, domestic market prices rise strongly as inflation is imported and primary 
factor prices are bid up when reducing the price of UK exports (i.e., price of sterling) on world 
markets. Per capita real incomes fall as the rising nominal incomes from increasing returns to 
primary factors do not offset the inflationary impact on domestic market prices. As a result, real 
macro growth shrinks in the UK by 0.3% and 0.8% in each corresponding scenario. Primary 
agricultural output falls by -1.2% and -1.8% in each corresponding scenario. Processed food output 
falls by -0.4% and -0.7% in each corresponding scenario. 
 
Estimated impacts at the sector level: UK-FAPRI results  
• The results from the partial equilibrium model demonstrate the extent to which the type of trade 
agreement could result in different price and production impacts in the UK depending on the 
disruption to trade patterns.  The UK-FAPRI model offers finer disaggregation of the effects at the 
sector level as compared to the CGE model, however, it doesn’t cover economy-wide adjustments.   
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• In general, a free trade agreement (FTA) results in the least disruption to trade flows, hence the 
estimated market impacts are relatively small.  The projected impacts are larger under the two 
other simulated trade arrangements. All sectors experience producer price and production 
declines under UTL. The impacts are particularly marked in the beef and sheep sectors where 
international competition is very strong.  In contrast, the direction of the market impact varies 
across sectors under the WTO scenario, depending on whether the UK is a net importer or a net 
exporter of the relevant commodity.  
 
• The projected changes under FTA in conjunction with the retaining of direct payments are 
relatively small since this entails limited disruption in trade.  UK producer prices increase slightly 
for commodities in which the UK is a net importer, e.g. beef, and the opposite for commodities in 
which the UK is a net exporter, e.g. barley, as the trade facilitation costs feed through to higher 
costs for the buyer.  Given the modest price impacts, changes in production and value of output 
are marginal.  Elimination of direct payments results in a modest fall in suckler cow, dairy cow and 
ewe numbers (-4%, -0.3% and -2% compared to the Baseline).   
 
• A unilateral trade liberalisation (UTL) decision to remove agricultural import tariffs from the RoW 
and from the EU, would see domestic producer prices fall markedly for all products, particularly 
for beef and sheep. Specifically, under UTL+, the model estimates a large increase in imports from 
RoW for the UK beef sector. This reflects the highly competitive nature of overseas suppliers (e.g. 
Brazil and Australia), and results in the domestic producer beef price falling close to world levels, 
(e.g. by 42 per cent).  The projected inflow of beef imports from the rest of the world displaces EU 
imports, which collapse to zero.   
 
• The projected decline in beef production under this scenario (UTL+) is more marked in Scotland (-
20%) compared to elsewhere in the UK (-10 to -13%).  This is attributable to differences in the 
proportion of beef sourced from the dairy herd across the UK, with a higher proportion of beef 
animals coming from the progeny of the dairy herd in England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
compared to Scotland.  
 
• The sheep sector is also exposed to strong international competition, with unilateral trade 
liberalisation leading to the inflow of more imports from the rest of the world and a significant fall 
in the domestic producer price (-19%).  The decline in price leads to a fall in sheepmeat production 
and a rise in consumption.  More imports from the rest of the world are required (+59%) to meet 
UK consumption since UK exports to the EU are largely maintained through the TRQ.  
 
• The projected falls in producer prices in the pig and poultry sectors are less pronounced under 
UTL (-4% and -3% respectively), reflecting the more competitive nature of UK prices in these 
sectors.  Projected input costs also exhibit a moderate decline and hence the projected declines 
in production and values of output are relatively modest.   
 
• In the dairy sector, cheese and butter prices also exhibit price declines under UTL+ (-7% and -20% 
respectively).  These price impacts are sensitive to the underlying Baseline projections, including 
a high projected EU butter price relative to its respective world price and the positive influence of 
population growth on UK demand. The projected changes in dairy commodity prices have a 
depressing impact on producer milk prices, e.g. falling by around 8% in England and 6% in Northern 
Ireland.  The declines in producer milk prices have a slight depressing impact on milk production.  
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• In the crop sector, the changes in producer prices are also modest.  For example, the price 
reductions are -2% and -8% for wheat and barley, respectively) since UK prices are fairly close to 
world levels. The price decline is greater for barley compared to wheat since under the Baseline 
there is a significant surplus of the former.  In addition, feed demand is a greater component of 
domestic use for barley and this component falls in response to the decline in livestock numbers.  
Within the rapeseed sector, the impacts of changes in tariffs under the different scenarios are 
expected to be minimal as there is no import tariff on this crop. 
 
• Removing direct payments under UTL hardly affects prices, since the reductions in domestic 
quantities produced are offset by changes in trade flows. The gradual elimination of direct 
payments in conjunction with the unilateral elimination of import tariffs has a further downward 
impact on suckler cow, dairy cow and ewe numbers. Nevertheless, the difference between with 
and without direct payments is more marked under UTL as compared to the UK-EU FTA. 
 
• Adoption of the WTO MNF tariff schedule has significant changes on producer prices, production 
volume, output and trade flows. The impacts mainly depend on the status of the sub-sector 
concerned (e.g., beef, sheep, dairy, pigs, poultry, wheat and barley) and whether the UK is a net 
importer or net exporter of specific commodities. The default bound MFN tariffs are in general 
very high, therefore the imposition of these tariffs leads to significant adjustments in trade 
between the UK and EU.   
 
• In the beef sector, the imposition of high tariffs leads to a collapse in trade between the UK and 
EU.  Available beef supplies within the UK domestic market fall significantly since the UK is a large 
net importer.  As a result, the UK beef price increases markedly (e.g.  17% higher than in Baseline). 
The rise in beef price is sufficient for non-EU countries to export beef to the UK paying the full 
high tariff.  Production responds positively to the price rise.  The projected increases in producer 
price and production, results in a 30% increase in the value of UK beef output. 
 
• Similarly, the UK is a net importer of pig and poultry, hence producer prices increase in response 
to the imposition of high tariffs, which greatly reduce the competitiveness of EU imports.  Price 
increase stimulates rises in production.  Projected butter and cheese prices within the dairy sector 
also rise due to the displacement of imports from the EU-27, which are historically high.  The 
wheat price also increases as the reduction in imports from the EU cannot be easily replaced from 
elsewhere due to the application of high tariffs.  The projected increase in wheat production is 
small due to the observed inelastic relationship between returns and crop production. 
 
• In contrast, under this scenario, lower producer prices are projected in the sheep and barley 
sectors (the UK is a net exporter). The introduction of WTO MFN tariffs diminishes the 
competitiveness and thus the volumes of UK exports to the EU, which leads to increases in 
available supplies within the domestic market.   
 
• The negative price impact is particularly marked in the sheep sector due to the large quantity of 
sheepmeat currently exported to the EU from the UK.  Despite the rechannelling of this produce 
onto the domestic market, the UK continues to import significant volumes of sheepmeat from the 
rest of the world through TRQs.  Although the UK price falls sharply, TRQ imports from the rest of 
the world remain competitive and hence the projected change is limited. The projected fall in the 
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producer price has a depressing impact on UK sheepmeat production and thus on the value of 
output.   
 
• The gradual elimination of direct payments under WTO has a downward impact on livestock 
numbers and production in the beef, dairy and sheep sectors.  However, in the beef sector the 
differential in livestock numbers/production between with and without direct payments is less 
marked under WTO as opposed to UTL and FTA.  This partly reflects the significant increase in 
value of output in this sector when the WTO tariffs are imposed, which diminishes the relative 
importance of direct payments.   
 
• A sensitivity analysis with a 10% and 20% depreciation of the pound has a significant upward 
impact on output prices under the UTL and WTO scenarios.  The transmission of the depreciation 
in the exchange rate and the projected price change is high. Despite the increase in output prices, 
it is estimated that the increases in production within the livestock sectors are small as input costs 
also increase. 
 
Estimated impacts at the farm level: ScotFarm and Budget-Simulation Results 
• The ScotFarm model estimates the impacts (e.g. under the assumption of profit maximisation) of 
the selected trade and domestic agricultural policies on different farm types and sizes across the 
devolved administrations. The estimates show that certain farm types are more vulnerable to 
farmgate price reductions than others. For example, producer price reduction under UTL, when 
direct payments remained unaltered, would affect most famers but particularly the profitability 
of beef and sheep farms.  In contrast some farms would experience increased profitability through 
higher milk, beef and wheat prices under the WTO scenario. The FTA+ scenario has the least 
impact.  
 
• However, there are differences between and within farm types, and across countries, reflecting a 
combination of factors.  Between-type differences largely reflect differential exposure to price 
changes and/or current dependence on direct payments. For example, cereal prices vary by less 
than livestock prices across the scenarios and dairy farms are generally relatively less reliant upon 
direct payments.  
 
• There is also some variation between countries in terms of current support payments and cost 
structures. For example, BPS rates differ across the UK and, reflecting variation in land quality and 
remoteness, farm areas and input prices are not uniform. However, some reported variation also 
arises as an artefact of the farm type classification. Although some farms are genuinely single-
enterprise specialists, many have two or more different activities. For example, livestock and 
cereal enterprises may co-exist, as can dairy and beef enterprises.  Consequently, many farms’ 
output comprises a combination of activities.  
 
• The elimination of direct payments will potentially have significant effects on farm profitability.  
This is true for all farm types and the magnitude of projected reductions in farm income are such 
that the viability of many farms, particularly beef and sheep, is questionable under any trade 
scenario if direct payments are removed.   
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• Within the aggregate results, there is some variation across different farm sizes and between 
countries. The latter reflects differences in farming systems arising from geographical (e.g. 
climate, soil) and structural characteristics (e.g. enterprise mix).  For example, Scottish dairy farms 
more commonly have beef enterprises than English dairy farms.  Variation in impacts across farm 
sizes probably reflect economies of scale and scope. Farm income gains and losses are essentially  
proportional to farm size.   
 
• In terms of production patterns, ScotFarm allows for adjustments within the current farming 
system and the results reveal varying degrees of responsiveness. In general, significant 
adjustments only occur under the more extreme scenarios, where prices move beyond their 
observed range and/or direct payments are removed. For example, reductions in sheep numbers 
by up to 100% under WTO and UTL scenarios, particularly without support payments, on some 
Less Favoured Areas and lowland grazing farms of all sizes in all countries. 
 
• A farm-level budgetary simulation model was used for comparative static analysis of the 
distribution of scenario impacts across a representative sample of 2,718 commercial farms 
businesses drawn from the UK Farm Business Surveys. The financial results of the simulations 
included the projected distributions for Farm Business Income (FBI) and Cash Income under each 
scenario by UK nation and main farm enterprise. 
 
• Under the FTA+ scenario, when direct payments were maintained, estimated mean incomes were 
virtually identical to their baseline levels.  The WTO+ scenario increased mean FBI by between 
32% (Wales) and 85% (Northern Ireland) due to the elevating effects of tariffs on most domestic 
farm prices. In contrast the UTL+ scenario reduced mean FBI by between 52% (England) and 130% 
(Scotland) as liberalised trade exposed UK agriculture to greater international competition and 
reduced commodity prices.  
 
• Given the important contribution of direct payments to baseline farm income their removal 
resulted in sharp declines in farm income. Under FTA- the average FBI declined by between 58% 
(England) and 135% (Scotland), with an average reduction of 69% for the UK as a whole. Under 
WTO-, increases in output prices almost fully offset the loss of direct support on average farm 
income for England and Northern Ireland. This contrasted with a less favourable potential 
outcome in Wales and Scotland where incomes remained well below baseline levels.  
 
• The results highlighted the potential variation in scenario impacts across the UK. Notably, impacts 
were less negative, on average, for England compared to the UK as a whole. Scotland stood out as 
most vulnerable to the Brexit scenarios and, even on a Cash Income basis, average Scottish farm 
incomes became substantially negative under UTL-. 
 
• Analysis by farm type shows that under FTA+, average FBI and Cash Income per farm remained 
very similar to their baseline levels, reflecting the modest price changes under this scenario. The 
WTO scenarios resulted in a more than doubling of average incomes for dairy and pig farms due 
mainly to projected increases in milk and pig meat prices. For other farm types, income remained 
at or slightly above the baseline when direct payments were maintained (WTO+) but declined 
sharply below the baseline when these were removed (WTO-).  
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• UTL was identified as the most challenging scenario across all farm types, especially for those 
involved in beef and sheep production.  The impact was particularly severe where UTL was 
combined with removal of direct support (UTL-), particularly for grazing livestock farms, which on 
average, had negative margins even when defined on a Cash Income basis. This highlights the 
specific vulnerability of beef and sheep enterprises to international competition and the 
significant dependence of their farm income on Pillar 1 direct payments. 
 
• Across the UK around 15% of businesses were loss making in the baseline FBI distribution. The 
FTA+ scenario resulted in income distributions that were virtually unchanged relative to the 
baseline. FTA-, UTL+ and WTO- increased the proportion of loss-making businesses based on FBI 
to between about 40% (England) and 60% (Scotland). On a Cash Income basis the proportion of 
loss-making businesses under these scenarios ranged from 20% (England) to 30% (Scotland). 
 
• WTO scenario had greatest impact on the shape of the income distribution curves as price 
increases under this trade scenario were relatively more advantageous to larger or more 
profitable farming businesses at the upper end of income distribution.  
 
• UTL- (extreme trade liberalisation coupled with Pillar 1 removal) was the most challenging 
scenario for farm businesses. In FBI terms the proportion of loss-making businesses under UTL- 
ranged from 62% (England) to 90% (Scotland). Even on a Cash Income basis the proportion of loss 
making businesses was about 50% for the UK as a whole.  
 
• The financial variables showed that farms in the worst affected quintile (e.g. beef and sheep) 
tended to have lower financial performance in the baseline with much lower average performance 
ratio, FBI and Cash income. Importantly, they tended to have substantially lower levels of 
diversification relative to farms in the least affected quintile. 
 
• There was little variation in the proportion of rented land across the quintiles and likewise average 
age of farmers was very similar across the quintiles. Farms in the least affected quintile (e.g. 
cropping, pigs, poultry and horticulture) tended to have a higher proportion of hired labour 
(relative to family labour) which reflected their larger average business size. 
 
• The results also identified a greater concentration of English farms in the least affected quintile 
while Scottish farm were more heavily represented in the worst affected quintile. 
 
• We also estimated the potential effects of the selected UK trade and domestic agricultural policy 
scenarios on the welfare of farm households, at regional (devolved administrations) and national 
level by employing a farm household viability model (Viability-Sustainability-Vulnerability or Via-
Sus-Vul).  
 
• Results show that depending on the scenario, and particularly the retention or elimination of 
direct payments as currently provided, the impact varies significantly across farm types and the 
devolved administrations.  
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• For example, under the Baseline Scenario, only 29% of the farms in England are viable, as oposed 
to 22 in Northern Ireland, 21% in Wales and  14% in Scotland. However, the viability ratings of 
farms increase (under WTO+), particularly farms in NI, due to the effect of tariffs on most domestic 
farm prices.  
 
• The vulnerability of many farms is more pronounced when the removal of direct payments takes 
place. Notably, our findings by country, show farms in Scotland as the most vulnerable to Brexit 
scenarios. The negative impacts are lower, on average, in England when compared to the other 
UK countries.  
 
• The viability assessment by farmer’s age also shows that farms with income support 
managed/owned by relatively young farmers (35-44 years) have higher viability ratings under 
WTO+ scenario across all devolved administrations. This contrasts with households where farmers 
are 64 years and above, for which the estimates of viability ratings are lower. 
 
• Given the substantial contribution of direct payments to farm income, their removal amplifies 
farm vulnerability. Hence, off-farm income is critical in safe-guarding the economic welfare of 
most UK farm households. 
 
 
 
Concluding remarks  
 
• There are notable divergences between the projections of the macro (CGE) and sector (PE- FAPRI) 
models and the farm level analysis. Both the CGE and PE estimates imply that UK Agriculture and 
its sectors can certainly survive, and in some cases may prosper, even under the harshest (UTL) 
conditions following Brexit. However, we note that they do not model any short-run adjustment 
and adaptation costs; rather they reflect the effects of these changes on an on-going and more or 
less fully adjusted basis. Their production responses (structural adjustment) are based on 
equations derived from historical data and/or assumptions about the degree to which direct 
payments are decoupled from production. This limitation must be noted when evaluating 
projections for scenarios that represent such significant divergence from past experience. 
 
• The farm level analysis clearly demonstrates that Brexit, especially the removal of direct payments 
would affect severely many farms, especially beef and sheep. The principal explanation of this 
critical difference is that the macro and sector level models reflect the major elements of 
structural adjustment within the industry (PE) and between the industry and the rest of the 
economy (CGE). Farm-level analysis confirms the likely pressures for structural adjustments, but 
does not model their manifestation.  
 
• Their production responses (structural adjustment) are Moreover, the equations used to derive 
production responses in these models are necessarily estimated from historical data; this 
limitation must be noted when evaluating projections for scenarios that represent such dramatic 
divergence from past experience.” 
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• Brexit would have significant implications for UK agriculture, a sector with strong trade links to 
the EU and reliance on CAP income support.  Moreover, the impact will be far from uniform, with 
large variation across the sectors and the devolved administrations. The consequences of Brexit 
for UK agriculture will depend upon (at least) two major factors: trade agreements or lack of them 
and changes in domestic agricultural policy, i.e. retaining or maintaining of direct payments.  
 
• Trade negotiations with the EU and the RoW will be paramount, and the impact of trade 
agreements on the sector is conditioned by the degree of trade competitiveness (i.e. relative 
tariffs) and trade openness. It also depends on the status of the sub-sector concerned (e.g., beef, 
sheep, dairy, pigs, poultry, wheat and barley) and whether the UK is a net importer or net exporter 
of specific commodities.  
 
• These trade effects, however, might be overshadowed by the exchange rate and possible labour 
market changes and other non-tariff barriers (beyond the remit of this project, hence not 
considered in this report).  
 
• In macroeconomic terms the impacts that arise from the scenarios are relatively small. This is 
because average tariffs in the wider economy between the UK and EU, as well as the assumed 
trade cost increases, are only moderate for the majority of UK economic activities. In those 
scenarios where larger tariffs and/or trade cost shocks occur, these effects are typically restricted 
to agrifood industries, which constitute only a small share of the UK GDP.   
 
• At the sector level, different sectors will be affected in various ways according to the different 
trade scenarios. Even a relatively ‘soft’ Brexit, a free trade agreement with the EU close to current 
arrangements (i.e. FTA+), would create some disruption to trade flows, albeit with estimated 
market impacts that are relatively small.  
 
• In the case of products where the UK is a net importer (e.g. beef) the imposition of tariffs reduces 
the competitiveness of the imported product resulting in higher domestic producer prices in the 
UK. The converse applies for products where the UK is a net exporter (e.g. sheep and barley) to 
the EU. 
 
• Given the dependence of many UK farms on direct payments, their removal, predictably, worsens 
the negative impacts of new trade arrangements and off-sets positive impacts. The elimination of 
direct payments will affect most farm businesses but the magnitude varies by farm type and 
devolved administration. 
 
• The negative impact on farm business income is reflected across all trade scenarios, especially UTL 
with or without direct payments. Average farm income varies significantly across the devolved 
administrations and by farm type, with most farms worse off (relative to the baseline) under all 
scenarios but one, WTO+. Noticeably, under this scenario dairy farms will particularly benefit as 
their average farm income could almost triple as compared to the baseline scenario. Beef and 
sheep farms will be the most affected under UTL-.  
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• Our extreme free trade scenario (UTL) leads to some striking results regarding farm income 
distribution. Whereas 15-20 percent of the farms were not making any money at all (even in the 
baseline scenario), this rises to 45 percent under the UTL scenario with direct payments still in 
place (UTL+).   The elimination of direct payments further increases this figure to 70 percent. 
 
• Raising agricultural productivity closer to the all-economy average will require reallocating less 
productive resources (e.g., poor quality land, unskilled labour) to other uses including provision of 
public goods) and utilising remaining resources more effectively. 
 
• Our sensitivity analysis at the farm level shows that, for example, by increasing productivity by 10 
per cent across beef and sheep will indeed lead to a sizeable increase to in farm business income 
under all trade scenarios.  However, this improvement in productivity would not be sufficient to 
offset the removal of direct payments nor the projected price decline under UTL.  
 
• Price projections, direct payments and off-farm income, largely influence variability in the levels 
of viability, sustainability and vulnerability across farm types and between the devolved 
administrations. Especially, given the substantial contribution of CAP direct payments to farm 
income, their removal amplifies farm vulnerability. Furthermore, the combination of trade 
liberalisation and removal of direct payments increases the proportion of vulnerable farms. 
Hence, the presence of off-farm income is critical in safe-guarding the economic welfare of most 
UK farm households. 
 
• Our models do not address the economic impacts of Brexit on the supply chain per se. Thus, it is 
difficult to predict exactly how these trade and domestic policy scenarios will affect the entire UK 
food supply chain, particularly consumers. However, UK food prices will depend not only on the 
tariff schedule put in place in the UK, but also the value of the pound in foreign exchange markets. 
A fall back to WTO terms would increase significantly domestic food prices which would 
particularly affect those with least disposable income. Lower (or no) tariffs (under FTA and UTL 
scenarios) could leave food prices unchanged or lower, so benefiting consumers, at least in the 
short term.  
 
• Irrespective of the international or domestic constraints on their adoption, our modelling results 
suggest that different policy options raise a number of issues.   In particular, our farm-level analysis 
implies significant pressure for structural adjustment as and when direct payments are eliminated.  
The immediate impacts on farm income are such that farm businesses and households would be 
expected to react by seeking to improve on-farm efficiency and/or search for alternative income 
sources, in some cases by leaving farming.   
 
• Although our models do not provide any explicit outcomes about the likely nature of structural 
change, the national (CGE) and sectoral (UK-FAPRI) models imply that structural adjustment will 
continue to occur, leading to resource reallocations and changes in the level and composition of 
output.  Such structural adjustment has implications in terms of the availability of raw materials 
for food manufacturing, levels of local economic activity and environmental impacts, all of which 
may lead to demands for further policy responses.   
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1. Introduction1 
 
1.1. An overview of the project 
 
Despite representing less than 1% of the UK economy, agriculture is firmly woven into the social fabric 
of our countryside. It supplies 60% of domestic food demand and supports downstream and upstream 
industries which contribute over £100 billion to the economy. The industry also shapes landscapes, 
habitats and biodiversity, and has considerable political importance. There is little doubt that the UK 
agri-food sector will be one of those most seriously affected by Brexit. Not only is it dependent on 
trade relations both with the European Union (EU) and with the Rest of the World (RoW) (both by 
tariff status, and non-tariff barriers relating to health and safety and product provenance), but it is 
also a sector heavily dependent on (permanent and seasonal) migrant labour, and the most heavily 
subsidised and regulated under the present Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The current 
Westminster government is, through its Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 
and the UK Treasury,  trying to reassure British farmers and the larger public that Brexit is a once in a 
life-time opportunity to replace the ‘fundamentally flawed’ CAP with ‘our own national food policy, 
our own agriculture policy, …, shaped by our own collective interests’ (Secretary of State Michael 
Gove, 2018). Since Mr. Gove outlined his vision for a ‘UK Agriculture Policy’ in January 2018, at the 
Oxford Farming Conference, the government has produced its Agriculture Bill2, which currently is 
under Parliamentary scrutiny. This aims to mark a radical departure from how agricultural policy has 
operated for the last 45 years since the country joined the European Economic Community in 1973. 
Specifically, support for agricultural production and farm income (i.e. direct payments) will be 
progressively phased out and replaced with a more targeted support for efficiency improvements, 
productivity growth and rewards for public goods. To allow businesses to adjust to the new policy 
framework, farmers are guaranteed a “seven-year agricultural transition (beyond the 2021-month 
transition period set out in the EU Withdrawal Agreement)”, and to receive the same level of subsidy 
(as under the CAP) until the end of 2022 (Michael Gove, 2019). In Defra’s words the “Government 
wants to transform agriculture policy through the Agriculture Bill by paying farmers and land 
managers to deliver environmental public goods”3.  To allow farm businesses to adjust to the new 
policy framework, UK farmers are guaranteed a “seven-year agricultural transition (beyond the 2021-
month transition period set out in the EU Withdrawal Agreement)”, and to receive the same level of 
subsidy (as under the CAP) until the end of 2022 (Michael Gove, 2019).  
 
Despite these efforts, the lack of concrete policy decisions and the uncertainty that surrounds the 
terms of negotiations (both in terms of the Withdrawal Agreement and future trade relationships) 
with the EU make UK farmers and rural communities very anxious indeed. Thus, how future UK 
Agricultural Policy (UKAP) will look after the country leaves the EU and what the economic and social 
implications of Brexit will be, remain open to debate and academic research.    
 
 
                                                          
1 The chapter was written extensively by Carmen Hubbard. 
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/landmark-agriculture-bill-to-deliver-a-green-brexit 
3https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/740670/agri-bill-
evidence-paper.pdf, last accessed 03 December 2018. 
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Research synthesis, user engagement and research are needed to support and inform negotiations 
and policy development for the sector following Brexit. A few notable studies (Boulanger and 
Philippidis, 2015; Van Berkum et al., 2016; Davis et al., 2017 and Bradley and Hill, 2017) have assessed 
the potential effects of exit on the UK agricultural sector using different scenarios and assumptions. 
However, there remains an absence of more comprehensive research including analysis of variation 
in the effects of different trade and domestic policy options across heterogeneous farm populations 
and, regionally, among the UK devolved administrations. Moreover, with the exception of the UK Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) team (Moss et al., 2009), there is no significant 
quantitative policy assessment tool kit in the UK which can be called on to develop this necessary 
capacity, and there is limited ‘joining up’ of policy expertise to provide cohesive analysis of Brexit 
scenarios for UK agriculture. These gaps are addressed in this priority grant project, Brexit: How might 
UK Agriculture Thrive or Survive?, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 
Specifically, the project assesses the economic impacts of a selected number of UK agricultural policy 
scenarios following Brexit by integrating state of the art economic modelling approaches at macro, 
sector and farm levels. It also aims to provide the UK Government, its devolved administrations and 
other stakeholders (e.g. levy boards, farmers and farmers’ organisations) with a cohesive and robust 
analytic capacity to support future policy decision making.  
 
The project harnesses existing model frameworks and expertise to integrate trade and 
macroeconomic relationships with the structure and performance of the UK agricultural sector and to 
disaggregate macro and sector projections to the farm level. Hence, the possible effects of new trade 
and domestic policy alternatives are estimated using both an agriculture specific variant of the well-
known Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
(Philippidis et al., 2007 and Philippidis and Kitou, 2012), and the UK-FAPRI partial equilibrium model 
(Moss et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2017).  
 
We employ both approaches for a limited range of potential policy scenarios, to provide sector-wide 
economic estimates of the possible consequences of Brexit (e.g. supply, demand, prices, exports, 
imports and welfare). However, in practice, the effects of Brexit will materialise as farmers adjust and 
adapt their businesses to the new policy environment and its effects. These ground level adaptations 
drive the sector consequences and mediate the feedbacks through their interactions in the local and 
national output, labour, capital and land markets. While both the partial and general equilibrium 
models seek to reflect these complex interactions through their specification of the behaviour of these 
markets, they cannot identify specific ground level effects. Consequently, we disaggregate sectoral 
projections using farm-level models to assess impacts of Brexit scenarios on production decisions and 
farm household incomes. At the farm level, we employ two modelling frameworks to estimate effects 
among farm households across UK countries and within major farm types. We also explore how to 
reconcile and interpret the macro, sector and farm level results, and their implications for UK 
agricultural policy development post Brexit. The research took place between April 2017 and 
September 2018.  
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1.2. Specific research objectives and questions 
 
As stipulated in the ESRC research proposal, the study is structured around six major objectives:   
1. To develop UK Agricultural Policy (UKAP) scenarios following Brexit through consultation and 
engagement with relevant stakeholders; 
2. To apply and compare general and partial equilibrium models in providing aggregate 
projections of the impacts of these scenarios on UK agriculture at the sector level.  
3. To assess the impacts of UKAP scenarios on farm production decisions and financial 
performance across the distribution of holdings within major farm types in the UK. 
4. To explore the effects of UKAP scenarios on the economic welfare of farm households in 
‘sensitive’ segments of the farming population.  
5. To reconcile and interpret the macro, sector and farm level results, and their implications for 
UKAP development post Brexit. 
6. To disseminate the research outcomes to policy makers and those most affected: industry, 
farmers and farmers’ organisations, and also the general public. 
 
These were further organised around five sequential but overlapping phases and disaggregated into 
the following specific research questions:  
  
Phase 1 (Objective 1): Developing UKAP scenarios following Brexit through consultation and 
engagement with relevant stakeholders 
 
- What limited number of policy scenarios most clearly and realistically depicts future 
agricultural and trade policy options following Brexit?  
- What are the critical issues raised by these options for UK agriculture and its stakeholders? 
 
Phase 2 (Objective 2): Applying and comparing general and partial equilibrium models and providing 
aggregate projections of the impacts of these scenarios on UK agriculture at the sector level. 
- What are the aggregate projections of the impacts of these scenarios on UK agriculture at the 
sector and regional levels?  
- How do the general and partial equilibrium models’ projections differ?  
- How can any differences be reconciled?  
 
Phase 3 (Objective 3): Assessing the impacts of UKAP scenarios on farm production decisions and 
financial performance across the distribution of holdings within major farm types in the UK. 
 
- What are the impacts on farm production decisions? 
- What are the effects on commercial performance across major farm types in the UK? 
- How will these impacts vary within and across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland?  
 
Phase 4 (Objective 4): Exploring the effects of Brexit scenarios on the welfare of farm households in 
‘vulnerable’ segments of the farming population 
 
- What are the effects of UKAP scenarios on the economic welfare of farm households? 
- Who are the most ‘vulnerable’ segments within the farming population?  
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Phase 5 (Objective 5): Reconciliation and interpretation of the macro, sector and farm level results, 
and their implications for UKAP post Brexit.   
 
- How do sector and farm level projections of policy scenario consequences compare? 
- How might farm level adjustments be reconciled with sector level projections? 
 
 
 
1.3. Project team and Research methods: A brief description  
 
The project comprises a strong team with unique expertise in modelling and policy analysis of 
agricultural and trade policies, and research on the EU CAP. Our expertise spans agricultural 
economics, international trade, econometrics and policy analysis. Carmen Hubbard (Newcastle 
University), the project leader, was supported by : Michael Wallace (Newcastle University and 
University College Dublin); David Harvey (Newcastle University); Mercy Ojo (Newcastle University); 
Andrew Moxey (Newcastle University); Charles Scott (Farm Business Survey Northern England, 
Newcastle University); Shailesh Shrestha (Scotland’s Rural College); Siyi Feng (Agri-Food and 
Biosciences Institute, Northern Ireland); Myles Patton (Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute, Northern 
Ireland); John Davis (Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute, Northern Ireland) and George Philippidis 
(independent consultant). The team had also benefited from the expertise of Anne Liddon, Science 
Communications Manager at Newcastle University. One of the major strengths of this study was the 
academic engagement with a highly focused Advisory Panel of policy experts who guided the whole 
project: Ian Bailey (Savills Ltd); Sarah Baker (AHDB); Jonathan Baker (CLA); Graeme Beale (Scottish 
Government); Michael Bourne (Defra); Paul Caskie (DAERA Northern Ireland); Richard Haw (Scottish 
Government); Tom Keen (NFU); Rebecca Hesketh (NFU); Peter Midmore (University of Aberystwyth); 
Neil Paull (Welsh Government). Graham Redman (Andersons Consultants); and Ken Thomson 
(University of Aberdeen)4.  
 
The figure below captures the project design across its major objectives. This is followed by a brief 
description of the research methods by phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Not every member on the panel was able to attend all project meetings. 
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Figure 1.1.1. The project general framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1: Developing UKAP scenarios following Brexit through consultation and engagement with 
relevant stakeholders (Leaders: C Hubbard and D Harvey)  
 
A brief literature review and the opening workshop with our Advisory Panel (May 2017) led to the 
selection of a limited number of trade and domestic policy scenarios (Chapter 2). The scenarios were 
chosen to represent a broad range of feasible options for: i) trade relations with the EU and the Rest 
of World; ii) domestic UK policy for direct payments to farmers (currently the Basic Payments Scheme).  
The UKAP scenarios are very similar (but not identical) to those used by van Berkum et al., 2016.  We 
modelled three selected trade policy scenarios (Table 1) with (+) and without (-) direct payments, in 
order to distinguish between the trade and domestic policy effects: (i) UK-EU Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA); (ii) Unilateral Trade Liberalisation (UTL); and (iii) a fall back to World Trade Organisation tariffs 
(EU Tariffs Schedule - WTO). These are modelled against a Baseline scenario which assumes that the 
UK remains fully integrated in the Single Market and the Customs Union, with direct payments in 
place. In addition to the main analysis, sensitivity analysis has been undertaken with regards to two 
other major conditioning factors for the economic effects of Brexit policy on UK Agriculture: i) 
restrictions on migrant labour; and ii) the sterling exchange rate, both with the Euro and with the US 
dollar.  
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 5  
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Table 1.1. Selected UKAP Trade Scenarios 
FTA UTL WTO 
• Comprehensive UK/EU FTA 
with UK-EU tariffs at zero 
• UK adopts the EU common 
tariff schedule on RoW 
imports  
• UK maintains share of EU 
Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) 
applying to RoW imports 
• Additional trade costs of 
5% (livestock) and 2% 
(crops) for UKEU trade 
flows 
• Elimination of all UK import 
tariffs for RoW including 
imports from the EU 
• UK-EU exports subject to EU 
Common Custom Tariffs (CCT) 
• TRQs on UK-EU exports 
• additional trade costs of 10% 
(livestock) and 5% (crops) for 
UKEU trade flows 
• no agreement by March 
2019, hence a fall back to 
WTO terms and current EU 
tariff schedules 
• UK trading with EU and RoW 
under WTO Most Favoured 
Nation (MNF) tariffs 
• requires a UK allocation of a 
share of the current EU tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs) with the 
RoW  
• additional trade costs of 8% 
and 4% for livestock & crop 
products for UKEU trade 
flows  
 
 
Phase 2:  Applying and comparing general and partial equilibrium models and providing aggregate 
projections of the impacts of these scenarios on UK agriculture at the sector level. (Leaders: D Harvey 
and C Hubbard)  
 
Two existing, independent and internationally recognised models, i.e. GTAP (Task Leader: G 
Philippidis) and FAPRI-UK (Task Leader: M Patton) were used to generate projections of the aggregate 
and sector level consequences of the Brexit scenarios established in Phase 1 (Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4). The CGE model is calibrated to release nine of the GTAP database (Narayanan et al., 2015) with 
information on cost and demand structures, gross bilateral trade data, transport costs, and trade 
protection for 57 activities in 140 regions, for the year 2011. In explicitly representing the input-output 
relationships among various sectors, the model assesses the knock-on impacts on the wider economy 
given a policy change in a particular sector.  Applying common scenario assumptions, disaggregated 
commodity-level projections for prices, production and trade flows are then estimated with the UK-
FAPRI partial equilibrium model. To ensure some degree of comparison between the two models, a 
softlink was developed between them, in the sense that the CGE Baseline was calibrated based on the 
projections (i.e. production results trends) from the FAPRI model. Additionally, an Advisory Board 
meeting was held in December 2017 to discuss and interpret the results of these two models on the 
prospects for UK agriculture under different Brexit scenarios. 
 
Phase 3: Assessing the impacts of UKAP scenarios on farm production decisions and financial 
performance across the distribution of holdings within major farm types in the UK (Leader S Shrestha) 
 
The CGE and UK-FAPRI models (Phase 2) are linked to a series of representative farm-level models to 
assess the effects of Brexit scenarios on production decisions and profitability of UK farms. Results 
from the aggregate models underpin key assumptions in the farm models, the values of which are 
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treated as exogenous. These include factor price projections (e.g. land rents and wages) from the CGE 
model and output and direct-input price projections from the UK-FAPRI model. The most extensive 
farm-level policy modelling system within the UK (ScotFarm) has been developed at Scotland’s Rural 
College (SRUC). The model employs a linear programming framework developed to assess the impacts 
of agricultural policy changes on Scottish farms. Specifically, using data from the Scottish Farm 
Accountancy Survey it estimates production and financial metrics for a large sample of representative 
farms. This project extended the geographic coverage of the SRUC model to include Northern Ireland, 
England and Wales, hence to reflect the regional variations in production systems as well as 
enhancement to model scenarios concerning future UKAP (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
 
 
Phase 4: Exploring the effects of Brexit scenarios on the welfare of farm households in ‘sensitive’ 
segments of the farming population (Leader: M Wallace) 
 
This phase complements and augments the modelling, in Phase 3, by providing a more holistic 
economic welfare analysis of Brexit impacts within a farm household context. Specifically, using UK 
Farm Business Survey (FBS) data for three consecutive years (2013/14 - 2015/16), it models (at an 
individual level) all farm businesses and estimates the potential effects of the Brexit scenarios on the 
distribution of farm income across UK and the devolved administrations and by main farm enterprise 
(Chapter 6). It also decomposes the estimated impacts for the projected changes in farm business 
income under each scenario using a series of regression equations. Furthermore, by employing a 
viability typology (O’Donoghue et al., 2015) it recognises the viability, sustainability and vulnerability 
associated with the pluri-active nature of many farm households, where farming production and 
income are usually combined with other non-farm income sources (Chapter 7). In addition, some 
sensitivity analysis is carried out to explore indirect impacts of scenarios on factor markets, particularly 
land and labour.  
 
 
Phase 5 Reconciliation and interpretation of the macro, sector and farm level results, and their 
implications for UKAP post Brexit (Leader: D Harvey and C Hubbard) 
 
This phase integrates and reconciles the projections of the consequences of the Brexit scenarios 
(Phase 1) from the two aggregate and sector models (Phase 2), and also between these implications 
and the farm and household effects (Phase 3 and 4). An Advisory Board workshop took place in June 
2018 to consider and develop the reconciliations and interpretations. The overall results were 
presented and discussed at a workshop organised by AHDB and Newcastle University (September 
2018) that brought together over 40 participants of high calibre across the industry, policy-makers and 
academia (Chapter 8). However, we do acknowledge that this phase (as the project as a whole) has 
caveats. At least two major reasons support the differences and acknowledge some of the caveats of 
our study. First, the representation of supply and demand responses, and hence trade flows and 
resulting prices, differs substantially between the models. FAPRI represents these responses through 
specific product (sector) supply and demand equations, and associated trade equations, based on 
econometric examination of past histories of supply and demand responses to prices (and other major 
determinants). Whereas, the CGE model represents these same market forces through constructed 
consumer demand (utility) functions and production possibility functions, albeit calibrated to 
correspond to actual production and consumption levels. Since Brexit might generate rather different 
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responses in both production and consumption than have been observed in the past, neither model 
can be regarded, a priori, as more ‘correct’ than the other, but each generates somewhat different 
results as a consequence of their internal specification and calibration. Second, and more important, 
differences in model outcomes reflect the partial versus general specification of the models. FAPRI 
largely ignores the second-round effects of changes in primary production levels on factor, input and 
more or less related product markets, other than as reflected in historical (econometric) product 
supply and demand relationships. In contrast, CGE, explicitly includes these second (and subsequent) 
round effects.  In general, it is expected that these second-round effects will tend to dissipate the first-
round effects somewhat, though in specific (though a priori unspecified) instances, these second-
round effects may compound the primary effects. Although it is possible, in principle, to design ‘hard 
linkages’ between partial and general equilibrium effects, to ensure that supply and demand 
responses reflected in the two models are similar, there was little point in doing so for this project, on 
two major grounds.  First, there is no logical or empirical reason to suppose that any one reflection of 
the underlying market forces is inherently superior to another.  Second, and pragmatically important, 
a hard linkage is technically much more demanding in extra time and resources, and was outside the 
scope of the present project.  
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2. Selected Trade and Domestic Policy Scenarios5 
 
This Chapter addresses Phase 1 of the project, i.e. developing UKAP scenarios following Brexit through 
consultation and engagement with relevant stakeholders. It focuses on the identification of a limited 
number of policy scenarios that most realistically may depict the future agricultural and trade policy 
options following Brexit, and the critical issues raised by these options for UK agriculture and its 
stakeholders.  
2.1. Rationale 
 
This section describes the rationale and justification for, and choice of, the limited range of Brexit 
scenarios for this project. The direct consultation and engagement with relevant stakeholders for our 
scenario development took place in Newcastle on 23 May 2017, during the opening meeting of the 
project team with our Advisory Panel.  Additionally, we considered a number of public expressions of 
the major dimensions of Brexit possibilities and issues, especially as comprehensively documented 
and discussed in the House of Lords (HoL) European Union Committee’s Brexit: Agriculture report (HoL 
paper 169, May 2017). The selection of scenarios is limited by the extent to which the macro and 
sector models can reflect the implications of possible changes, as well as by the project resources and 
time-frame. The scenarios are chosen to represent the range of feasible options for: i) trade relations 
with the EU and the Rest of the World; ii) domestic UK policy for direct payments to farmers (currently 
the Basic Payments Scheme); iii) labour availability and costs (mainly relevant to the macro CGE 
model). 
We recognize that restricting attention to these three major dimensions ignores Brexit implications 
and options for both environmental policies and also for market, product and process regulations. We 
justify our restricted focus on two major grounds.  First, neither of our sector or macro models is able 
to reflect either environmental policies or the extent and effects of changes in market, product and 
process regulations in sufficient detail to warrant specific attention to these dimensions of Brexit 
options at the sector and macro levels. Second, exploration, dissemination and explanation of the 
possible options and their potential consequences over these dimensions in addition to the major 
trade and support policy dimensions would be both over-ambitious and largely impractical within the 
scope of this project. In addition, we consider that the implications of potential changes in both of 
these dimensions to be largely additive rather than strongly inter-active with changes in the trade, 
support and labour dimensions, at least in the first instance. 
 
2.2. Conception and Specification of Brexit Scenarios 
 
Three important features of the sector level analysis need to be emphasized at the outset.  First, unlike 
most economic policy analysis, the status quo option, which normally forms a sensible Baseline, is not 
a realistic option in this case – the UK is to leave the EU (at the time of writing).  Nevertheless, present 
circumstances, and hence model reflections of these circumstances, are conditioned on UK 
membership of the EU, the Single Market and the CAP. Hence, the only feasible Baseline available to 
analysts is that of continued membership of the EU. 
                                                          
5 This chapter was extensively written by David Harvey. 
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Second, our scenarios are not intended to represent alternative forecasts or predictions of the actual 
outcomes of the UK/EU negotiations for either Article 50 or future trade relations and transition 
arrangements. The purpose of our scenarios is to represent the major characteristics of a range of 
possible negotiation outcomes specifically with reference to agriculture. Our model results of the 
scenarios relative either to the Baseline or to each other are not predictions of Brexit consequences. 
Rather, they are highly conditional projections of the effects of specific scenario variations, assuming 
that nothing else changes. In reality, many things will change, either as a consequence of or 
coincidentally with Brexit in March 2019. Specifically, with respect to agriculture, national and 
personal incomes, employment rates, exchange rates and interest rates will all change after 2019.  
Forecasts of the condition of UK agriculture after Brexit would require prediction of all these 
coincidental and consequential changes in macro-economic conditions, which is outside the scope of 
the present project. 
Third, our modelling frameworks are inherently and explicitly ‘equilibrium’ in nature. We do not 
pretend to be able to represent the dynamic evolution, adjustment paths and processes of even the 
highly complex and multifaceted agri-food systems in Europe and the rest of the world, let alone the 
macro-economic and trade systems within which the agri-food systems are embedded. The models 
we use are analytical simplifications. They are intended to illustrate the principles on which we believe 
markets behave – essentially to balance supply with demand given current production possibilities, 
consumer preferences, market structures, transaction costs and trade possibilities. Although both 
models (CGE and FAPRI) include some dynamical adjustment – lagged responses and feedbacks – and 
hence are typically run over a number of periods (years), specific annual outcomes can only be 
interpreted as the model representations of the consistent effects of the market-equilibrating 
processes given the precise (but necessarily) general policy conditions specified in the scenarios. Thus, 
the model outcomes are best considered as the logical consequences of the specific features of the 
chosen scenarios, and not as coherent forecasts of the future. 
 
2.2.1. Baseline 
 
Our Baseline assumes continued membership of an unchanged EU Single Market and CAP as envisaged 
in 2019/20, but with no projected changes to the CAP or EU or UK trade relations beyond 2019. Each 
of the models is based on Global Insight macro-economic projections, supplemented by data sources 
from the World Bank as necessary. Each is run over a modelling period from 2017 to 2026, with Brexit 
scenarios beginning in 2019, where the outcomes in the final year represent the longer-run 
projections of the consequences of the scenarios. The Brexit scenarios are developed for, first, the 
UK’s trade relations, and second for the UK (and implicitly for devolved administration) domestic 
agricultural support policy. 
 
2.2.2. Trade Relations Scenarios 
 
Against this Baseline, we consider three general trade relation scenarios which are designed to cover 
the range of possibilities which appear (Summer 2017) to embrace the possible outcomes of the 
UK/EU negotiations. In practice, as even a casual reading of trade agreements and associated disputes 
will testify, any trade agreement is highly complex. Our scenarios do not attempt to replicate this 
complexity and associated specificity and are intended only as a highly simplified and stylised 
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representation of the general frameworks of such potential agreements. Otherwise, both specification 
and modelling of these new and as yet unspecified relations is impossible. 
 
2.2.2.1. UK-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
 
This trade scenario represents a comprehensive UK/EU Free Trade Agreement, with UK-EU tariffs at 
zero. For relations with the rest of the world (RoW), this scenario assumes that the UK also adopts the 
EU Common Custom Tariff schedule (CCT) on RoW imports, and that the UK has a share of existing EU 
Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) applying to these RoW imports. However, since only the poultry TRQ has 
been close to being fully utilized, these quotas are not expected to be significant for this scenario. This 
scenario can be considered as a possible transition agreement, pending the development of further 
trade agreements between the UK and the rest of the world, as well as the UK’s adoption of existing 
EU/RoW trade agreements. It does envisage the UK’s departure from the Single Market, and hence 
raises the probability that there would be some additional trade facilitation costs affecting UK-EU 
trade. The 2017 HoL report (Brexit: Agriculture) outlines these considerations (p.30ff) related to the 
harmonization, mutual recognition or agreed equivalence of product and process standards, which 
are particularly relevant to agricultural and food trade, and to many of the inputs to the food system. 
While this scenario (FTA) implies that most of these standards and protocols would continue largely 
as at present, it is reasonable to assume that the UK-EU agreement could not exactly replicate the 
present complete Single Market harmonization without additional costs and thus (in effect) 
impediments to UK/EU trade. Since these impediments are generally likely to be more onerous in the 
livestock than the crop sectors, this scenario applies an admittedly arbitrary 5% and 2% additional 
trade facilitation cost respectively to EU/UK trade flows for these products, implying somewhat lower 
prices in the UK than the EU.6 
 
2.2.2.2. Unilateral Trade Liberalisation (UTL) 
 
To reflect comprehensive trade agreements between the UK and the RoW after Brexit, this scenario 
adds elimination of all tariffs between the UK and the RoW (an obviously extreme free-trade scenario), 
including imports from the EU.  Such a scenario would necessarily involve extensive controls on the 
UK/EU trade flows to avoid displacement effects – the UK’s tariff-free imports, at a lower price, from 
the rest of the world flowing straight to the EU market, either directly or indirectly (through 
substitution of products in the UK market), and hence undermining the EU’s common customs tariffs. 
The most likely method of applying such controls would be through an extensive set of TRQs on UK/EU 
exports, effectively limiting export flows to be no greater than the Baseline flows (and thus generating 
some quota rents for UK producers from higher EU prices). Any additional UK/EU exports would then 
be subject to the EU’s CCT, which would dilute UK prices. The monitoring and regulation of these TRQs 
and the associated rules of origin would add to the costs of UK/EU exports, which are likely to be more 
onerous for livestock than for crop products.  
                                                          
6There are some technical issues about the appropriate method of applying such trade costs within each of the models. In 
particular, the CGE model uses the Armington approach to reflect trading preferences and product differentiation between 
country pairs, which can be shifted to reflect additional non-tariff-measure (NTM) costs of trade. The alternative is to include 
these costs with border tariffs. 
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To reflect the essence of these complex considerations, we impose additional trade costs of 10% and 
5% respectively for these products flowing from the UK to the EU under this scenario. 
  
2.2.2.3. World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
 
Our third trade scenario reflects the potential for no agreement being in place by March 2019, and a 
fall back to WTO terms (e.g. tariffs) thereafter. However, the establishment of the UK’s commitments 
and obligations under the WTO would not be straightforward (HoL, 2017, p 15ff). For our purposes, 
this scenario is specified as the UK trading with both the EU and the RoW under WTO most favoured 
nation (MFN) tariffs, effectively removing the UK from all existing trade agreements, and requiring an 
allocation to the UK of a share of the current EU TRQs with the rest of the world.  Again, there is an 
issue about the trade costs under such a scenario, where UK exports (both to the RoW and the EU) 
would be required to meet the product standards of the importing country, while it is also likely that 
there would be considerable pressure from UK consumers and citizens for the application of British 
standards to imports from elsewhere (e.g. hormone-free beef from the US). To reflect these 
considerations, we apply additional trade costs of an arbitrary but illustrative 8% and 4% for livestock 
and crop products, respectively, to UK trade flows in both directions with the EU. 
 
2.2.3. UK Agricultural Policy (UKAP) 
 
Brexit clearly implies that the UK, and the devolved administrations, will need to reconsider the 
framework of agricultural policy, currently determined by the EU via the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), and heavily complicated by both environmental and rural development measures (largely under 
Pillar 2 of the CAP).  In particular, Brexit (under any future trade scenario) implies no further UK 
contributions to or receipts from the EU budget. Currently, UK farmers receive a number of direct 
payments, under both “entitlement” and “voluntary” schemes. These schemes were introduced in a 
series of reforms of the CAP, and have their origin in compensating farmers for reductions in price 
support. They have a range of justifications, including income support (national or regional), nature 
and landscape conservation, payments for improved animal welfare, and vary by both CAP Pillar (1 or 
2) and country (England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland). Rather than trying to disentangle these 
different monetary streams and re-quantifying each under alternative scenarios, the project approach 
taken to post-Brexit payments to UK farmers is to consider all Pillar 2 payments (i.e. Less Favoured 
Areas and more explicit Agri-environmental payments) as continuing after Brexit at current real levels 
(in total), while Pillar 1 direct payments (which include the “greening” element of Basic Payments) 
would be replaced by “UK direct payments” (see below). Secretary of State, Michael Gove has 
promised a “green Brexit”, to include payments to farmers being based on their supply of “public 
goods”, such as the environment and “rural life” (or “human ecology”). Given the large range and 
complexity of these public goods, how this might be done remains unclear, as does the likelihood of 
further restrictions on individual direct payments in terms of their total value per farm business, 
farmer “activity” or other qualifying criteria.  In view of this unresolved complexity, this project did 
not attempt to model the potentially different “green” effects of such a UK domestic policy (or more 
likely policies, in the four devolved administrations). Inclusion of environmental policy options would 
have very substantially complicated our analysis, and make dissemination of the results very much 
more difficult. Furthermore, and importantly, neither our partial nor our general equilibrium model 
currently deals with the environmental consequences of farming activities (and vice versa) in any 
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specific detail, so that the analytical gain from including environmental policies would have been 
rather limited. On these grounds, we excluded environmental policies (i.e. Pillar 2 payments) from 
consideration in this project and treated these policies and their payments as ongoing at current levels 
in the UK after Brexit. In particular, consideration of the potential options for the UK and devolved 
administrations for agricultural policy needs to take account of the trade relations, and any associated 
harmonization of product standards, which the UK adopts after Brexit. 
It is likely that (in practice) the trade scenarios will be linked with the UK agricultural policy options 
(e.g., freer trade being linked, perhaps, with higher and more persistent farm support). We considered 
making this link explicit in our scenario definition, but have rejected this option. This is principally 
because to do so confuses the causes of model outcomes, making it difficult to distinguish between 
the effects of changing support and those resulting from changes in trade relations.  We consider that 
this distinction is critical in providing coherent and robust analytical support to the policy decision-
making process – the principal aim of this project.  
As a result, our key agricultural policy focus concerns the Basic Payments (Pillar 1). Since these 
payments have been in existence for some time, both the CGE and FAPRI models already include them. 
There is, however, still considerable debate about the extent to which these payments actually affect 
the supplies of farm products (based on the commercial profitability of farms). It is possible to consider 
that farmers treat these payments as additional payments for their production. In the trade policy 
jargon, they are treated as being fully coupled, and directly affect (increase) production from what it 
would otherwise have been. Under the present WTO conventions, however, these payments are not 
considered to be significantly production-distorting in this sense, and designated so they are included 
in the “green box”, hence they are not subject to any spending limits under current WTO rules.  But, 
the actual effect of the EU basic payment scheme on agricultural production levels remains unclear, 
and hence the reflection of the effects in our present models is also somewhat arbitrary.  
As a consequence, we are obliged to rely on the logic of existing economic principles, informed by the 
relevant research where available, to reflect the effect of these fixed annual payments. These 
principles assert that the effects of fixed annual payments on the agricultural industry are to increase 
the rents earned by the fixed factors employed in the industry (land, labour, capital and management), 
while perhaps allowing imperfectly competitive input, plant and equipment suppliers to charge the 
industry higher prices than otherwise. The consequence, in an effectively competitive agricultural 
sector, is that these annual payments to farmers are dissipated in higher land rents, possibly higher 
input and capital equipment prices, and greater returns to labour (both own and hired) than would 
otherwise be the case.  With more labour, and perhaps more capital and land, employed in the sector 
than otherwise, production may be somewhat greater with these payments than without, depending 
on the productivity of the induced labour, capital and land. 
At present, the CGE model uses a set of ‘coupling rates’ for these payments, related to the extent to 
which they are capitalised in the agricultural value of the land (based on estimates of the capitalisation 
rates found in the current literature in Summer 2017). We use these same rates in both models (CGE 
and FAPRI) to reflect the effects of the BPS on production. We also consider the likelihood of continued 
support payments to UK farmers following Brexit.  There is very likely to be considerable pressure 
from farming groups (particularly in Scotland) for continued support in some form, and indeed the 
present payments have been guaranteed until 2020 (HoL, 2017, p. 57, para. 210), and promised to 
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2022 in the Conservative Party’s 2017 election manifesto7. However, there will also be considerable 
pressure from both the Treasury and other spending Ministers to reduce and eventually eliminate 
these payments, releasing the funds for other purposes, including perhaps ecosystem services and 
rural development schemes. To reflect this broad consensus, we concluded that a phased-out of direct 
payments over a 5-year period (2020-2025) involving a straight-line reduction of current payment 
levels to zero in 2025, was considered as appropriate.  Hence, we assume two domestic policy 
scenarios: (i) direct payments retained as currently under the CAP, and (ii) a gradual elimination of 
direct payments over a five-year period (2020-2025).  Since the eventual production effects of these 
domestic policy options should be rather similar as far as our macro and sector models are concerned, 
we present results for the three trade scenarios, each with (+) and without (-) direct payments, in 
order to distinguish between the trade and domestic policy effects. Additionally, the potential 
differential effects between the phased elimination were explored in the farm-level analysis phase of 
the project. 
 
2.3. Sensitivity Analysis Considerations 
 
There are two major conditioning factors for the economic effects of Brexit policy scenarios on UK 
agriculture:  i) the increased restrictions on migrant labour; and ii) the sterling exchange rate, both 
with the Euro and with the US dollar. While we could include these considerations in the specification 
of our scenarios, we have been very conscious of both the resources available for this project, and of 
the major aim of providing clear and understandable policy analysis for public debate and policy 
decision-making. We have therefore decided to treat both these major considerations through some 
limited sensitivity analysis of our major results. 
 
2.3.1. UK migrant labour policies 
 
 As the HoL 2017 report makes clear (Chapter 6, p.68ff), the UK’s agri-food sector is presently heavily 
dependent on (both seasonal and permanent) migrant labour, much of which comes from the EU. If, 
after Brexit, UK immigration policies tighten the regulation of these migrant flows, then labour 
supplies will be restricted, especially affecting the horticultural, intensive livestock (pigs and poultry), 
food processing and packaging, and retailing (restaurant) sectors. However, our sector model (FAPRI) 
does not include either horticulture, or the processing and retail sectors. The CGE model, on the other 
hand, includes both 14 primary (agriculture, fishing and forestry) sectors, and 8 food processing 
sectors, as well as 5 different labour supplies (by skill level), and so is able to reflect restricted labour 
supplies to this extent. 
According to evidence submitted to the HoL committee (HoL, 2017, p. 68, para. 253) between 10 and 
60% of labour used in the most affected sectors is presently provided by migrant labour. Estimates 
show that 27,000 EU nationals are directly employed in agriculture and some 116,000 in the food 
processing sector (Byrne, 2018)8. It is highly unlikely that all of this labour will be prevented from 
coming to the UK after Brexit, or fail to be replaced to some extent by domestic labour or increased 
                                                          
77 The 2018 Agriculture Bill (currently under the scrutiny of UK Parliament) proposes a seven-year transition period starting 
2021.  Hence, from 2021 direct payments for English farmers would be subject to a progressive phase-out, with 2027 the 
last year of payments. 
8 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/01/05/the-migrant-labour-shortage-is-already-here-and-agri-tech-cant-yet-fill-the-gap, 
last accessed 10 December 2018.  
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mechanisation. Hence, we tested the sensitivity of our main results to potentially restricted labour 
supplies, to the extent that resources allow, by examining the effects of restricting low (though 
specific) skilled labour supplies by between 10 and 30%. 
 
2.3.2. Sterling Exchange Rates 
 
The base exchange-rate projections used for our modelling exercises already included some 
allowances for the Brexit decision. The post-Referendum depreciation of sterling, by up to 20%, albeit 
with a recent recovery, indicates that the foreign exchange markets might be particularly sensitive to 
post-Brexit trade and economic policies in the UK, and consequential changes elsewhere, especially in 
the European Union. The CGE model database is specified in US dollars, whilst the model framework 
does not include any money markets, with the implicit exchange rates being embedded in the main 
drivers of economic activity (macro-economic projections), which are also used for the FAPRI model. 
In both cases, it seems sensible to test the sensitivity of the main model results to a shift in the 
underlying real exchange rate between sterling and other currencies, not least because maintaining a 
real sterling depreciation is one major economic lever available to the UK government and the Bank 
of England to offset any potential decline in UK competitiveness in world markets as the UK economy 
adjusts to a post-Brexit world. For illustrative purposes, we tested the sensitivity of our main results 
to a depreciation in the real sterling exchange rate of between 10 percent and 20 percent, to the 
extent that the model structures (particularly the CGE) allow.   
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3. The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model9     
 
As a component of Phase 2, this Chapter focuses on the provision of aggregate projections of the 
impacts of the selected trade and domestic policy scenarios (as described in Chapter 2) on the UK 
agriculture, using an agriculture specific variant of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) multi-
region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.  Specifically, it estimates the impacts of the Brexit 
scenarios focusing on the wider economy, on the sector per se (in terms of production volumes, 
market prices and factor markets) and trade balances between UK and EU, and UK and the rest of the 
world (non-EU regions). Furthermore, using sensitivity analysis, it assesses potential impacts following 
the reduction of unskilled migrant labour and the devaluation of the pound with respect to other 
currencies (e.g. euro).  
 
3.1. CGE Methodology and Database 
 
In the current experiment, version 9 of the well-known GTAP database is employed, benchmarked to 
the year 2011. The database is complete with a series of input-output tables for 140 regions, 57 
activities and 5 primary factors of production (i.e., land, skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital and 
natural resources). This data is supplemented by gross bilateral trade flows, international transport 
margins and tariff protection data. To this database, is calibrated a multi-region neoclassical 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) market model known as ‘Defra-Tap’ (Philippidis et al., 2007 and 
Philippidis and Kitou, 2012). In explicitly representing the input-output relationships among various 
sectors, the model assesses the knock-on impacts on the wider economy given a policy change in a 
particular sector, i.e. agriculture.  As typical of all neoclassical CGE models, the Defra-Tap model is 
based on a system of three types of mathematical equations to represent economic activity. First, a 
series of theoretically consistent behavioural equations based on convenient homogeneously linear 
functional forms implement the tenets of neoclassical constrained optimisation theory. With zero 
homogeneity of prices in the underlying demand and supply equations (i.e., no money illusion), only 
changes in relative prices matter. Second, market clearing equations are required to ensure that an 
equilibrium price emerges in the model solution for all N markets. Third, accounting equations are 
coded to enforce long-run zero economic profits for constant returns to scale production technologies 
in each activity 'j', whilst these accounting conventions also ensure a closed circular flow within each 
economy (i.e., output equals expenditure equals income). Global savings, which in each region is a 
fixed share of changes in real income, drives global international investment. At the regional level, 
investment is allocated across regions as a function of differences in the regional rates of return on 
capital. Assuming all N domestic markets clear, the net balance on the current account (exports minus 
imports) is balanced by the capital account (investment minus savings), such that the overall balance 
of payments sums to zero. 
To ensure a model solution for a simultaneous system of mathematical equations, the number of 
endogenous variables (prices and outputs) must be equal to the number of equations; this is known 
as ‘model closure’. The exogenous variables are typically policy variables (i.e., tax rates), productivity 
variables (i.e., technical change assumptions) and endowment stocks of primary factors of production. 
Subject to available secondary data projections, these can be manipulated by the modeller (i.e., 
                                                          
9 This chapter was written by George Philippidis.   
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‘shocked’) over time periods to capture, in as much detail as possible, the evolving macroeconomic 
structure of the economy. 
 
3.2.  Simulation Design 
 
Starting from a benchmark year of 2011, the simulations are projected over three periods (2011-2017, 
2017-2019 and 2019-2026). The Baseline scenario captures a ‘business as usual’ status quo which 
includes projections shocks on real growth and population provided from the FAPRI Baseline, to 
generate greater consistency between the common macro drivers of the two models. In the Defra-
Tap model, it is assumed that the capital stock changes at the same rate as real GDP (fixed capital 
output ratio) and that skilled and unskilled labour change at the same rate as population (i.e., the rate 
of unemployment is assumed at a medium to long run fixed rate).  In addition to these macroeconomic 
projections a series of policy drivers are also modelled. A Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Baseline 
to 2020 consisting of shocks to first pillar payments is implemented based on the data work of 
Boulanger and Philippidis (2015). From 2020 to 2026, payments are deflated by a rate of 2 percent per 
annum. Thus, it is assumed that the decoupled/coupled structure of CAP first pillar payments is 
maintained unchanged beyond 2020 to 2026.  Within the model, it is further assumed that first pillar 
(decoupled) payments under the single area payment scheme (SAPS) embody a degree of coupling to 
production based on the best available estimates from the literature (with the usual associated 
caveats) collated by Boulanger, Philippidis and Urban (2017)10. In the database, the proportion of the 
SAPS which is capitalised into land rents by each EU member state is allocated as a uniform subsidy 
rate payment to the agriculture specific land factor11. By entering the first order conditions as a 
uniform payment, this component of the decoupled payment is not production distorting whilst 
avoiding cross commodity effects. The remaining proportion (92%) of the SAPS is allocated uniformly 
across land, agricultural labour (skilled and unskilled) and agricultural capital factors. To the extent 
that a proportion of the single payment schemes is implemented to labour and capital, which can 
enter/leave the agricultural sector, the SAPS payment can be considered as coupled to production. 
Notwithstanding, this degree of coupling is also limited by a (elasticity) transformation mobility 
parameter (typically very inelastic) between agricultural and non-agricultural uses, which is 
implemented to reflect the rent and wage differentials that exist between these two sub-sectors. 
In addition to the CAP shocks, trade policy shocks in the 2011-2017 period are implemented to 
characterise the accession of Croatia to the EU and the elimination of all EU export refunds. Moreover, 
for a select group of cereals, oilseeds, meat and dairy sectors, the Baseline trends in output reported 
in FAPRI across each period are targeted in the Defra-Tap model (a so-called 'soft-linkage'). To meet 
these output targets in the CGE model, in an initial run, a Hicks neutral output productivity variable 
for activity 'j' is ‘endogenised’ (swapped with exogenous output) and calibrated to the exogenously 
shocked output targets fed in from FAPRI. In the final Baseline, the resulting calibrated productivity 
values for those activities 'j', are implemented as exogenous shifters in all periods for all simulations 
(i.e., Baseline plus Brexit policy simulations). In the Baseline, these shifters will generate the desired 
                                                          
10 This implies that the standard GTAP benchmark database corresponding to the EU domestic support component, must be 
recalibrated to reflect the new allocation of the SAPS across the factors of production in the EU regions.  
11 In the UK, this capitalisation rate is estimated to be approximately 8%, compared with the EU15 average of 6-7% and the 
2004 enlargement members average of 10% (Boulanger, Philippidis and Urban, 2017). 
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FAPRI Baseline output trends, whilst in the remaining simulations, deviations from this Baseline are 
due to additional policy shocks. A summary description of the Scenarios is provided in Box 3.1.  
Box 3.1. Baseline and Scenario Descriptors  
Baseline from 2011 to 2026: real GDP and population projections consistent with FAPRI model, 
agricultural output developments linked to the FAPRI model (soft-link), EU enlargement tariff 
shocks, CAP Baseline. 
 
UK-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (Scenarios 1 and 2): 
Scenario 1 (FTA +): Baseline shocks plus for 2019-2026 for UK-EU trade flows, 2% additional trade 
costs on all non-agri-food goods, 2% additional trade costs on cropping activities and 5% additional 
trade costs on livestock.  
Scenario 2 (FTA-): The same as scenario 1 plus the elimination of CAP Pillar 1 direct payments. 
 
Unilateral Trade Liberalisation (UTL) (Scenarios 3 and 4): 
Scenario 3 (UTL+): Baseline plus for 2019-2026 for UK-EU trade flows, 2% additional trade costs on 
all non-agri-food goods, 5% additional trade costs on cropping activities and 10% additional trade 
costs on livestock. Also, all import tariffs between the UK and the ROW are eliminated, whilst EU 
imports of goods from the UK cannot exceed the Baseline level (to avoid cheaper imports to the EU 
emanating from the UK). 
Scenario 4 (UTL-): The same as scenario 3 plus the elimination of CAP Pillar 1 direct payments. 
 
A fall back to World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Scenarios 5 and 6) terms: 
Scenario 5 (WTO+): Baseline plus for 2019-2026 for UK-EU trade flows, 2% additional trade costs 
on all non-agri-food goods, 4% additional trade costs on cropping activities and 8% additional trade 
costs on livestock. Tariffs on trade between the EU and UK are now subject to WTO Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) applied average rates, whilst tariffs on UK-ROW trade are also subject to WTO MFN. 
Scenario 6 (WTO-): The same as scenario 5 plus the elimination of CAP pillar 1 direct payments. 
 
3.3. CGE Results  
 
The results presented in this section are comparisons with the Baseline at the end of the third period. 
The differences can be interpreted as an average per annum deviation from the Baseline path over 
the seven-year period 2019-2026.  All results are in real terms (as no allowance for inflation in the 
model). The CGE model highlights the following key points. The UK is a net importer of agricultural 
and food products. The impact of the scenarios is heterogeneous across individual UK agricultural and 
food activities, and it is conditioned by the degree of relative trade competitiveness (i.e., relative 
tariffs) and trade openness in each UK sector. A decomposition of the results compared with the 
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Baseline by the underlying trade shocks drivers, reveals that each policy tool (e.g., EU/UK trade costs, 
UK/ROW import tariffs) can have conflicting impacts on production and prices. 
 
3.3.1. Macroeconomic results 
 
Our CGE modelling shows that in all scenarios considered, Brexit has a negative impact on UK Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and real per capita incomes (Table 3.1). Under FTA+, with the imposition of 
additional trade facilitation costs associated with the loss of single market access (by 2026), UK real 
GDP and per capita income are, on average, -0.34% and -0.44% lower per annum, respectively, than 
the Baseline12.  In the absence of other trade shocks, higher assumed trade costs between the EU and 
the UK, under UTL+, would generate an even greater slowdown to the UK economy. This impact is, 
however, mitigated by the removal of UK-RoW tariff barriers which, in isolation, generates increasing 
UK real incomes associated with cheaper UK access to RoW imports and increased economic 
opportunities to UK exporters from lower cost access to RoW markets. As a result, although UK real 
economic growth and real incomes remain below the Baseline (-0.22% and -0.12%, respectively), this 
scenario produces the best outcome for the UK when comparing with FTA+ and WTO+.  The 
macroeconomic impact resulting from WTO+ (scenario 5) is the worst outcome for the UK. Although 
the assumed trade costs from the loss of EU single market access are lower than in UTL+ (scenario 3), 
the damage inflicted on the UK economy from the loss of tariff free access to the EU and the adoption 
of WTO MFN applied average tariff rates (with the associated loss of preferential access to third 
markets) results in an average per annum reduction in UK real Gross Domestic Product and  per  capita  
real  income  of -0.42% and -0.59%, respectively.   
As expected, when comparing with each of the pathways represented in scenarios 1, 3 and 5 (trade 
scenarios with direct payments), the elimination of first pillar CAP payments under FTA-, UTL- and 
WTO- (scenarios 2, 4 and 6) has a very slight positive impact on UK real GDP and real per capita income 
(Table 3.1), due to the allocative efficiency gains from the removal of subsidy distortions in the UK 
agricultural sectors and associated reallocations of agricultural factors to higher value uses. That these 
effects are negligible is due to the fact that in macroeconomic terms, UK agriculture is a ‘small’ sector.  
 
Table 3.1. Impacts on UK GDP (%) and per capita income (%) (cf Baseline projections 2026) 
  Scenarios 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
  FTA+  FTA-  UTL+   UTL-  WTO+   WTO-   
UK GDP (%) -0.34 -0.33 -0.22 -0.22 -0.42 -0.41 
Per capita real income -0.44 -0.44 -0.12 -0.12 -0.59 -0.58 
 
 
                                                          
12 GDP changes differ from real per capita income changes because of the depreciation on investment. Real GDP is a 
quantity measure of real economic growth (including depreciation) and the utility measure is a per capita change in 'net' 
domestic product. 
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Thus, in macroeconomic terms, the impacts that arise from the scenarios are relatively small.  A 
reversion to WTO under most favoured nation (MFN) tariff schedules reduces it the most, circa 0.4 
percent per annum on average, whereas UTL reduces it the least, 0.22 percent per annum on average. 
This is because average tariffs in the wider economy between the UK and EU, as well as the assumed 
trade cost increases, are only moderate for the majority of UK economic activities. In those scenarios 
where larger tariffs and/or trade cost shocks occur, these effects are typically restricted to agri-food 
industries, which constitute only a small share of the UK GDP. 
 
For the EU27, comparing with the Baseline, real GDP losses in scenarios 1, 3 and 5 (not shown) are -
0.042%, -0.048% and -0.051% per annum on average. The asymmetry in magnitudes between the UK 
and the EU27 reflects the fact that the EU represents a much larger trade partner for the UK in 
proportional terms, whilst the percentage changes in UK macroeconomic performance are calculated 
from a smaller base. With very small sectoral percentage impacts in EU sectors, the remaining 
Chapters focus on the impacts for the UK only. Despite the small impacts at the macroeconomic level, 
considerable potential impacts are expected, both for the agri-food sector and food consumers in 
terms of retail price changes, as elaborated below.  
 
 
3.3.2. CGE sectorial model drivers 
 
In each of the scenarios, the resulting impact on different UK agri-food activities is not uniform. This 
observation is driven by (i) the degree of ‘openness’ of each UK agri-food sector ‘j’ with respect to 
foreign trade; (ii) the relative competitiveness of each UK agri-food sector ‘j’ compared with its trade 
partners, measured in terms of the applied ad valorem tariff barriers in place; (iii) and the degree of 
substitutability of trade in said sector ‘j’ when the vector of relative UK import prices changes in 
response to policy shocks. 
Furthermore, the impact of different trade shocks can generate conflicting impacts for UK prices and 
output. To illustrate, the case of the loss of the single market access to the UK is applied. The EU 
imposed trade costs discourage demand for UK exports, thereby depressing UK production and 
market prices. By the same token, increased protection in the form of UK trade costs on imports from 
the EU, increase production and domestic market prices. The net market effects of these individual 
shocks depend on the purchase share of EU imports in the UK and the UK sales share of EU exports in 
each sector ‘j’ (first round effects), as well as the impact on primary factor reallocations between 
expanding and contracting sectors, resulting changes in regional incomes and real GDP growth 
(second-round or ‘general equilibrium’ effects). With these considerations in mind, this Chapter 
describes the structure of UK agri-food production, consumption and trade calculated by the model 
for the Brexit starting-period year of 2019 (Annex 3.1), whilst Annex 3.1 shows the level of average ad 
valorem tariff protection between the UK and the RoW. In the composite UK ‘primary agriculture’, 
exports account for approximately 8% of the value of sales, with 5.4% going to the EU market (Annex 
3.1). On the other hand, not only does the UK exhibit a trade deficit with the world in all primary 
agricultural sectors totalling approximately £8 billion (Annex 3.11 - 2011 prices), 33% of the value of 
UK purchases of aggregate agricultural products are imports, with over 17% originating from outside 
the EU (Annex 3.1). 
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In the broad sectors of horticulture and other crops (which includes live plants, flowers, seeds, spices, 
fodder crops, protein crops), a majority share of UK purchases (73% and 59%, respectively) are 
imported and evenly split between EU and non-EU sources. In the oilseeds sector, UK imports from 
RoW sources accounts for over a third (34%), whilst almost all UK purchases of paddy rice (91%) 
originate from non-EU sources. In contrast, UK cereals production exhibits a much higher degree of 
self-sufficiency, with trade mainly occurring with the EU. Comparing relative trade protection between 
the UK and the non-EU region (Annex 3.1), the UK imposes lower tariffs in all of these aforementioned 
cropping sectors. In terms of live animals, both UK cattle and sheep and pigs and poultry exhibit 
relatively small export sales shares and import purchase shares, whilst the level of trade protection 
imposed by the UK and non-EU region on mutual trade is broadly similar. Interestingly, although both 
plant-based fibres and wool sectors are very small (with small UK trade deficits – Annex 3.11), they 
are extremely open to trade. In the wool (plant fibres) sector, 84% (88%) of the value of UK sales are 
exported whilst 91% (95%) of the value of UK purchases are imported. In both commodities, the UK’s 
export and import trade is dominated by the non-EU region. Trade between the UK and the non-EU 
region in wool and plant fibres is practically tariff free, although the RoW imposes a tariff of 26% on 
imports of wool from the UK (Annex 3.1).  
As in the case of the primary agriculture sector, the UK also runs a trade deficit in all food processing 
activities totalling approximately £16.5 billion (in 2011 prices; Annex 3.11). Approximately 18% of the 
value of UK food sales are exported, where some 11% are destined for the EU market. On the import 
side, approximately 30% of the value of UK food purchases is imported (Annex 3.1), with a relatively 
larger proportion (compared with primary agriculture), coming from the EU trade bloc. In the 
(aggregate) dairy sector, the value share of exports is marginally above the UK food average (20%), 
whilst the large majority of (tariff free) UK dairy trade is with the EU – with exports accounting for 20% 
of the value of UK production and 25% of the value of UK purchases of dairy products. As an EU 
member, the UK also benefits from TRQ preferential access to imports of butter and cheese from the 
non-EU region, with a weighted ad valorem applied tariff of 24.5% (Annex 3.1). 
In the red and white meat sectors, the UK exhibits large trade deficits of £1.1 billion and £4.8 billion 
with the entire World (EU + RoW), respectively (Annex 3.11 - 2011 prices), whilst 29% and 40% of UK 
purchases are imported (Annex 3.1). Although UK white meat imports are heavily biased in favour of 
the EU, red meat imports are evenly split between the EU and non-EU region (e.g., New Zealand, 
Australia). Comparing UK and non-EU region tariffs (Annex 3.1), the UK imposes an average ad valorem 
applied import tariff of 21% on white meat (which accounts for the UK’s TRQ on poultry meat), 
compared with only 11% by the non-EU region. On red meat trade, the UK’s ad valorem tariff on non-
EU region red meat exports is 45% (which accounts for the UK’s TRQ on sheepmeat), whilst the non-
EU region imposes an average ad valorem applied tariff of 27% on UK exports of red meat.  
The UK also runs trade deficits in processed sugar and processed rice of £329 million and £188 million, 
respectively (Annex 3.11), with greater import dependency in both cases from the non-EU region13. In 
both cases, comparing with the non-EU region, the UK is considerably more protective of its imports, 
18% and 17% on sugar and rice, respectively, compared with corresponding tariffs of 6% and 8% 
imposed by the non-EU region on UK exports (Annex 3.1). The UK is also heavily dependent on 
                                                          
13 In the case of raw sugar, non-EU region sourced imports to the UK come from Brazil, Central America, Jamaica and Oceania. 
In terms of rice trade, non-EU import sources to the UK include Thailand, India, Pakistan and the USA.  
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vegetable oils and fats imports, with almost 40% coming from the non-EU region14. With its 
comparative disadvantage, these imports enter the UK market almost tariff free (2%), whilst the 
average RoW tariff on the UK’s exports is a highly prohibitive 55%. 
A considerable proportion of remaining food processing production and trade is captured in the 
residual composite ‘other food’ processing sector (including fish products, and all remaining processed 
food products not elsewhere classified). This sector accounts for half of the UK’s food processing trade 
deficit (£7.7 billion in 2011 prices, Annex 3.11). The export sales share (19%) is almost evenly split 
between EU and non-EU trade routes (Annex 3.1), whilst the value share of UK purchases attributed 
to imports is 27%, with 20% coming from the EU. The average ad valorem tariff imposed by the UK on 
RoW exports is half (7%) of that imposed by the non-EU region on UK exports. 
 
3.3.3. Output results vs Baseline Scenario 
 
In the following Chapters, the results are presented in two formats. On the one hand, the incremental 
impact of each of the policy scenarios is measured in comparison with the Baseline.  Furthermore, an 
approximate decomposition of this incremental impact can also be performed for each scenario by 
linking to the corresponding additional exogenous trade (and CAP) policy drivers which define each 
policy scenario. In other words, employing a technique by Harrison et al., (2000), we show the 
approximate contribution ('part-worth') of each additional trade and CAP policy driver, to the change 
in output volumes compared with the Baseline. 
 
3.3.3.1. FTA+ (Scenario 1) 
 
Comparing with the Baseline, the net production impacts resulting from the introduction of assumed 
UK and EU trade costs (to capture the loss of UK single market access) are relatively small. This results 
from the opposing domestic production impacts arising from UK imposed trade costs on EU imports 
(Annex 3.2, column 2) which protect domestic production, and the EU imposed trade cost on UK 
exports (Annex 3.2, column 3), which discourages UK production.  
Examining the part-worth of EU imposed trade costs on UK production (Annex 3.2), in the food 
processing sectors the effect is negative, with the strongest impact in the export-oriented UK dairy 
and processed sugar sectors (-2.8% and -1.0%, respectively). As a result, in the corresponding 
upstream sectors of raw milk and raw sugar, production also contracts as a result of this shock. In the 
upstream agricultural sectors, with higher EU trade costs assumed for UK livestock produce, the 
impact is also negative on UK livestock sectors, although this has the second-round impact of freeing 
up agricultural resources (i.e., capital and labour) into a number of cropping activities.  
Rising UK trade costs on EU imports act as a form of protectionism for UK producers, which encourages 
production. This observation is particularly prevalent in the UK livestock, dairy and meat sectors. In 
white meat, 34% of UK purchases are from the EU, such that the UK trade cost increases provides UK 
produces with a significant opportunity to increase production, resulting in an output rise of 4.0% 
(Annex 3.2, column 3). 
                                                          
14 Principally from Argentina and to a lesser extent, Brazil, the USA, India and the Ukraine. 
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In remaining agricultural and food sectors, the effect of this specific shock is more ambiguous. Despite 
the protectionism that this trade policy affords to UK producers, primary resources are also 
reallocated (particularly in primary agriculture) in favour of livestock and away from cropping activities 
whilst the UK trade cost shock also reduces real growth due to the deflating impact on primary factor 
returns, regional income and domestic demand. 
Comparing with the Baseline, the net impact of these two opposing trade shocks on UK primary 
agricultural production and food processing production is approximately +0.4% in both sectors (Annex 
3.2, column 3), suggesting that the UK trade protection effect is slightly stronger, whilst there is 
relatively greater relative production gain in UK meat production (+2.0%) and livestock (+0.5%) (vis-a-
vis cropping, +0.2%).  
 
3.3.3.2. UTL+ (Scenario 3) 
 
Under UTL, one assumes greater trade cost increases on crops and livestock products, which produces 
stronger positive and negative production effects. For example, in red meat, dairy and processed sugar 
sectors, the negative production impacts compared with the Baseline reported under FTA, are larger. 
Similarly, the positive production impact for white meat under the FTA scenario is also stronger (6.2%, 
Annex 3.3, column 3). 
In addition to the trade cost shocks, the UTL scenario also contemplates tariff elimination shocks 
between the UK and the non-EU region. In isolation, UK import tariff elimination encourages greater 
import competition from the non-EU region, whilst non-EU region tariff elimination offers export 
opportunities to UK producers. In Annex 3.3 (columns 4 and 5) are presented the net impacts on 
production and the part-worths associated with these tariff shocks.  
From the discussion of the model drivers above, in a number of primary agricultural activities (paddy 
rice, horticulture, oilseeds, other crops, plant-based fibres, wool) and food processing activities (red 
meat, vegetable oils and fats, processed rice, processed sugar) the non-EU sourced import share of 
UK purchases is relatively high. Furthermore, there are high UK tariffs on wheat, red meat, white meat, 
dairy, processed rice and processed sugar. Thus, the isolated impact on UK production arising from 
the removal of UK protection on imports of red meat, white meat, processed sugar and processed 
rice, is negative (Annex 3.3, column 5). A similar negative effect is also observed for UK wheat 
production (-1.6%), which implies sectoral trapped land is substituted into other cropping activities 
(particularly cereals and oilseeds). With reduced downstream demand by sugar and meat sectors from 
the elimination of UK tariffs, upstream raw sugar and livestock production also contracts under this 
shock, also reinforcing the reallocation of agricultural factors into other agricultural activities.  
Although UK dependency on horticulture and oilseeds imports from the ROW is relatively high, the 
elimination of UK tariffs does not contract output in these sectors, partly due to the resource 
reallocation effect and also owing to the fact that UK tariff protection in both sectors is very low (3% 
and zero, respectively). In the dairy sector (and by extension, the upstream raw milk sector), the 
production effect arising from removing UK TRQs (on butter and cheese) is only minor given the small 
non-EU region UK purchase share of dairy products (approximately 1%; Annex 3.1, column 7).  
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Turning to the effect of the non-EU region tariff eliminations, the highest average applied ad valorem 
tariffs imposed are on UK exports of wheat, wool, red and white meat, vegetable oils and fats and the 
‘large’ sectors of dairy and ‘other food processing’ (see Table 3). Notwithstanding, the UK sales share 
corresponding to the non-EU is minor in all these activities except for wool, vegetable oil and fats, 
other food processing and to a lesser extent, dairy.  As a result, these latter UK activities benefit the 
most from the removal of the non-EU region import tariff (46.4%, 103.9%, 4.4% and 3.1%, respectively 
– Annex 3.3, column 4). With dairy and other food processing sectors accounting for over 70% of UK 
food processing output, the removal of non-EU region tariffs results in the contraction in the 
remaining food sectors (rice, sugar, white meat) as primary resources are diverted away from these 
activities.  
Due to the isolated impact of non-EU tariff removal, production trends recorded in downstream sugar 
(negative), dairy, vegetable oils and red meat (all positive) are also in evidence in the corresponding 
upstream sectors of raw sugar (negative production effect), raw milk, oilseeds and cattle and sheep 
(both with positive production effects). In remaining agricultural activities, there are low non-EU 
import tariffs on UK exports (Annex 3.1) and/or small UK export sales shares to the non-EU region (see 
Annex 3.1). Thus, with the exception of wool, the part-worth production impact resulting from the 
non-EU region tariff removal (Annex 3.3, column 4) is more related to second-round general 
equilibrium primary resource reallocation effects.  
Combining all the trade shocks, under UTL, UK meat (particularly red meat), processed rice and sugar 
sectors perform worse than under FTA and WTO (see below). On the other hand, the large sectors of 
dairy and other food processing, as well the vegetable oils and fats sector, perform better, owing to 
unfettered UK access to non-EU export markets. As a result, UK food processing output rises almost 
2% compared with the Baseline (Annex 3.3, column 6), which is the highest production increase across 
all three policy storylines. Despite a significant improvement in UK oilseeds and wool (small sector) 
production, UK primary agricultural output under UTL performs the worst compared with FTA and 
WTO (see later) due to the output contraction in UK ‘cattle and sheep’ and wheat sectors, as well as 
the smaller sectors of sugar beet, paddy rice and plant-based fibres. Importantly, UK agricultural 
production shifts in favour of cropping activities and away from livestock.  
 
3.3.3.3. WTO+ (Scenario 5) 
 
In this scenario, the UK now faces WTO Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs on its trade with both the 
EU and the UK. The UK is a net importer of all agricultural and food products and has very strong trade 
relationship with the EU trade bloc. Not surprisingly, the part-worth impact of the rising EU tariffs on 
UK exports is very damaging to the food sector, particularly in red meat, dairy and processed sugar 
sectors (Annex 3.5, column 4), which leads to contractions in corresponding upstream agricultural 
sectors (cattle and sheep, pigs and poultry, raw milk, raw sugar). In the large ‘other food’ sector, the 
negative production impact is rather muted given the relatively smaller assumed increase in the 
average EU tariff. In primary agricultural activities, UK paddy rice (very small sector) and wheat are 
losers from rising EU import tariffs due to a large EU export sales share (paddy rice) or the EU tariff 
increase (wheat) (Annex 3.5). In the remaining, principally crop based, agricultural sectors (other 
grains, horticulture, oilseeds, other crops, plant fibres, wool), the assumed EU tariff increases are 
relatively small, so under this shock, these sectors increase in size as they attract more agricultural-
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specific primary factors from those UK agricultural sectors which are contracting (e.g., wheat, sugar 
beet, paddy rice, cattle and sheep, pigs and poultry, raw milk). 
In many UK agri-food sectors, the negative production affect from reduced market access to the EU 
is, in broad terms equally offset by MFN tariff protection imposed by the UK on its imports from the 
EU Annex 3.5, column 5). In some (small) sectors (e.g., paddy rice; sugar processing and sugar beet), 
however, the negative production impact in the UK from the EU imposition of MFN tariffs is markedly 
stronger as the value share of UK sales destined to the EU is high. On the other hand, for UK white 
meat activity, the positive production effect from UK tariffs dominates given the significant 
competitive edge given to UK producers to partially fill the significant white meat market share 
previously occupied by EU imports (34%; Annex 3.1). 
Comparing with the part-worth production impacts arising from UK-EU tariff increases, those part-
worths corresponding to UK-non-EU region tariff increases are of a lesser magnitude, since the non-
EU trade shares (both on UK export sales and UK import purchases) are generally smaller. In general, 
the MFN tariff levels imposed by the UK and RoW offset one another in terms of UK production 
impacts. On the other hand, the UK tariff raising impact is strongly positive for UK production in the 
case of processed sugar, processed rice, red and white meat (plus corresponding upstream activities 
sugar beet, livestock). In the UK, each of these sectors exhibits a high UK purchase shares 
corresponding to imports from the non-EU region, whilst tariff increases corresponding to WTO MFN 
rates are significant. In the case of ‘wool’ and ‘vegetable oils and fats’ activities, the rise in the RoW 
tariff rate has a strong negative impact on UK production. 
Examining the net impact resulting from all these trade policy shocks, aggregate agricultural output 
rises by 1.9% compared with the Baseline - more than in any other scenario. The fall in cropping 
activity output (-0.8%) is more than compensated by the relative rise in UK livestock output (3.5%), 
largely motivated by stronger meat processing demand for upstream ‘cattle and sheep’ and ‘pigs and 
poultry’ output. Indeed, UK meat production witnesses a significant production increase of 14.8% 
compared with the Baseline. UK dairy production rises very slightly (0.4%) compared with the Baseline, 
whilst UK food processing output expands 0.8% (Annex 3.5) compared with the Baseline.  
 
3.3.3.4. Removal of direct payments (FTA-, UTL-, WTO-) 
 
For each of the three pathways explored above (Scenarios 2, 4 and 6), a variant is modelled which 
eliminates all first pillar Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments (Annexes 3.3, 3.4, 3.5). The 
isolated impact of the trade costs is very close to that observed in the three scenarios above (results 
not shown). On the other hand, the production effect from the removal of first pillar CAP payments is 
negative in the UK’s agricultural sectors, and as a result, the UK’s downstream food processing sectors. 
As noted in Chapter 2 above, only a proportion of the first pillar single area payment is decoupled 
(allocated to the agriculture specific land factor as a uniform subsidy rate), whilst the proportion of 
the payment allocated to labour and capital factors which are not specific to agriculture (although 
highly immobile), is the proportion of the payment which is coupled. As a result, comparing with the 
‘standard’ FTA+ (scenario 1), UTL+ (scenario 3) and WTO+ (scenario 5), the policy shock to remove 
direct payments depresses UK agricultural output by -3.3% (Annex 3.2), -3.3% (Annex 3.3) and -3.1% 
(Annex 3.5), respectively, with a concomitant reduction in UK food processing output of approximately 
one percent in all three scenarios. 
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3.3.4. Price results vs Baseline 
 
The trade policy shocks impose conflicting price effects, which implies that the net market price effect 
of any given policy scenario in comparison with the Baseline is not, a priori, immediately clear. A 
decomposition of the price effect by trade policy shock decomposes each of these effects into more 
intuitive part-worths. For example, as expected, the market price change in the UK resulting from the 
imposition of UK tariffs on imports from the EU is positive, since there is a resulting increase in the 
price of intermediate imported inputs (cost push) and final import demands in the UK. Similarly, EU 
trade cots imposed on UK exports, depress EU export demand for UK produce, with the result that 
relative UK market prices fall. As alluded to above, that the price effect across different UK activities 
is differentiated (although uniform in sign), is a function of the relative degree of trade openness of 
each sector, the size of the tariff or trade cost shock, and the elasticity of substitution of imports in 
the importing region.    
3.3.4.1. FTA + (Scenario 1) 
 
The isolated market price impact arising from the imposition of EU and UK trade costs is presented in 
Annex 3.6 (columns 2 and 3). On the one hand, the imposition of the UK trade costs on EU produce 
has a positive impact on UK market prices (column 3). Typically, the largest price rises occur in the 
animal related sectors (higher assumed trade cost). Indeed, in the UK white meat market, which 
exhibits a significant EU import purchase share, the price transmission effect resulting from the UK 
trade cost increase has a stronger repercussion on UK market prices (2%).  
On the other hand, the introduction of EU import trade costs on UK exports has a depressing effect 
on UK market prices (Annex 3.6, column 2). In most cases, the UK trade cost shock on imports from 
the EU has the stronger effect resulting in a net increase in market prices compared with the Baseline. 
This reflects the net importer position that the UK maintains with the EU in all agricultural and food 
products (see also Chapter 3.6). In primary agriculture, prices rise a very moderate 0.1% compared 
with the Baseline, whilst in food processing the corresponding price rise is 0.4%. 
 
3.3.4.2. UTL+ (Scenario 3) 
 
In this scenario, the magnitude of the price effects is now stronger (Annex 3.7) given the assumption 
of higher trade costs both in animal (10%) and crop (5%) activities. As under FTA scenario, the UK trade 
cost shock has the stronger effect (vis-a-vis the EU trade cost effect). Additional trade shocks in the 
form of applied average ad valorem tariff removals between the UK and the non-EU region also 
present consistent price effects. Thus, the removal of RoW tariffs on UK exports increases UK agri-
food market prices, whilst the opening of UK markets through the elimination of UK tariffs on non-EU 
exports, depresses UK market prices. 
Examining the net price impacts compared with the Baseline resulting from the tariff shocks Table 8 
(column 6), there is no clear price trend, although in processed rice, processed sugar and meat sectors, 
the UK tariff shock on non-EU exports has a larger impact leading to UK market price falls. More 
specifically, red meat exhibits a market fall of 11% compared with the Baseline, whilst notable market 
price falls are also recorded in processed rice (-5%) and processed sugar (-7%). Compared with the 
Baseline, there are overall market price falls in paddy rice (-2%), sugar beet (-3%) and cattle and sheep 
(-2%) reflecting falling demand in the corresponding downstream sectors. On the other hand, the 
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relative UK price rise in oilseeds (2%) reflects the expansion of the vegetable oils and fats sector in this 
scenario, whilst there are also price rises in the large dairy, and ‘other food’ processing sectors. With 
positive and negative net price effects across individual agri-food sectors, in the aggregate crop and 
livestock sectors, as well as total food processing, the UK market price impact compared with the 
Baseline is negligible 
 
3.3.4.3. WTO+ (Scenario 5) 
 
As under FTA and UTL scenarios above, the net impact from the imposition of UK and EU trade costs 
(4% cropping activities, 8% livestock activities) is relatively price inflationary in the UK (Annex 3.8) 
under WTO. Furthermore, rising protectionism reflecting the adoption of WTO MFN rates, generates 
a notable inflationary impact on agri-food prices in the UK (Annex 3.8). Once again, this net price 
inflationary effect reflects the import trade dependency exhibited by the UK for agricultural and food 
products.  Examining the overall impacts (Annex 3.8, column 8), compared with the Baseline there are 
market price rises of approximately 7%-8% in red meat, white meat, dairy and processed sugar, whilst 
aggregate food processing prices rise 3.7%. The index of agricultural prices rises 2% compared with 
the Baseline, with the largest price rises in cattle and sheep (3.5%), pigs and poultry (2.6%) and 
horticultural sectors (3%). 
 
3.4.4. Removal of direct payments: FTA- (Scenario 2), UTL- (Scenario 4), WTO- (Scenario 6) 
 
Examining the relative market price effects within each of the Brexit scenarios due to the additional 
removal of first pillar CAP payments, the clear trend that emerges is that agricultural prices rise further 
(Annexes 3.6, 3.7, 3.8). This result is driven by cost considerations as the SAPS is removed from the 
agricultural factors of production, resulting in an increase in the unit cost of primary agricultural 
factors to the farmer. As a result, the increase in UK aggregate primary agricultural market prices 
attributed to the loss of first pillar payments is approximately 3.2%-3.4% across the three scenarios, 
with a concomitant price rise of approximately 0.3%-0.4% in the downstream food processing sectors. 
 
3.5. Agricultural factor markets 
 
Annex 3.9 shows the impacts on the UK’s agricultural land and agricultural labour markets under each 
of the Brexit scenarios. In each of scenarios 1, 3 and 5, the changes in UK agricultural labour 
employment and land supply shadow the trends for agricultural output. Agricultural labour supply 
changes are limited since total UK labour supply in each policy scenario is assumed unchanged, whilst 
the transfer of labour between agricultural and non-agricultural subsectors is highly sluggish.  
Similarly, relative changes in UK land supply are small since it is modelled as supply inelastic.  
Thus, under WTO, UK agricultural output rises compared with the Baseline (driven by downstream 
processed meat demand for upstream animal livestock – Section 3.3.3) drive up relative UK 
agricultural employment and land use by 1.7% and 0.1%, respectively. A similar relative effect is 
observed for the FTA scenario, although the magnitudes are considerably smaller since agricultural 
output only expands by 0.4% compared with the Baseline. Under UTL, the relative fall in UK 
agricultural production of 0.9% leads to agricultural land leaving the sector and land abandonment, 
although in both cases the impacts are very small. 
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With a highly inelastic UK land supply curve, land rent changes are larger in magnitude than the 
accompanying land supply changes. Moreover, with only a muted relative rise in UK land supply in the 
FTA and WTO scenarios (inelastic land supply function), land yields need to rise to bridge the increases 
in agricultural output. Under the UTL scenario where agricultural output falls relative to the Baseline, 
land yields also fall as output falls more than land abandonment. The marginal impact on agricultural 
wages is relatively limited under FTA+ (S1), UTL+ (S3) and WTO+ (S5), conditioned by relative rates of 
growth between competing agricultural and non-agricultural using sectors. 
With the additional removal of the Common Agricultural Policy first pillar payments in the UK in each 
of the three scenarios, both employment and wages are depressed in UK agriculture. For example, the 
agricultural employment reduction compared with the corresponding Brexit scenario where first pillar 
CAP payments are maintained, is between -2.4% and -2.7%. As a result, the wage depressing effect 
compared with the corresponding Brexit scenario where first pillar CAP payments are maintained, is 
approximately 3.5%-4%. Similar negative trends for land use and land rents are also observed (due to 
the lost capitalisation of first pillar CAP payments into land rents). In addition, land yields in the UK 
also fall with removal of first pillar payments (as agricultural output drops more rapidly than land 
abandonment). 
 
3.6. Trade Balances 
 
Annex 3.10 presents the impacts on the UK trade balance for each of the agriculture and food sectors 
compared with the Baseline by 2026 (2011 world prices, million pounds). Examining the UK trade 
balance with the EU27 in the Baseline, by 2026, there is a UK trade deficit in all primary agricultural 
and food markets. Of the total in primary agriculture (-£3,310 million), the vast majority is in the 
aggregate sectors of horticultural products (-£2,239 million) and ‘other crops’ (-£1,099 million). 
Similarly, from the trade deficit for food processing (-£14,993 million), most is attributed to meat (-
£4,462m million), dairy (-£2,075 million) and the large residual ‘other food processing’ (-£8,194 
million) sector. 
The UK also exhibits a trade deficit with the non-EU region in both of primary agriculture (-£4,730 
million) and food processing (-£1,499 million). Once again, the structure of the food processing deficit 
is largely attributed to the meat sector (-£1,487 million). In primary agriculture, the cropping sector 
trade balance (-£4,834 million) dominates, corresponding to the broad sectors of horticulture (-£2,763 
million) and other crops (-£1,215 million). In the following Sections, all results are presented in 
comparison with the Baseline. 
 
3.6.1. FTA+ (Scenario 1) 
 
In general, by 2026 agricultural and food trade balances with the EU27 improve compared with the 
Baseline by £26 million and £693 million, respectively. On the one hand, this result is due to the fact 
that the UK is a net importer with the EU. Thus, applying the same trade cost rises in both partners 
the expectation is that the monetary impact from reduced UK imports from the EU will be larger than 
the monetary impact from reduced UK exports to the EU.  
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The net UK trade balance impacts with the non-EU region reflect a price substitution effect as the UK 
imports more from the RoW to partially substitute the loss of EU imports, and a trade displacement 
of UK exports to the RoW. In all primary agricultural sectors, the import substitution effect is stronger, 
resulting in worsening UK agricultural and food trade balances with the RoW (-£193 million and £430 
million, respectively). 
Summing over the UK’s trade balances with the EU27 and the non-EU region, in primary agriculture, 
the situation worsens slightly compared with the Baseline in 2026 (-£167 million), whilst for processed 
food, there is a corresponding improvement (£262 million).  
 
3.6.2 UTL+ (Scenario 3) 
 
With the imposition of higher trade cost assumptions between the UK and the EU, the relative UK 
trade balance improvements with the EU27 reported in the FTA scenario are now even stronger under 
the UTL scenario (£291 million and £3,622 million in primary agriculture and food processing, 
respectively – Annex 3.10). In terms of the UK’s relative trade balance changes with the non-EU region, 
in addition to the effects of the UK’s displaced trade with the EU, as reported for FTA, these balance 
changes are also driven by simultaneous tariff elimination shocks on gross bilateral trade flows 
between the UK and the non-EU region. Examining Annex 3.1, non-EU tariff protection is higher for 
many agri-food activities, with the notable exceptions of pigs and poultry, meat activities, dairy, rice 
and sugar. Furthermore, the UK has trade deficits with the non-EU region in almost all commodities, 
which implies that non-EU tariff eliminations (vs. UK tariff eliminations) on gross bilateral trade flows 
would have to be considerably larger in order to generate relative trade balance improvements for 
the UK. Examining the results for primary agriculture and food processing, the relative UK trade 
balances with the non-EU region, in general, worsen compared with the Baseline (and under FTA). In 
some sectors (other food, vegetable oils), relative production improvements reported in Section 3.3.2, 
generate export increases to the non-EU region and, consequently, UK trade balance improvements 
compared with the Baseline.  
Examining the overall trade balance impact with the world (Annex 3.10), the UK primary agricultural 
and food trade balances worsen £435 million and £468 million, respectively, due to the UK’s stronger 
trade balance deterioration with the non-EU region.  
 
3.6.3. WTO+ (Scenario 5) 
 
With significant increases in trade protection imposed on gross trade flows between the UK on the 
one hand, and the EU and non-EU regions, both UK export and import volumes are reduced 
significantly. In the case of the meat and dairy sectors, relative UK trade balance improvements with 
the EU in red meat (£380 million), white meat (£2,299 million) and dairy (£949 million), due to the loss 
of tariff-free import access, are the key drivers of the UK's processed food trade balance improvement 
with the world (£2,145 million). Indeed, as noted in Section 3.3.3, in the case of the UK's red and white 
meat activities, domestic production rises strongly to fill the gap created by the reduction in imports. 
Elsewhere, the UK's dairy trade balance with the EU improves £949 million, which drives an overall UK 
trade balance improvement with the entire world of £844 million.  
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The shortfall in UK domestic agri-food consumption between the loss of UK imports from the EU and 
the rise in domestic production, must be met by imports from the non-EU region. This effect mitigates 
the fall in UK imports from the non-EU region, such that there are further trade balance deteriorations 
with the non-EU region in many sectors. 
 
3.6.4. Removal of direct payments: FTA- (Scenario 2), UTL- (Scenario 4), WTO- (Scenario 6) 
 
Under all scenarios, the removal of direct payments, results in relative falls in production and relative 
rises in market prices are reported (Sections 3.3 and 3.4). As a result, there is a further deterioration 
in UK’s agri-food trade position reflecting slight falls in UK competitiveness and exports (Annex 3.11 
vs Annex 3.10).  For example, Annex 3.11 reveals that without CAP Pillar 1 direct payments, the UK's 
primary agriculture trade balance with the world compared with the Baseline now deteriorates -£520 
million, -£794 million and -£892 million under FTA, UTL and WTO scenarios, respectively. This is 
compared with the corresponding figures reported in Annex 3.10 (CAP unchanged) of -£167 million,   
-£435 million and -£567 million. A similar observation is apparent for the UK's processed food trade 
balances. 
 
3.7. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
3.7.1.  Unskilled labour migration controls 
 
Further simulation experiments examine the impacts of an immigration policy limiting the agricultural 
unskilled labour force in the UK in the post Brexit period of 2019-2026. More specifically, in the period 
2019-2026, two experiments are conducted where the agricultural unskilled labour force is assumed 
to be reduced by 10% and 30% compared with the Baseline, under each of the six scenarios.15  
A cursory examination of Annex 3.12 shows, as expected, that for each of the six scenarios, the volume 
of output in all UK agricultural and food sectors falls further. For example, compared with the Baseline, 
FTA+ (scenario 1) reported a 0.4% increase in UK primary agricultural production, although with a 10% 
and 30% reduction in agricultural unskilled labour in the post-Brexit period, there is a further fall in UK 
agricultural output, compared with simulation 1, of -2.8% and -10.4%, respectively. The corresponding 
output volume fall in the UK crops sector is slightly larger than the agricultural average (-3.3% and -
12.1%, respectively), confirming that this sector is more intensive in unskilled labour. In all sectors and 
scenarios, the magnitude of the output contraction from the reduction in agricultural unskilled labour 
is broadly uniform across all scenarios.  
With the reduction in the labour force, unskilled labour wages and agricultural prices rise in the UK 
(Annex 3.12). Thus, relative to the result in each of the six policy scenarios, agricultural wages rise a 
further 5% and 17% with reductions in unskilled labour of 10% and 30%, respectively. As a result, 
corresponding rises in UK agricultural prices are approximately 3% and 11.5%, respectively, whilst in 
processed food, these price rises are approximately 0.3% and 1%-1.5%, respectively. 
                                                          
15 According to the House of Lords Committee (HoL, 2017, p.68), between 10% and 60% of UK agricultural unskilled labour is 
migrant. 
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The UK trade balance effect with the world is also shown in Annex 3.13. With the reduction in UK 
agricultural output and export volumes resulting from a smaller unskilled agricultural labour force, the 
trade balances also deteriorate. In each scenario, a 10% unskilled labour force reduction in the 2019-
2026 period generates an additional deterioration in the agricultural and food trade balances of 
approximately -£300 million and -£450 million across all the scenarios. Under the stronger assumption 
of a 30% unskilled labour reduction over the same period, the corresponding figures for each scenario 
are approximately -£1,000 million and -£1,600 million. 
With a reduction in the unskilled agricultural labour force the real UK growth impact is consistently 
worse for the UK, although the additional macro costs are negligible since the contraction in UK agri-
food production is offset by growth in the non-agricultural sectors. More specifically, compared with 
the macro results in Table 3.1 for each of the policy scenarios, the additional cost to the UK from the 
reduction in the unskilled agricultural labour force by 10% in the 2019-2026 period, is a further 
reduction in UK GDP by approximately 0.02% compared with the real GDP results shown in Table 3.1. 
Similarly, the 30% reduction in the UK’s agricultural unskilled labour results in a 0.11% additional loss 
in average UK GDP per annum.  
 
3.7.2. Exchange rates devaluation 
 
An additional set of experiments examines the impact of a devaluation of the pound with respect to 
all currencies (the pound has already slipped from €1.30 at the time of the Brexit referendum in June 
2016, to approximately €1.10 at the current time). In the following experiments, it is assumed that the 
pound devalues 10% and 20%, respectively, compared with the Baseline. In the CGE framework, this 
is modelled as a 10% (20%) uniform increase in the price of UK imports and an equal percentage 
decrease in the price of UK exports. It should be noted that this model reports the medium-term effect 
owing to the assumptions of market clearing and flexible factor markets within the UK’s agricultural 
and non-agricultural subsectors. As a result, the results will not capture the short-term boost to UK 
exports from the fall in sterling. Thus, with rising import prices, the UK imports inflation as imported 
intermediate inputs and final demands face higher per unit costs/prices. On the other hand, UK export 
competitiveness is enhanced by the cheaper pound on the foreign currency markets. The anticipated 
boost to exports, ceteris paribus, raises UK output in all activities which, in the medium term, increases 
the returns to the factors of production, and as a result, increases regional incomes in the UK. 
As a result, the medium-term impact is that of rising market prices (Annex 3.14) from the combined 
effect of imported inflation and rising UK factor prices. Thus, for UK primary agriculture, food 
processing and in total, the import trade balances with the world improve relatively (Annex 3.15) as 
imports fall compared with the Baseline (-3.5%, not shown), whilst the impact of inflation also leads 
to an export volume fall compared with the Baseline (-1.5%, not shown), which is mitigated by the 
devaluation of the pound. 
In macroeconomic terms, UK real per capita incomes fall (i.e., the weighted market price rise is greater 
than the increase in regional incomes). Compared with the per capita income results for each scenario 
presented in Table 3.1, the additional reduction in real per capita incomes under 10% and 20% 
devaluation is 0.6% and 1.4%, respectively (not shown). Furthermore, in comparison with the relative 
real GDP results for the UK presented in Table 3.1, under 10% and 20% devaluations, average per 
annum UK real growth falls a further 0.3% and 0.8%, respectively (not shown). With slower economic 
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growth in the UK due to the impacts of inflation, the volume of production in agri-food markets falls 
in relative terms compared with each corresponding scenario. For example, under a 10% devaluation 
of the pound, production volumes in primary agriculture and food processing approximately fall a 
further -1.2% and -0.4% in each scenario. Under 20% devaluation, the corresponding approximate 
output volume falls are -1.8% and -0.7%. 
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4. FAPRI-UK Partial Equilibrium Model: The Sector Analysis16  
 
4.1. Overview of the FAPRI-UK Model 
 
The FAPRI-UK partial equilibrium model captures the dynamic interrelationships among the variables 
affecting supply and demand in the main agricultural sectors of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, covering the dairy, beef, sheep, pigs, poultry, wheat, barley, oats, rapeseed and biofuel 
sectors. The UK model is fully incorporated within the EU grain, oilseed, livestock and dairy (GOLD) 
model17.  The modelling system has been substantially updated to account for the fact that in the case 
of Brexit the UK and EU markets would no longer be fully integrated.   
The modelling system is firstly simulated to generate Baseline projections based on the assumptions 
that current policies remain in place, specific macroeconomic projections hold18 and average weather 
conditions apply.  The Baseline used in this analysis covers the projection period 2017 to 2026, wherein 
it is assumed that the UK is fully integrated within the EU’s Single Market and the Customs Union.  In 
addition, post-2013 CAP reforms (including the phased introduction of flat rate payments, greening 
measures and the provision of coupled payments within some countries) remain in place for the 
duration of the entire projection period within the Baseline19.  
These Baseline projections provide a benchmark against which projections derived from policy 
scenarios can be compared and interpreted.  Within this study, the modelling system is further 
simulated to incorporate changes to trade arrangements and direct payments based on alternative 
Brexit scenarios.  The projections for the alternative Brexit scenarios are compared against the 
Baseline to isolate the impact of these policy changes.   
Note, we do not cover certain agriculture sectors such as sugar or examine the implications of Brexit 
on food products.  In addition, the model uses Agriculture in the UK data for imports/exports, which 
only covers raw meat trade; i.e. the data for UK imports/exports excludes processed meat.  Processed 
trade is significant within the poultry and pig meat sectors, hence disruptions to this trade may have 
knock-on market impacts on the agricultural sector.   
 
4.2. Results 
 
4.2.1. Main analysis  
 
A summary table containing percentage changes between each scenario and the Baseline at the end 
of the projection period for producer prices, production and value of output at the UK-level is provided 
below in Table 4.1. More detailed results on a per-sector basis at the UK-level and the country level 
(England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) are provided in the annexes for Chapter 4.  
                                                          
1616 This chapter was written by Siyi Feng, Myles Patton and John Davis.  
17 The FAPRI-UK model is operated by staff in AFBI- Economics, while the FAPRI-EU GOLD model is run by FAPRI at the 
University of Missouri. 
18 Projections of macroeconomic variables (including exchange rates, GDP growth rates, inflation and the oil price) are based 
on projections by IHS Global Insight. 
19 Although the Basic Payment Scheme payments are decoupled from production in an administrative sense, it is assumed 
that these payments exert a partial influence on production (30 percent production stimulating impact compared with the 
old coupled payments). 
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The following discussion primarily focuses on UK-level results but highlights individual country level 
results where notable differences exist. 
 
4.2.1.1. FTA+ (Scenario 1) and FTA- (Scenario 2) 
 
As described above, Scenarios 1 and 2 simulate the implementation of a comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement between the UK and EU-27, with tariff and quota free access for UK exports to the EU and 
tariff and quota free access for imports into the UK from the EU.  However, additional trade facilitation 
costs are incorporated.  These costs arise due to cross border administration paperwork (e.g. checking 
rules of origin), sanitary and phytosanitary inspections and delays at ports.  Note, these additional 
trade facilitation costs exclude wider non-tariff barriers.  
FTA+ (Scenario1)  
The projected changes under a Free Trade Agreement with the EU in conjunction with unaltered direct 
payments are relatively small (Table 4.1) since this entails limited disruption in trade.  UK producer 
prices increase slightly for commodities in which the UK is a net importer, e.g. beef, and the opposite 
for commodities in which the UK is a net exporter, e.g. barley, as the trade facilitation costs feed 
through to higher costs for the buyer (Figure 4.1).  Given the modest price impacts, changes in 
production and value of output are marginal.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Percentage Change in UK Commodity Prices under the Six Scenarios 
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Table 4.1. Percentage Change in UK Commodity Prices, Production and Value of Output 
(Main Analysis) 
 
    S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
    FTA+  FTA- UTL+ UTL- WTO+ WTO- 
Commodity               
Beef: Price 1% 2% -42% -42% 17% 17% 
 
Production 1% 0% -12% -13% 11% 10% 
  Output value 1% 1% -44% -44% 30% 29% 
Sheep: Price 0% 4% -19% -19% -23% -23% 
 
Production 0% -2% -5% -8% -9% -12% 
  Output value 0% 2% -18% -19% -31% -32% 
Pigs: Price 1% 1% -4% -4% 25% 25% 
 
Production 1% 1% -2% -2% 22% 22% 
  Output value 1% 1% -6% -6% 52% 52% 
Poultry: Price 0% 0% -3% -3% 15% 15% 
 
Production 0% 0% -1% -1% 8% 8% 
  Output value 0% 0% -4% -4% 24% 24% 
Milk & Price 1% 1% -8% -8% 28% 28% 
Dairy: Production 0% 0% -2% -2% 7% 6% 
  Output value 1% 1% -9% -10% 37% 36% 
Wheat: Price 0% 1% -2% -2% 7% 8% 
 
Production 0% -1% 0% -1% 1% 1% 
  Output value 0% 0% -2% -3% 8% 9% 
Barley: Price 0% 1% -8% -8% -5% -5% 
 
Production 0% -1% -1% -2% -1% -1% 
  Output value 0% 0% -10% -10% -6% -6% 
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FTA- (Scenario 2)  
The phased elimination of direct payments in conjunction with and UK-EU FTA results in a modest fall 
in suckler cow, dairy cow and ewe numbers (-4%, -0.3% and -2% compared to the Baseline).  The 
limited impact partly reflects the assumption that these payments do not have the same production 
stimulating impact as fully coupled payments (it is assumed that the production stimulating impact of 
these decoupled payments is 30%)20,21. In addition, although Pillar 1 direct payments are completely 
eliminated by 2024, they are still retained within this scenario analysis.   
It is projected that dairy cow numbers fall by less compared to suckler cow numbers as direct 
payments represent a smaller component of overall farm income for dairy farmers compared to beef 
farmers.  The projected decline in UK beef production is lower compared to UK suckler cow numbers 
due to the phased nature of the elimination of payments combined with the time lag of approximately 
two years between the birth of a calf and finished beef production; the limited decline in dairy cow 
numbers; and the increased slaughtering of suckler cows and heifers as the herd size contracts.  
It is projected under Scenario 2 that there are positive price responses in the beef and sheep sectors 
associated with the declines in production.  This price responses further contributes to the limited 
decline in livestock numbers.  Note that the elimination of Pillar 1 support has a more marked decline 
in suckler cow and ewe numbers in Scotland compared to elsewhere in the UK (Annex 4.5) due to the 
provision of coupled support within the Baseline in these sectors.  
 
4.2.1.2. Unilateral Trade Liberalisation: UTL+ (Scenario 3) and UTL- (Scenario 4) 
 
Tariffs on imports from the rest of the world and the EU are eliminated under Scenarios 3 and 4. In 
addition, exports from the UK to the EU are controlled via tariff rate quotas (TRQs) in order to avoid 
the possibility that the UK exports the majority of its domestic production to the EU (for higher prices) 
and imports from elsewhere in the world to meet domestic demand, which would significantly 
increase the supply on the EU market. The magnitude of these TRQs are based on recent historic levels 
on a per sector basis. 
 
UTL+ (Scenario 3) 
In the beef sector it is projected that there is a large increase in imports from the rest of the world 
under Scenario 3 in which import tariffs are eliminated and direct payments are unaltered (Figure 4.2a 
and Annex 4.1; end of chapter). This reflects the highly competitive nature of overseas’ suppliers, such 
as Brazil and Australia, and results in the domestic producer beef price falling close to world levels (-
42%; Figure 4.2b).  The projected decline in the producer beef price is substantial and, hence, would 
result in severe knock-on impacts on farm income in the beef sector (see Chapter 6).  It is important 
                                                          
20 The production stimulating coefficient means that the production impact of a £1 increase in direct payment is 30% of 
that of a £1 increase in price.   
21 The decline in livestock numbers would be greater if it is assumed that the production stimulating impact of decoupled 
payments is higher than incorporated within this main analysis.  For example, if it is assumed that the production stimulating 
impact of decoupled payments is 70%, suckler cow, dairy and ewe numbers fall by 7%, 1% and 4% respectively under the 
equivalent policy changes compared to the Baseline.  In addition, the associated positive price impacts are greater.  
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to acknowledge that there is some uncertainty concerning the extent to which UK prices may drop 
under such an extreme liberalisation scenario. The potential impact of different factors that may 
impact the decline in price is discussed in Box 4.1. The projected inflow of beef imports from the rest 
of the world displaces EU imports, which collapse to zero. Total beef imports increase compared to 
the Baseline due to a concurrent increase in consumption and decline in production. The rise in beef 
consumption reflects the large falls in price, while the decline in production is described in more detail 
below.  
 
Figure 4.2. Projected Changes in the Beef Sector under UTL+ 
 
Figure 4.2a. UK Imports and Exports (2026) Figure 4.2b. UK Beef Price and Production 
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Box 4.1. Factors affecting projected price decline under UTL+ (Scenario 3) 
Potential of RoW to meet expansion in imports 
 
It is implicitly assumed that there is sufficient capacity within the rest of the world to meet the expansion in UK imports.  This assumption is regarded 
as plausible since the increase in the level of imports to the UK under this scenario is relatively small compared to the global level of trade and 
imports are sourced from various countries. 
 
Extent to which imports from RoW may displace local produce 
 
It is also assumed within the FAPRI modelling system that consumers show equal preferences for local produce and that from the rest of the world, 
with the result that imports from the latter displace produce from both the EU-27 and the domestic market. Consumer preferences for local 
produce, supermarket sourcing policies and beef heterogeneity may dampen the increase in imports from the rest of the world.  In this case, the 
decline in the domestic beef price would be somewhat less marked than shown here.  It is difficult to gauge the extent to which these factors would 
result in a segmented market based on local and non-local produce.  Nevertheless, the segment for higher priced, locally produced produce would 
need to be considerable to support beef prices. 
 
Note that although the CGE model allows for imperfect substitution, the decline in the price of ‘red meat’ (beef and sheep meat) under this scenario 
using this alternative modelling system is still considerable.  The figures are not directly comparable but the 11% fall in the retail price for ‘red meat’ 
from the CGE model implies a 22% decline in the average producer price for beef and sheep.  This indicates that the projected price decline is less 
marked in the CGE model but not by a substantial margin (see Chapter 8 for a comparison of the CGE and PE results). 
It is important to underline the extreme nature of this scenario, with tariffs on imports being completely eliminated.  This scenario was specified to 
capture the outer boundary of possible market impacts.  A less radical reduction in tariffs would affect the competitiveness of imports from the 
rest of the world and possibly stem the inflow of imports.  
 
 
Relevant world price 
 
The Brazilian beef price is used as the reference world price within the modelling system under this scenario analysis as tariffs are eliminated to all 
importing countries and hence the most competitive price is the relevant benchmark price.  The differential between the UK and Brazilian beef 
prices within the modelling system is reasonably consistent with international datasets. As shown in Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2, the Brazilian R3 Steer 
Price has remained very competitive compared to the UK price over the recent historic period.  The same is true for other important beef exporters 
from South America such as Uruguay.  The competitiveness of produce from South America is underlined by cost data, with Agri-Benchmark data 
indicating that Brazilian costs are at least half that in the UK (Agri-Benchmark, 2016).   
Australia is also an important exporter on the global beef market.  While the differential between the UK and Australian price narrowed in 2015, 
this reflected drought conditions in the latter.  Drought conditions have been less severe over the last year and consequently, the historic price gap 
is beginning to re-emerge.  
 
Figure 4.3. International Comparison of R3 
Steer Price 
Table 4.2. Average, Maximum and Minimum Differential between UK and 
Brazil, Uruguay and Australia R3 Steer Prices between May 2015 and April 
2018 
 
 
Source Price quoted in Euros from Bord Bia https://www.bordbia.ie/industry/farmers/pricetracking/cattle/pages/prices.aspx 
UK Export potential 
While it is projected that there is a 55% increase in UK beef exports to the rest of the world, this is from a small base; UK exports to the RoW 
increase from 19 to 29 thousand tonnes.  The relatively small absolute expansion partly reflects the unilateral nature of the scenario in which it is 
assumed that existing exporting trading arrangement remain unchanged.   
 
The potential for expanding UK beef exports may be greater under a Bilateral Trade Agreement with specific non-EU countries, particularly for 
lower value cuts.  Targeting markets that value these cuts more highly would help to increase the whole carcass value, but would require a 
substantial increase in exports to support the price transmitted to the producer. 
 
58 
The lower projected producer price is not offset by a significant fall in input costs, partly because 
domestic grain prices are closer to their world equivalents, and consequently cattle numbers fall 
significantly. For example, UK beef cow numbers are 37% lower under Scenario 3 compared to the 
Baseline at the end of the projection period22.  The projected decline in beef production is less marked 
(-12%) due to a lagged effect and progeny from the dairy herd supporting beef production.  
The projected decline in beef production under UTL+ (Scenario 3) is more marked in Scotland (-20%) 
compared to elsewhere in the UK (-10 to -13%). This is attributable to differences in the proportion of 
beef sourced from the dairy herd across the UK, with a higher proportion of beef animals coming from 
the progeny of the dairy herd in England, Wales and Northern Ireland compared to Scotland. For 
example, in 2015, dairy cows accounted for 55% to 63% of total cows in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, compared to 30% in Scotland. This variability results in a greater fall in beef production in 
Scotland in this scenario since it is projected that trade liberalisation has a substantial negative impact 
on beef cow numbers across the UK, but a modest negative impact on dairy cow numbers.   
The projected fall in the value of output in the beef sector is particularly acute. By the end of the 
projection period, the UK beef sector value of output is 44% lower under Scenario 3 compared to the 
Baseline. The value of output is partially supported by TRQ exports from the UK to the EU since EU 
and UK producer prices diverge under this scenario; EU prices exhibit a small decline in response to 
the rechannelling of produce to the EU-27 market that previously would have been exported to the 
UK, but this price fall is significantly below that for the UK. However, the extent to which this supports 
the beef value of output is relatively small due to the limited quantity of TRQs.  
Similar to the beef sector, the sheep sector is exposed to strong international competition, with 
unilateral trade liberalisation leading to the inflow of more imports from the rest of the world and a 
significant fall in the domestic producer price (-19%). The decline in price leads to a fall in sheep meat 
production and a rise in consumption. More imports from the rest of the world are required (+59%) 
to meet UK consumption since UK exports to the EU are largely maintained through the TRQ23.   
The projected value of output in the sheep sector is 18% lower under this scenario compared to the 
Baseline. While this represents a significant fall, the impact is tempered by the large volume of 
produce that is exported from the UK to the EU via the TRQ. As in the beef sector, the UK sheepmeat 
price falls relative to the EU price, which deepens the importance of exports to the EU in supporting 
the sheep sector. 
 
 
                                                          
22 Note within this analysis it is assumed that UK producers receive the full benefits of the TRQs; within the model beef cow 
numbers are a function of an average domestic/EU price, weighted according to the level of exports from the UK to the EU.  
This implies that UK exporters receive the full EU price, with no loss due to allocation or administration of TRQs.  
23 There is a question mark concerning the significant increase in imports from the rest of the world to the UK given the 
current underutilisation of TRQs by New Zealand.  This is dependent on the extent to which a sheepmeat exporter such as 
Australia, which has consistently fully used its quota (but from a significantly lower base), can increase its export potential. 
It is effectively assumed that there is sufficient capacity in the rest of the world to meet UK consumption.  Under this trade 
liberalisation scenario total imports from the rest of the world equates to 162 thousand tonnes.  In order to assess the 
importance of this assumption, sensitivity analysis is undertaken in which imports to the UK from the rest of the world are 
capped at a level equal to the existing level of TRQ imports to the EU from New Zealand (139 thousand tonnes). Under this 
sensitivity analysis, the projected decrease in the UK sheepmeat price is 13%.  
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The projected falls in producer prices in the pig and poultry sectors are less pronounced (-4% and -3% 
respectively), reflecting the more competitive nature of UK prices in these sectors. Projected input 
costs also exhibit a moderate decline and hence the projected declines in production and values of 
output are relatively modest.   
In the dairy sector, cheese and butter prices exhibit price declines under UTL+ (Scenario 3) (-7% and -
20% respectively). These price impacts are sensitive to the underlying Baseline projections, including 
a high projected EU butter Baseline price relative to its respective world price and the positive 
influence of population growth on UK demand.   
Due to data availability issues it has not been possible to model UK market clearing prices for SMP and 
WMP. Thus, changes to the trading arrangements for these commodities have not been explicitly 
incorporated within this scenario analysis.  Nevertheless, it is expected that the price changes for these 
commodities under a Unilateral Trade Liberalisation scenario would be small since domestic prices are 
close to world levels; i.e. world prices would limit the extent to which UK powder prices can fall.  
Implicitly it is assumed within this analysis that the changes in UK SMP and WMP powder prices are 
negligible. 
The projected changes in dairy commodity prices have a depressing impact on producer milk prices, 
with those in GB falling by around 8% and the NI producer milk price falling by 6% (Figure 4.4). The 
declines in producer milk prices have a slight depressing impact on milk production. Apart from 
Northern Ireland, the projected fall in milk production has a disproportionate negative impact on milk 
for manufacture as the quantity of milk required for liquid consumption is relatively stable. In 
Northern Ireland, milk for manufacture increases since raw milk that was previously exported to 
Republic of Ireland is retained for local processing within this scenario analysis24.   
 
Figure 4.4. Projected Producer Milk Prices in England and Northern Ireland under UTL+ 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Note, it could have alternatively been assumed that there is a TRQ for raw milk exported from NI to RoI.  The price impact 
of this alternative assumption is negligible since domestic commodity prices are effectively determined by world prices in 
this particular scenario.   
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In the crop sector, it is projected that wheat and barley prices decline under a Unilateral Trade 
Liberalisation scenario. However, the price reductions are relatively modest (-2% and -8% for wheat 
and barley respectively) since UK prices are fairly close to world levels within the Baseline. The price 
decline is greater for barley compared to wheat since under the Baseline there is a significant surplus 
of the former. In addition, feed demand is a greater component of domestic use for barley and this 
component falls in response to the decline in livestock numbers.  In addition, feed demand is a greater 
component of domestic use for barley and this component falls in response to the decline in livestock 
numbers.  Within the rapeseed sector, the impacts of changes in tariffs under the different scenarios 
are expected to be minimal as there is no import tariff on this crop.  
The FAPRI model does not explicitly provide projections of consumer prices.  However, it is clear that 
the significantly lower beef and sheep producer prices following trade liberalisation would have a 
knock-on downward impact on retail prices. Based on the assumption that existing producer-retailer 
price spreads remain the same, a 42% decline in the beef producer price implies a 21% decline in the 
aggregate retail price of beef, while a 19% decline in the producer sheepmeat price implies a 10% 
decline in the aggregate retail price of sheepmeat. The projected declines in production, combined 
with increases in consumption, result in notable shifts in UK self-sufficiency in the beef and sheep 
sectors (Table 4.3). At the end of the projection period, UK beef self-sufficiency is 58% under Scenario 
3, compared to 76% in the Baseline. Similarly, UK sheepmeat self-sufficiency falls from 93% in the 
Baseline to 79% under UTL+.   
 
Table 4.3. UK Self-Sufficiency under the Baseline and Six Selected Scenarios (2026) 
 
Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
  
FTA+ FTA-  UTL+ UTL- WTO+ WTO- 
Beef 76% 77% 77% 58% 58% 88% 87% 
Sheepmeat 93% 93% 92% 79% 77% 79% 77% 
Pigmeat 57% 58% 58% 55% 55% 76% 76% 
Poultry 79% 79% 79% 77% 77% 86% 86% 
Cheese 62% 62% 62% 59% 58% 75% 75% 
Butter 80% 80% 80% 68% 68% 99% 99% 
Wheat 100% 99% 99% 101% 100% 97% 97% 
Barley 125% 125% 124% 124% 123% 114% 114% 
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UTL- (Scenario 4) 
The gradual elimination of direct payments in conjunction with the unilateral elimination of import 
tariffs has a further downward impact on suckler cow, dairy cow and ewe numbers (Annex 4.1 at the 
end of chapter). The projected declines in livestock numbers has a knock-on impact on beef, 
sheepmeat and milk production. The difference between with and without direct payments is more 
marked in connection with the Unilateral Trade Liberalisation agreement trade arrangements (UTL) 
compared to the UK-EU FTA. For example, the additional decline in suckler cow numbers under 
Scenario 4 (UTL-) compared to Scenario 3 (UTL+) is approximately 8%. In contrast, suckler cow 
numbers are 4% lower under Scenario 2 (FTA-) compared to Scenario 1 (FTA-). The more marked 
impact under Unilateral Trade Liberalisation is attributable to the inflow of imports from the rest of 
the world, which prevent prices from rising; i.e. producer prices are projected to fall by the same 
amount under UTL (Scenarios 3 and 4).25  
 
4.2.1.3. WTO (EU Tariff Schedule): WTO+ (Scenario 5) and WTO- (Scenario 6) 
 
Under scenarios 5 and 6, tariffs equivalent to the default bound EU MFN tariffs are applied on UK 
exports to the EU and likewise imports from the EU to the UK. Within the modelling system 
commodities are modelled at the aggregate level and thus it is necessary to impose a single tariff for 
each commodity, rather than multiple tariff lines. In the case of meats, for example, the relevant 
carcass MFN tariffs are used as representative of all meat products in that category. The MFN tariffs 
implemented in this scenario are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4. Bound MFN Tariffs Implemented under UTL (Scenarios 5 and 6) 
 WTO MFN Tariff 
Beef Carcass 12.8% plus €176.8/100kg 
Sheep Carcass 12.8% plus €171.3/100kg 
Pig Carcass €53.6/100kg 
Chicken Carcass €32.5/100kg 
Cheese (Cheddar) €167.1/100kg 
Butter €189.6/100kg 
Wheat# €95/tonne 
Barley €93/tonne 
#: Refers to the tariff for low and medium quality wheat, which encompasses the categories of wheat mainly exported from 
the UK to the EU.  Although the EU does operate a TRQ for these wheats, the UK’s export volumes are likely to exceed the 
erga omnes quantities allowed, and so face the EU’s full MFN tariff of €95 per tonne.  This tariff does not apply to high quality 
wheat but the UK does not export this category of wheat. 
                                                          
25 Note the above analysis is again based on the assumption that the production stimulating impact of decoupled payments 
is 30%.  When an alternative assumption of 70% is used, the additional decline in suckler cow numbers under Scenario 4 
(UTL-DP) compared to Scenario 3 (UTL+DP) is 12%.   
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It is further assumed under these scenarios that in terms of exports from the UK to the rest of the 
world the UK inherits the EU’s tariff structure to third countries, while in terms of imports from the 
rest of the world the TRQs utilised by the UK from third countries are retained.  
 
WTO+ (Scenario 5) 
The default bound MFN tariffs are in the main very high and hence the imposition of these tariffs leads 
to significant adjustments in trade between the UK and EU.  Under Scenario 5 in which default bound 
MFN tariffs are imposed and direct payments are unaltered, the projected changes in trade have 
significant impacts on domestic markets, with the direction of impact again depending on whether 
the UK is a net importer or a net exporter of the relevant commodity.  
In the beef sector, the imposition of high tariffs leads to a collapse in trade between the UK and EU 
(Figure 4.5a). Available beef supplies within the UK domestic market fall significantly since the UK is a 
large net importer in the Baseline. As a result, the UK beef price increases markedly. The rise in beef 
price is sufficient for non-EU countries to export beef to the UK paying the full high tariff. As a result, 
the rise in the UK price is effectively curbed the ‘World Price +MFN Tariff’. At the end of the projection 
period the UK producer beef price is 17% higher under Scenario 5 compared to the Baseline.  
Production responds positively to the price rise. The projected increases in producer price and 
production, results in a 30% increase in the value of UK beef output. 
Assuming the existing producer-retailer price spreads remains the same, the 17% increase in producer 
price implies an 8.5% increase in the aggregate retail price of beef.  The higher prices have a downward 
impact on consumption; UK beef consumption is 3% lower under Scenario 5 compared to the Baseline 
in 2026. 
Figure 4.5. Projected Changes in the Beef Sector under WTO+ 
 
Figure 4.5a. UK Imports and Exports (2026) Figure 4.5b. UK Beef Price and Production 
 
 
Similarly, the UK is a net importer in the pig and poultry sectors in the Baseline and hence producer 
prices increase is response to the imposition of high tariffs, which greatly reduce the competitiveness 
of EU imports.  Again, the increase in prices in these sectors stimulates rises in production. Projected 
butter and cheese prices within the dairy sector also rise due to the displacement of imports from the 
EU-27, which are historically high. The wheat price also increases as the reduction in imports from the 
EU cannot be easily replaced from elsewhere due to the application of high tariffs. The projected 
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increase in wheat production is small due to the observed inelastic relationship between returns and 
crop production. 
Underlying this analysis, it was necessary to make an assumption regarding exports in the poultry 
sector to reflect the carcass balance issue. In general, UK consumers show a preference for breast 
meat compared to thighs and wings. As a result, the latter cuts have a relatively low value in the UK 
and existing exports from the UK predominantly consist of these cuts. Within this scenario, exports 
from the UK to the EU collapse due to the imposition of the high tariff. Since these cuts are valued 
more highly elsewhere, it is assumed that the UK is able to find markets for these cuts in the rest of 
the world and total export levels are maintained at the Baseline level. 
It is also important to note that the data for UK imports/exports excludes processed meat. Processed 
trade is considerable within the poultry and pigmeat sectors and thus the model results do not capture 
the market impacts of disruption to this trade. In particular, a significant volume of processed poultry 
meat is imported from third countries, while the volume of imports of raw poultry meat from third 
countries is small. However, processed poultry meat imports from third countries are sourced through 
TRQs, which are largely filled (the out of quota tariff is very high - €1,024 per 1000 kg). Thus, if the 
TRQ and out-of-quota tariff is retained the scope for increasing processed poultry imports to fill the 
supply-demand gap within this scenario is small. 
In terms of pigmeat, almost all imported meat is from other EU member states. The MFN tariffs for 
different categories of processed pigmeat are high (e.g. €747 per 1000 kg for uncooked sausages) and 
hence the application of these tariffs to imports from the EU would likely reduce available supplies 
further.  This would result in a somewhat larger UK price increase than shown in this analysis. 
Within the dairy sector, the increase in producer milk prices is higher in England, Wales and Scotland 
(+27% to +28%) compared to Northern Ireland (+17%) where there is a much higher reliance on the 
milk powder market (Figure 4.6). Within Northern Ireland the increases in cheese and butter prices 
have a smaller impact on the producer milk price. By the end of the projection period, the price 
differential between the English and Northern Ireland producer milk price is 6.2 pence per litre. This 
differential could potentially lead to supplies of raw milk being drawn from NI to GB. 
 
Figure 4.6. Producer milk prices 
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In contrast, lower producer prices are projected in the sheep and barley sectors. Within the Baseline 
the UK is a net exporter in these sectors. The introduction of MFN tariffs diminishes the 
competitiveness and thus the volumes of UK exports to the EU, which leads to increases in available 
supplies within the domestic market.   
The negative price impact is particularly marked in the sheep sector due to the large quantity of 
sheepmeat currently exported to the EU from the UK. Despite the rechannelling of this produce onto 
the domestic market, the UK continues to import significant volumes of sheepmeat from the rest of 
the world through TRQs (Figure 4.7a). Although the UK price falls sharply, TRQ imports from the rest 
of the world remain competitive and hence the projected change is limited. If there were less imports 
via the TRQ the negative price impact would be smaller. 
The projected fall in the producer price has a depressing impact on UK sheepmeat production (Figure 
4.7b) and thus on the value of output. In addition, the fall in producer price would have a depressing 
impact on consumer prices. Based on the assumption that existing producer-retailer price spreads 
remain the same, a 23% decline in the producer sheepmeat price implies an 11.5% fall in the aggregate 
retail price of sheepmeat. Consumption responds positively in response to the lower price (+7%).   
 
Figure 4.7. Projected Changes in the Sheep Sector under WTO+ 
 
Figure 4.7a. UK Imports and Exports (2026) Figure 4.7b. UK Sheep Price and Production 
 
The projected changes in production and consumption lead to shifts in self-sufficiency. Under Scenario 
5, the positive production effects, combined with the falls in consumption, results in a rise in UK self-
sufficiency in the beef, pigmeat, poultry and dairy sectors.  In contrast, self-sufficiency declines in the 
sheepmeat and barley sectors in line with the falls in production and increases in consumption.  The 
impact is particularly marked in the sheep sector.  Under Scenario 5 sheepmeat self-sufficiency at the 
end of the projection period is 79%, compared to 93% in the Baseline.   
WTO- (Scenario 6) 
The phased elimination of direct payments under Scenario 6 has a downward impact on livestock 
numbers and production in the beef, dairy and sheep sectors. Note that in the beef sector the 
differential in livestock numbers/production between with and without direct payments is less marked 
when WTO trade arrangements apply, compared to Unilateral Trade Liberalisation or a bespoke free 
trade agreement with the EU. This partly reflects the significant increase in value of output in this 
sector when the WTO tariffs are imposed, which diminishes the relative importance of direct 
payments. 
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4.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis: 10% and 20% depreciation of the Sterling 
 
Sensitivity analysis is undertaken with regards to the UTL+ and WTO+ (Scenarios 3 and 5) and results 
are reported in Table 4.5. Within this sensitivity analysis the depreciation of the pound has a marked 
upward impact on output prices under both the UTL and WTO scenarios. The transmission of the 
depreciation in the exchange rate and the projected price change is high. Despite the increase in 
output prices, it is projected that the increases in production within the livestock sectors are small as 
input costs also increase. 
Table 4.5. Percentage Change in UK Commodity Prices, Production and Value of Output (Sensitivity 
Analysis) 
  UTL+ (S3) WTO+ (S5) 
    Main 
Analysis 
10% 
Dep. 
20% 
Dep. 
Main 
Analysis 
10% 
Dep. 
20% 
Dep. 
Commodity               
Beef: Price -42% -37% -31% 17% 28% 38% 
 
Production -12% -12% -12% 11% 13% 16% 
  Output value -44% -38% -33% 30% 45% 60% 
Sheep: Price -19% -12% -5% -23% -16% -9% 
 
Production -5% -5% -4% -9% -10% -10% 
  Output value -18% -9% -1% -31% -24% -18% 
Pigs: Price -4% 5% 13% 25% 35% 46% 
 
Production -2% 1% 3% 22% 25% 27% 
  Output value -6% 5% 16% 52% 69% 87% 
Poultry: Price -3% 6% 15% 15% 25% 36% 
 
Production -1% 2% 4% 8% 11% 13% 
  Output value -4% 8% 20% 24% 39% 53% 
Milk & Price -8% 3% 10% 28% 40% 51% 
Dairy: Production -2% 0% 2% 7% 10% 12% 
  Output value -9% 3% 13% 37% 53% 70% 
Wheat: Price -2% 7% 16% 7% 15% 25% 
 
Production 2% 1% -1% -8% -9% -11% 
  Output value 0% 8% 16% -2% 5% 11% 
Barley: Price -8% 1% 9% -5% 4% 13% 
 
Production -1% 0% 1% -1% 1% 2% 
  Output value -10% 0% 10% -6% 4% 15% 
66 
 
67 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
The results from the partial equilibrium model demonstrate the extent to which the type of trade 
agreement could result in different price and production impacts in the UK depending on the 
disruption to trade patterns. In general, a bespoke free trade agreement results in the least disruption 
to trade flows and hence, the estimated market impacts are relatively small. It is important to bear in 
mind that this analysis excludes wider non-tariff barriers. Over time further costs may be incurred due 
to the emergence of non- tariff barriers, e.g. due to divergence in regulations between the UK and EU-
27, which would result in larger impacts than shown in this analysis.  
The projected impacts are larger under the two other simulated trade arrangements. All sectors 
experience producer price and production declines under the Unilateral Trade Liberalisation scenario.  
The impacts are particularly marked in the beef and sheep sectors where international competition is 
very strong. In contrast, the direction of the market impact varies across sectors under the WTO 
scenario, depending on whether the UK is a net importer or a net exporter of the relevant commodity. 
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5. Farm-level analysis: the ScotFarm Linear Programming Model26  
 
5.1. Brief Introduction to Phase 3 
 
Phase 3 aims to assess the impacts of selected trade and domestic policy scenarios on farm-level 
production decisions and financial performance across a range of farm types and sizes. It applies price 
projections from the CGE and FAPRI models (Chapters 3 and 4) to a range of representative farm-level 
circumstances derived from Farm Business Survey (FBS) data and represented within ScotFarm(a 
linear programming model of farm production).   
The specific Phase 3 objectives are to explore:  
- What are the impacts on farm production decisions? 
- What are the effects on commercial performance across major farm types in the UK? 
- How will impacts vary within and across England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales? 
  
5.2. Overview of the ScotFarm Model 
 
ScotFarm is a farm level dynamic linear programming (LP) model that optimises farm profit subject to 
a number of limiting farm resources (Shrestha, 2017). The current version of the model was originally 
developed at SRUC in 2012 to conduct impact assessments of CAP reforms on Scottish farms, with 
previous versions having been used for studies of English dairy farms (Shrestha, 2004) and Irish 
livestock and crop farms (Shrestha et al., 2007; Hennessy et al., 2008).  
The model is based on farming system analysis and includes biophysical and management 
relationships to link production to resource requirements. For example, land, number of livestock, 
labour effort and purchased inputs required to generate a given volume of different outputs. These 
are combined with data on the prices of inputs and outputs to calculate farm profit as an objective 
function to be maximised.  
Although profit can be defined in different ways, Farm Business Income (FBI) is generally now regarded 
as the preferred measure and is used here as an indicator of financial returns to unpaid labour and 
capital invested for sole-trader and partnership farms (or return on shareholder capital for corporate 
farms).  Unlike Net Farm Income (NFI), no account is taken of imputed wages or imputed rents. To 
account for time-lags in farm adjustments, for example due to the length of breeding cycles, the model 
optimises over a time frame of multiple years rather than a single year.  
It is acknowledged that profit maximisation may not be the actual objective of farmers, but as a first 
approximation it allows exploration of how production patterns and financial performance may evolve 
in response to Brexit-induced change. As such, it extends static, partial-budget type analysis (e.g. 
Bradley & Hill, 2017) to consider how farm-level incomes and production patterns may respond to 
changing market and policy signals. 
 
                                                          
26 This chapter was written by Shailesh Shrestha and Andrew Moxey.  
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5.3. ScotFarm Data and Configuration 
 
ScotFarm is configured to represent a given farm by using information on resource levels and usage 
patterns plus the prices of inputs and outputs. This information can be assumed (e.g. for 
demonstration or testing purposes) or derived from the profile of an actual farm as revealed through 
a case-study visit or a farm survey exercise. 
The Farm Business Survey (FBS) is the most extensive and detailed survey of farm businesses 
conducted annually across the UK.27 It dates back to the 1930s and is part of the Farm Accountancy 
Data Network (FADN) used to estimate farm incomes on a consistent basis across the European Union 
(EU).  FBS data encompass a mix of physical and financial variables, allowing detailed profiles of farm 
characteristics and performance to be constructed and compared across and between different 
locations and years. As such, it represents the most comprehensive farm database available and was 
chosen as the basis for configuring ScotFarm for this project. 
FBS data for England and Wales were obtained from the UK Data Archive held by the University of 
Essex, and directly from relevant government officials for Northern Ireland and Scotland. This process 
took longer than expected, partly due to unexpected differences in the formats and descriptions of 
individual datasets, leading to delays in actual modelling analysis.   
Although data for the three years from 2013/14 to 2015/16 were obtained, only data for 2015/16 
were subsequently used because inspection revealed that resource levels and usage patterns did not 
vary significantly and averaging across three years reduced the overall (common) sample size (and 
also 2015/16 is the first year where farms received Pillar 1 payments under the Basic Payment 
Scheme).  
Whereas the original intention had been to use clustering analysis to generate a novel farm typology, 
Steering Group advice coupled with delays in obtaining the FBS data led to adoption of the pre-existing 
farm size and type classifications used for government reporting.  This avoided further delays, but also 
more positively facilitates easier comparisons with routinely published FBS analysis.  
Not all farm sizes and types are represented sufficiently in the FBS to support meaningful analysis. In 
particular, very small (essentially part-time) farms are excluded and the numbers of specialist 
horticultural, pig and poultry farms are low.   Consequently, attention was restricted to small, medium, 
large and very large sized farms and to cereal, general cropping, dairy, LFA grazing (i.e. beef and 
sheep), lowland grazing (i.e. beef and sheep) and mixed farm types.  The FBS sample in each part of 
the UK for each farm size and type in 2015/16 is shown in Annex 5.1.  
For each farm size and type combination, a representative farm was constructed by averaging across 
the relevant FBS sub-sample. ScotFarm was then configured to each of these representative farms and 
run under each of the selected six Brexit scenarios as compared to the Baseline scenario. This 
modelling approach is outlined in Figure 5.1  
 
 
                                                          
27 For example, see www.farmbusinesssurvey.co.uk/about/Default.aspx for England and Wales coverage. 
70 
Figure 5.1. Outline of ScotFarm usage 
 
 
In terms of production responses, ScotFarm was configured to restrict the available production 
possibility set to activities currently observed for the given representative farm. That is, under each 
scenario, the model chooses the mix and level of farm activities to maximise FBI but only from those 
activities already present.  Activities can expand or shrink, but within bounds. For example, herd sizes 
can increase, but only up to the capacity of existing capital (such as a milking parlour).   
This avoids the need to address investments in human and physical capital required to introduce new 
activities or expand beyond current infrastructure constraints but does dampen structural 
responsiveness by limiting scope for resource re-allocation. This approach may be too conservative 
given the likely pressures for structural change arising from (uncompensated) removal of Pillar 1 direct 
payments support. Nevertheless, it has been deployed here as a pragmatic initial step. 
The next section summarises ScotFarm results for changes in Farm business Income (FBI) under each 
scenario, by farm type and country. Annex 5.2 presents the accompanying Tables, with Annex 5.3 
reporting associated changes in livestock numbers on dairy, LFA grazing and lowland grazing farms. It 
is important to note that ScotFarm embodies a number of simplifying assumptions, including profit 
maximisation and linear production technologies, which means that results should be treated as 
indicative projections of the likely direction and order-of-magnitude of change rather than precise 
predictions. Similarly, the use of “average” representative farms necessarily masks variation in 
individual farm circumstances and, again, attention should be focused on the broad pattern of results 
rather than on specific figures per se.  
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Farm level data 
(FBS 2016)
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Baseline scenario (pre-
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FTA+
UTL+
FAPRI trade scenarios (price 
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5.4. Results 
 
The combination of four farm sizes with six different farm types modelled across a Baseline and six 
scenarios generates a relatively large volume of results.  Farm income results are summarised below 
in graphical form (Tables are also presented in Annex 5.2), by farm type and country. For ease of 
comparison, the same colour keys and vertical scale are used throughout.  
In general, the direction of impacts on farm income are similar in each country. For example, incomes 
rise where output prices are projected to increase, fall where prices are projected to decrease and are 
higher with support payments than without. Loss of support payments is generally a more significant 
determinant of income than price changes. Income reductions are most severe under the UTL- 
scenario and income gains highest under WTO+. The FTA+ scenario has the least impact. However, 
there are some differences between and within farm types, and across countries. This variation 
reflects a combination of factors.   
Between-type differences largely reflect differential exposure to price changes and/or current 
dependence on support payments. For example, cereal prices vary by less than livestock prices across 
the scenarios and dairy farms are generally relatively less reliant upon support payments. There is also 
some variation between countries in terms of current support payments and cost structures. For 
example, the BPS rates differ across the UK and, reflecting variation in land quality and remoteness, 
farm areas and input prices are not uniform. However, some reported variation also arises as an 
artefact of the farm type classification. 
Although some farms are genuinely single-enterprise specialists, many have two or more different 
activities. For example, livestock and cereal enterprises may co-exist, as can dairy and beef 
enterprises.  Consequently, many farms’ output comprises a combination of activities. To reflect this, 
the farm type classification is based on the predominant enterprise, as measured by output. For 
example, a farm is classified as specialist dairy if at least two-thirds of its (standard) output arises from 
a dairy enterprise. This means that there can be some variation in the enterprise mix of individual 
farms within a given type category,28 both within and between countries. For example, the mix of 
cereal crops can vary across “cereal” farms of different sizes and in different countries, as can the mix 
of beef, sheep and dairy enterprises across livestock farms. 
In terms of production patterns, ScotFarm’s configuration allows for adjustments within the current 
farming system and the results reveal varying degrees of responsiveness. In general, significant 
adjustments only occur under the more extreme scenarios, where prices move beyond their recently 
observed range and/or support payments are removed. For example, reductions in sheep numbers by 
up to 100% under WTO and UTL scenarios, particularly if without support payments, on some LFA and 
Lowland grazing farms of all sizes in all countries. Similarly, reductions in beef cattle numbers of up to 
100% under UTL scenarios, with or without support payments, on some LFA and Lowland grazing 
farms of all sizes in all countries. Some further, brief descriptions of the income results are presented 
alongside each graph below.   
  
                                                          
28 It also means that a farm’s type can shift through changes in output prices even if actual physical production activities 
remain the same. 
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5.4.1. Specialist cereal farms 
 
Figure 5.2. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of cereal farm in England 
Higher wheat prices under 
FTA and (more so) WTO 
improve cereal incomes in 
England, with lower UTL 
prices reducing income 
slightly.  However, gains are 
more than offset by loss of 
support payments.  Gains and 
losses are essentially  
proportional to farm size.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of cereal farm in Northern Ireland 
Higher wheat prices under 
WTO improve cereal incomes 
for large and medium farms, 
but lower barley prices hit 
small farms. UTL affects all 
farms, with removal of 
support increasing losses 
under all scenarios. NB. no 
very large farms in Northern 
Ireland sample. 
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Figure 5.4. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of cereal farm in Scotland 
Slightly higher barley prices 
under FTA improve incomes 
very slightly in Scotland, but 
lower barley prices under 
WTO and (more so) UTL 
reduce incomes. Losses are 
amplified by removal of 
support payments.  Gains and 
losses are essentially  
proportional to farm area. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of cereal farm in Wales 
Higher wheat prices under FTA 
and (more so) WTO improve 
cereal incomes in Wales, with 
lower UTL prices reducing 
income slightly.  However, 
income effects are dominated 
by loss of support payments.  
Gains and losses are essentially  
proportional to farm area. NB: 
there are no very large cereal 
farms in Welsh FBS sample. 
 
 
5.4.2. General cropping farms  
Figure 5.6. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of general cropping farm in England 
As with cereal farms (but 
diluted by other crops), higher 
wheat prices under WTO 
improve cropping incomes in 
England, with FTA and (more 
so) UTL reducing incomes.  
However, loss of direct 
payments dominates losses.  
Gains and losses are essentially  
proportional to farm area. 
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Figure 5.7. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of general cropping farm in N Ireland 
Unlike general cropping farms 
elsewhere, those in Northern 
Ireland are dominated by 
horticulture – which benefits 
from higher prices under WTO 
scenarios, and is also less 
dependent on support 
payments NB. no very large 
farms in FBS sample for 
Northern Ireland.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of general cropping farm in Scotland 
Incomes fall under all 
scenarios, mostly reflecting 
lower barley prices but 
particularly loss of support 
payments. Losses are 
essentially  proportional to 
farm area, with Scottish farms 
having a smaller area than 
English farms, but bigger than 
Welsh farms. 
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Figure 5.9. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of general cropping farm in Wales 
Relatively little impact from 
price changes, with removal 
of support dominating 
income reductions.    Changes 
essentially proportional to 
farm area (very large farms 
more than twice area of large 
farm).  NB. no medium or 
small farms in Welsh FBS 
sample. 
 
 
 
5.4.3. Dairy farms 
Figure 5.10. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of dairy farm in England 
Incomes rise under WTO+ due 
to higher milk prices.  Lower 
prices under UTL+ lead to 
slight income losses.  Removal 
of support amplifies losses 
under UTL, introduces losses 
under FTA and reduces gain 
under WTO.  Gains and losses 
are essentially proportional to 
farm herd size and area. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of dairy farm in Northern Ireland 
Incomes rise slightly under FTA+ 
and, much more so, WTO+ due 
to higher milk prices.  Lower 
prices under UTL+ lead to 
income losses.  Removal of 
support amplifies losses under 
UTL, overturns gains under FTA 
and reduces gain under WTO 
slightly.  Gains and losses are 
essentially proportional to farm 
herd size and areas. 
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Figure 5.12. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of dairy farm in Scotland 
Incomes rise under FTA+ and, 
especially, WTO+ due to 
higher milk prices.  Lower 
prices under UTL+ prompt a 
reduction of 38%-55% in herd 
size, and hence income falls. 
Removal of support amplifies 
losses under UTL, overturns 
gains under FTA and reduces 
gain under WTO.  Gains/ 
losses proportional to size. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13. Estimated change in FBI for different sizes of dairy farm in Wales 
Incomes rise under FTA+ and, 
especially, WTO+ due to 
higher milk prices.  Lower 
prices under UTL+ prompt up 
to 89% reduction in 
production and lead to lower 
income.  Removal of support 
amplifies losses under UTL, 
overturns gains under FTA 
and reduces gain under WTO.  
Gains/ losses proportional to 
farm herd size and area.  
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5.4.4. LFA grazing farms 
 
Figure 5.14. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of LFA grazing farm in England 
Slight price changes under 
FTA+ have negligible impact, 
but higher beef prices under 
WTO have modest positive 
income effect on most farm 
sizes, but sheep price 
reductions offset this for large 
farms UTL price reductions 
lead to income losses, as does 
removal of support payments, 
with up to 99% reduction in 
sheep.  
 
 
Figure 5.15. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of LFA grazing farm in Northern Ireland 
Very slight gains under FTA+ 
are reversed under WTO+ and 
UTL+ due to dominance of 
sheep enterprise, with 
removal of Pillar 1 support 
leading to increasing losses 
under remaining scenarios.  
Gains/ losses proportional to 
farm herd size and area.  NB. 
no very large farms in FBS 
sample for Northern Ireland. 
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Figure 5.16. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of LFA grazing farm in Scotland 
Higher beef prices under WTO 
have modest positive income 
effect on most very large farm 
size, but sheep price 
reductions offset this for 
other sizes.  UTL price 
reductions lead to income 
losses, as does removal of 
support payments, with up to 
39% reduction in beef 
numbers and up to 100% in 
sheep numbers. 
 
 
Figure 5.17. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of LFA grazing farm in Wales 
Sheep price reductions lead 
to income losses for all farm 
sizes under all scenarios, due 
to greater reliance on sheep.  
Losses are amplified by 
removal of support 
payments.  UTL- leads to 
sheep reductions of up to 
96%.  
 
 
 
5.4.5. Lowland grazing farms 
Figure 5.18. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of lowland grazing farm in England 
Price changes under FTA+ 
have negligible impact, but 
lower sheep prices lead to 
income reductions on large 
farms whilst higher beef 
prices lead to income gains 
on medium and small farms. 
Removal of support 
payments leads to income 
reductions across all farm 
sizes, mostly proportional to 
farm area.   
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Figure 5.19. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of lowland grazing farm in Northern 
Ireland 
FTA+ has negligible effect on 
incomes, but beef price rises 
under WTO+ raise incomes 
slightly, but price falls under 
UTL- lead to income losses.  
Removal of support leads to 
larger income losses across all 
remaining scenarios, 
proportional to farm size.  NB. 
no very large farms in FBS 
sample for Northern Ireland.   
 
 
Figure 5.20. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of lowland grazing farm in Scotland 
FTA+ has negligible effect on 
incomes, but beef price rises 
under WTO+ raise incomes, 
but price falls under UTL- 
reduce income and lead to 
up to 100% reductions in 
beef and sheep numbers.   
Removal of support 
payments leads to income 
reductions across all farm 
sizes, mostly proportional to 
farm area.  
 
 
Figure 5.21. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of lowland grazing farm in Wales 
Price rises under FTA+ and 
(more so) WTO+ raise 
incomes, particularly for very 
large and small farms. Price 
falls under UTL- reduce 
income and lead to up to 
82% reduction in sheep 
numbers.  Removal of 
support payments leads to 
income reductions in most 
cases.   
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5.4.6. Mixed farms 
 
Figure 5.22. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of mixed farm in England 
Price changes under FTA+ 
have negligible effect, but 
price rises for beef, milk and 
wheat lead to income gains 
under WTO+.  UTL price falls 
lead to reductions in 
incomes for all farm sizes, as 
does removal of support 
payments. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.23. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of mixed farm in Northern Ireland 
Pig and poultry enterprises 
support high labour usage on 
large (by SLR criterion) mixed 
farms but occupy less land 
than grazing enterprises on 
medium (by SLR criterion) 
size farms – which leads to 
the latter suffering more 
from removal of support 
payments. NB. no very large 
farms in FBS sample for 
Northern Ireland. 
 
 
Figure 5.24. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of mixed farm in Scotland 
Price changes under FTA+ 
have negligible effect, but 
price rises for beef, milk and 
wheat lead to income gains 
under WTO+.  UTL price falls 
lead to reductions in incomes 
for all farm sizes, as does 
removal of support 
payments.  Very similar to 
results for England, but 
slightly different to those for 
Wales. 
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Figure 5.25. Estimated change in FBI (£) for different sizes of mixed farm in Wales 
Price changes under FTA+ 
have negligible effect, but 
price rises for beef, milk and 
wheat lead to income gains 
under WTO+ for some farm 
sizes whilst price falls for 
sheep and barley lead to 
income reductions for 
others.  UTL price falls lead 
to reductions in incomes for 
all farm sizes, as does 
removal of support. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
 
This section summarises results of modelling farm-level production and income levels under different 
trade and domestic support scenarios following Brexit. Using FBS data to define and configure 
representative farms, ScotFarm has been used to estimate effects across different farm types and 
sizes in different parts of the UK. Although it is important to note that the modelled impacts are based 
on a number of assumptions (see Annex 5.4) and will not precisely represent actual impacts for 
individual farms, they are indicative of the likely direction of travel and of where pressures for 
structural adjustment are likely to be felt most keenly. The findings are broadly consistent with those 
of other studies also using FBS data (Bradley & Hill, 2017; Swales et al., 2017). 
For example, it is apparent that certain farm types are more vulnerable to farmgate price reductions 
than others. In particular, price reductions under WTO+ would adversely affect the profitability of 
sheep farms whilst price reductions under UTL+ would adversely affect the profitability of beef farms. 
Conversely, some farms would experience increased profitability through higher beef, milk and wheat 
prices under the WTO+ scenarios. The UTL+ scenario is the most disruptive to current profitability. 
However, it is also apparent that domestic decisions on Pillar 1-type support will potentially have more 
significant effects on farm profitability. This is true for all farm types and the magnitude of projected 
reductions in income are such that the viability of many farms is questionable under any trade scenario 
if Pillar 1 support is abolished without some concomitant increase in other (i.e. Pillar 1-type) support 
and/or alternative income support measures. Indeed, the reductions in beef cattle and sheep numbers 
imply that many livestock farms would simply cease production. 
Within the aggregate results, there is some variation across different farm sizes and between 
countries. The latter probably reflects differences in farming systems arising from biophysical 
conditions (e.g. climate, soils) as well as structural characteristics (e.g. farm size, enterprise mix). For 
example, Scottish dairy farms more commonly have beef enterprises than English dairy farms.  
However, it should be noted that support payment rates and funding levels also vary between 
countries. Variation in impacts across farm sizes probably reflect economies of scale and scope, but 
larger units’ higher Pillar 1 support levels can make them more exposed to funding withdrawal even 
if they benefit from possible efficiency advantages. 
Given the magnitude of projected income reductions (particularly from removal of support payments), 
it is clear that the pressure for structural change will be significant and hence a more open model 
configuration may be required. In particular, ScotFarm has been configured to restrict the available 
production possibility set to activities currently observed for the given representative farm. This is a 
pragmatic initial step, focusing on adjustments to the scale and mix of existing activities without the 
need to address more radical structural adjustments or capital investments. Moreover, although 
projected price movements are substantial, they do mostly lie within the range of prices observed in 
the recent past. However, addressing the possibilities of changes to factor prices (e.g. lower land rents, 
higher labour costs) and reconciling farm-level and sectoral or macro projections will require a more 
flexible approach and exploration of sensitivity to some of the current assumptions. This probably 
implies recourse to simulation analysis, considering what degree of farm-level change in productivity, 
scale and enterprise mix would be required to achieve outcomes consistent with those suggested by 
the CGE and sectoral models.   
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6.  Farm level analysis: A Budget Simulation Model29 
 
The objectives of Phase 4 were to:  
• quantify potential effects of UKAP scenarios on the welfare of farm households 
• identify segments within the farming population likely to be most vulnerable to UKAP 
scenarios.  
These objectives were addressed using a budgetary simulation model to estimate potential effects of 
Brexit scenario on the distribution of farm incomes by UK nation and main farm enterprise. Further 
analysis decomposes the estimated impacts to ascertain characteristics of more vulnerable segments 
of the farm population We also use sensitivity analyses to investigate mitigating factors such as farm 
productivity improvements, greater reduction in land rents and pound devaluation. The final analytical 
component of phase 4 (Chapter 7) provides a more comprehensive investigation of welfare impacts 
on farm households utilising a viability typology. 
6.1 Data 
 
Our analysis utilises data from the UK Farm Business Surveys (FBS) for 2013/14, 2014/15 and 2015/16. 
The necessary data files were obtained through Special Licence from the UK Data Archive in the case 
of England and Wales, and directly from DAERA and SG RESAS for Northern Ireland and Scotland, 
respectively. The FBS is recognised as the most detailed and extensive source of financial and physical 
performance on UK farming businesses. The survey includes fully reconciled management accounts 
including crop and livestock enterprise gross margins, overhead costs, income statement and balance 
sheet data. The UK-wide FBS data files, in total, comprised survey responses from approximately 3,300 
individual farming businesses in each year of the data period (Table 6.1). The FBS sample is weighted 
using calibrated inverse sampling fractions to provide statistically representative data for a population 
of approximately 100,000 commercial farming businesses with output of at least €25,000 per annum 
and at least 0.5 Standard Labour Requirement (SLR). These businesses represent c. 47% of UK holdings 
in 2015/16 but they account for more than 90 percent of total agricultural output.  
While the FBS provides comprehensive data on farm business characteristics (including on-farm 
diversification) and financial performance, it’s coverage of off-farm income is more limited. Notably, 
the English FBS ceased collecting off-farm income data in 2014/15. Moreover, non-response issues 
and the broad income ranges used for categorising off-farm income levels restricted the utility of the 
available off-farm income from a modelling perspective. Accordingly, our initial plan to model a more 
comprehensive measure of farm household income was necessarily modified to focus primarily on 
farm income metrics. However, the FBS is a survey of commercial farm businesses and therefore 
farming tends to be the predominant source of income for these households. To some extent this 
aspect mitigates the limitation caused by a paucity of off-farm income data. Nonetheless, in the final 
part of the work-package, more comprehensive evaluation of household welfare impacts (using the 
limited off-farm income data available) is approached through classificatory analysis using viability 
criteria thresholds. 
 
                                                          
29 This chapter was largely written by Michael Wallace.  
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We purposefully selected some 250 FBS variables comprising a comprehensive set of physical and 
financial metrics that are defined equivalently for each FBS administration in the UK. A balanced panel 
sample was constructed comprising farm businesses recorded in each of the three years of the data 
period (2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16). The panel approach helped to control for inter-year variability 
(see below) while the availability of 3-years of records for each farm provided a useful consistency 
check. However, due to the normal turnover in the FBS sample, construction of the balanced panel 
reduced the available records by approximately 15% to 2,803 farm businesses that then formed our 
initial data sample (Table 6.1).   
 
Table 0.1. FBS survey sample and weighted sample of population (number of farms)  
 
 
FBS coverage in England, Wales and Scotland excludes ‘spare-time’ businesses while the NI  
survey includes a sub-sample of these smaller businesses. Accordingly, for consistency when 
comparing between UK nations, we restricted our data sample only to commercial businesses with a 
Standard Labour Requirement (SLR) of at least 0.5 Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) labour units. The 
resulting dataset on 2,718 commercial farming businesses formed the primary sample used in our 
farm-level simulations. This sample was weighted (using FBS sampling weights) to be statistically 
representative of c.73,200 commercial farming businesses across all main farm enterprise types in the 
UK (Table 6.1). 
 
In preparing the reference dataset for modelling purposes we applied a data normalisation procedure 
to control for inter-year variability using the panel data for 2013/14, 2014/15 and 2015/16. 
Specifically, arithmetic means of the physical and financial variables for each farm were calculated 
over the three-year data period. This approach smoothed data aberrations and enhanced the 
‘representativeness’ of the primary data used in modelling. 
 
England Wales Scotland N. Ireland Total - UK
Initial FBS sample
2013/14 1,907 550 500 360 3,317
2014/15 1,897 550 505 363 3,315
2015/16 1,811 550 501 357 3,219
Initial weighted sample (population)
2013/14 58,370 9,898 12,023 22,800 103,091
2014/15 57,541 9,783 12,143 22,853 102,320
2015/16 56,469 9,826 11,968 23,731 101,994
3-Year balanced panel (2013/14-2015/16)
Sample 1,535 481 457 330 2,803
Weighted sample (population) 46,537 8,605 11,089 20,573 86,804
3-Year balanced panel & farm size >= 0.5 SLR
Sample 1,498 477 457 286 2,718
Weighted sample (population) 44,061 8,443 11,089 9,615 73,208
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6.2 . Modelling Strategy 
 
A flow chart of the modelling process in Phase 4 is shown in Figure 6.1. The analysis harnessed the 
strengths of the rich FBS dataset by individually modelling all farm businesses in the combined FBS 
samples for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This approach embraced the inherent 
heterogeneity within the UK farm population and, using FBS weights, simulated scenario impacts for 
the individual farm businesses could be ‘raised’ to provide a robust assessment of those impacts across 
the farm population as a whole. While modelling all farms in the large data sample necessarily 
required a relatively parsimonious model specification, it was felt that this limitation was justified by 
the enhanced scope for more general analysis of impacts across the overall farm populations by 
enterprise type and region. 
 
Figure 6.1. Flow chart of Phase 4 modelling process 
 
 
A farm-level budgetary simulation model was constructed to evaluate the potential effects of Brexit 
scenarios. The model utilised a standardised management accounting framework to individually 
simulate financial performance for each farm in the data set (n=2803). Revenue, cost and income 
equations were implemented within Excel worksheets so that scenario projections for prices, support 
payments or productivity could be quantified for each farm in the sample. The modelling procedure 
used enterprise-level data detailing outputs and variable costs for each farm enterprise. Totalled 
enterprise gross margins were augmented by whole-farm estimates of direct payments, diversification 
and other revenues, and then overhead costs were deducted. 
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The financial results from the model simulations included Farm Business Income and Cash Income. 
Farm Business Income (FBI) is DEFRA’s headline measure of farm income. It represents the return to 
all unpaid labour (farmer, spouse and others with an entrepreneurial interest in the business). Cash 
Income is simply trading (cash) receipts less trading (cash) expenditure and it excludes notional items 
such as depreciation and the effects of livestock and crop valuation changes. It is a measure of the 
cash return to all those with an entrepreneurial stake in the business and, since it excludes costs 
associated with maintenance of the capital assets of the business, it provides an indicator of short-run 
business viability. 
The model was used to simulate year-2026 projections for the six selected UKAP scenarios and a 
reference Baseline (status quo) situation. Additional scenarios such as changes in land rental values, 
devaluation of pound and farm productivity changes were considered in supplementary simulations 
(sensitivity analysis). Each trade scenario (FTA, UTL, WTO) was simulated under two alternative 
assumptions about future domestic support policy in 2026.  
The price projections simulated for each policy scenario have been discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 but 
are summarised in Table 6.2. Specifically, we used UK-FAPRI model projections for output prices and 
variable costs as these were suitably disaggregated at the product level as required for the farm-level 
simulations. However, the FAPRI model did not provide projections of factor market impacts, thus 
projections for land rents and wage costs were obtained from the CGE model (Chapter 3). 
 
Table 6.2. Output price and input cost projections under each scenario in model simulations 
 
Note:  Projected price changes for each scenario in 2026 relative to 2026 Baseline 
Output prices and variable costs projections from FAPRI-UK Model  
Fixed cost projections from CGE model estimates 
 
FTA+ FTA- UTL+ UTL- WTO+ WTO-
Livestock Prices
Beef +0.6% +1.9% -42.4% -42.3% +17.3% +17.5%
Sheep meat -0.4% +4.3% -19.4% -18.8% -23.4% -23.0%
Milk +1.0% +1.1% -7.5% -7.5% +27.7% +27.9%
Pig meat +0.5% +0.7% -4.2% -4.2% +24.7% +24.7%
Poultry meat +0.2% +0.4% -3.1% -3.1% +14.6% +14.6%
Other Livestock 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Crop Prices
Wheat -0.0% +1.0% -1.8% -1.5% +6.6% +7.8%
Barley -0.4% +0.5% -8.3% -8.1% -5.5% -5.2%
Oats -0.4% +0.5% -7.8% -7.6% -5.2% -4.9%
Rapeseed 0.0% +0.0% -0.3% -0.2% -0.5% -0.4%
Other Cash Crops 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Variable Costs
Purchased feed -0.05% +0.16% -1.18% -1.13% 0.00% +0.12%
Other Livestock VCs -0.05% +0.16% -1.18% -1.13% 0.00% +0.12%
Crop variable costs -0.02% +0.05% -0.44% -0.42% -0.10% -0.06%
Fixed Costs
Land rents +1.2% -14.9% -2.8% -18.8% +4.9% -10.6%
Wage rates +5.1% +5.0% +5.0% +4.9% +5.3% +5.3%
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Since the beef and sheepmeat price projections from FAPRI were for finished cattle and finished 
lambs, respectively, we assumed that projected changes in deadweight prices would be fully 
transmitted through the production chain to the prices and valuations of immature stock. For 
example, a given percent reduction in the price of finished cattle was assumed to result in an 
equivalent percentage change in beef calf and store cattle prices. Similarly, projected changes in prices 
of cull cows and cull ewes were assumed equivalent to the projected percentage changes in beef and 
sheepmeat prices, respectively. However, prices of replacement dairy heifers were assumed to change 
in proportion to changes in milk prices.  
The farm-level simulation was essentially a comparative static analysis. The projected annual farm 
management account under each scenario was contrasted with the equivalent account under a 
Baseline (status quo) situation. Farm structural characteristics (e.g., land areas, stocking, cropping) 
and technical efficiencies (e.g., stocking rates, yields, input-output ratios) were held constant. 
Accordingly, it is emphasised that model estimates are first-order effects that may represent an upper 
bound of potential impacts (before accounting for farm-level adaptations). This is a recognised 
limitation of the analysis as farmers would be expected to respond to price or policy shocks by 
adjusting their production systems to mitigate impacts.  
Potential farm management responses to Brexit scenarios include enterprise substitution, 
diversification, productivity change, disinvestment or abandonment of farming.  However, adjustment 
capacity, at least in the short term, will be a function of human factors (e.g. management skills, 
preferences), and physical and financial resource constraints that determine adaptive flexibility.  
Such constraints cannot readily be inferred from FBS data; consequently more comprehensive 
modelling of production responses would have relied on potentially arbitrary assumptions about 
magnitudes of potential adjustments. For this reason we instead utilised sensitivity analysis to 
evaluate potential mitigating responses such as productivity improvement (see below). Moreover, the 
representative farm modelling in Phase 3 accounted for potential enterprise substitutions but subject 
to the existing range of activities for each farm. Additionally, by providing projections of Cash Income 
we assessed, albeit in a stylised manner, the potential of farmers to mitigate income losses in the 
short-term by deferring investment. 
The simulated financial performances of farms in our data sample are weighted using official FBS 
sample weights to provide results that are statistically representative of the farm population as a 
whole. These weighted estimates underpin our simulation of income distribution curves for farm 
populations according to farm type and UK nation. Importantly, these income distribution curves 
provide a compact, visual presentation of scenario results. Proportions of the farm population with 
incomes above or below any given threshold value on the income scale can be readily observed. For 
example, the estimated proportion of businesses that become loss-making under a scenario or 
whether there are differential impacts on higher versus lower income farms. Finally, we provide more 
in-depth assessment of farm types likely to be most vulnerable to Brexit scenarios by disaggregating 
the impacts using regression and impact-quintile analyses.   
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6.3 . Results 
 
Results from the farm-level budgetary simulations are organised as follows. Section 6.3.1 estimates 
mean incomes (cash income and FBI) and income distributions under each UKAP scenario according 
to farm populations in each UK nation. This is followed in section 6.3.2 by similar analyses according 
to main enterprise type. In 6.3.3 farms are classified into quintiles based on severity of scenario impact 
and we quantify characteristics of farms that are most and least vulnerable to the policy projections. 
Scenario impacts are further decomposed in section 6.3.4 using regression analysis to quantify the 
relationships between key farm characteristics and estimated changes in Farm Business Incomes. 
Finally, in section 6.3.5 sensitivity analyses are used to evaluate potential mitigating factors such as 
productivity improvements, Sterling devaluation and sharper reductions in land rents. 
 
6.3.1. Impacts on farm income distribution by country  
 
Projected mean Farm Business Incomes (a) and Cash Incomes (b) for each scenario and the UK nations 
are shown in Figure 6.2. In each case the Baseline or reference scenario is shown as a dashed red line. 
Under the FTA+ scenario, where Pillar 1 DPs were maintained, estimated mean incomes were virtually 
identical to their Baseline levels. The WTO+ scenario increased mean FBI by between 32% (Wales) and 
85% (Northern Ireland) due to the elevating effects of tariffs on most domestic farm prices. In contrast 
the UTL+ scenario reduced mean FBI by between 52% (England) and 130% (Scotland) as liberalised 
trade exposed UK agriculture to greater international competition and reduced commodity prices. 
Given the important contribution of Pillar 1 DPs to Baseline farm income it was not surprising that the 
scenarios that simulated their removal resulted in sharp declines in farm incomes. Under FTA- Farm 
Business Income declined by between 58% (England) and 135% (Scotland), with an average reduction 
of 69% for the UK as a whole. Under WTO-, increases in output prices almost fully offset the loss of 
Pillar 1 DP on average farm Business Incomes for England and NI. However, this contrasted with a less 
favourable potential outcome in Wales and Scotland where incomes remained well below Baseline 
levels. A combination of trade liberalisation along with elimination of Pillar 1 DPs (UTL-) was found to 
be most challenging with projected mean FBI becoming negative in each all four nations. The results 
highlighted the potential variation in scenario impacts across the UK. Notably, impacts were less 
negative, on average, for England compared to the UK as a whole. Scotland stood out as most 
vulnerable to the Brexit scenarios and, even on a Cash Income basis, average Scottish farm incomes 
became substantially negative under UTL-. 
Estimated population distributions for (a) FBI and (b) Cash Income for each scenario are shown in 
Figures 6.3-6.7 for UK, England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, respectively. Across the UK 
around 15% of businesses were loss making in the Baseline FBI distribution. The FTA+ scenario resulted 
in income distributions that were virtually unchanged relative to the Baseline. FTA-, UTL+ and WTO- 
increased the proportion of loss-making businesses based on FBI to between c.40% (England) and 
c.60% (Scotland). On a Cash Income basis, the proportion of loss-making businesses under these 
scenarios ranged from c.20% (England) to c.30% (Scotland). 
Importantly, WTO had greatest impact on the shape of the income distribution curves as price 
increases under this trade scenario were relatively more advantageous to larger or more profitable 
farming businesses at the upper end of income distribution. As expected, UTL- (extreme trade 
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liberalisation coupled with Pillar 1 removal) was the most challenging scenario for farm businesses. In 
FBI terms the proportion of loss-making businesses under UTL- ranged from 62% (England) to 90% 
(Scotland). Even on a Cash Income basis the proportion of loss making businesses is c.50% for the UK 
as a whole.  
 
Figure 6.2. Average Farm Income Estimates by Scenario, UK (2026) 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
 
(b) Cash Income 
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Figure 6.3. Estimated Farm Income Distribution by Scenario (All UK, N=73,208) 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
 
 
(b) Cash Income 
 
-50,000
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95
Fa
rm
 B
u
si
n
e
ss
 In
co
m
e
 (£
)
Prop. of Farms
Base FTA+ FTA- UTL+ UTL- WTO+ WTO-
-50,000
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95
C
as
h
 In
co
m
e
 (£
)
Prop. of Farms
Base FTA+ FTA- UTL+ UTL- WTO+ WTO-
91 
Figure 6.4. Estimated Farm Income Distribution by Scenario (England) 
 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
(b) Cash Income 
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Figure 6.5. Estimated Farm Income Distribution by Scenario (Wales) 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
(b) Cash Income 
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Figure 6.6. Estimated Farm Income Distribution by Scenario (Scotland) 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
 
(b) Cash Income  
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Figure 6.7. Estimated Farm Income Distribution by Scenario (Northern Ireland) 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
 
(b) Cash Income 
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6.3.2. Impacts on income distribution by farm type 
 
Projected mean Farm Business Incomes (a) and Cash Incomes (b) for each scenario and by main 
enterprise type are shown in Figure 6.8.  
Under FTA+, average Farm Business Income and Cash Income per farm remained very similar to their 
Baseline levels, reflecting the modest price changes under the FTA scenario. The WTO scenarios 
resulted in a more than doubling of average incomes for dairy and pig farms reflecting the projected 
increases in milk and pig meat prices under the scenario. For other farm types, incomes remained at 
or slightly above the Baseline when Pillar 1 direct payments were maintained (WTO+) but declined 
sharply below the Baseline when these payments were removed (WTO-). This result indicated that 
projected price increases under the WTO scenario would be insufficient, on average, to offset loss of 
the direct payments for farms with arable or beef/sheep enterprises as their main activity. 
As noted previously, UTL was identified as the most challenging scenario across all farm types but 
especially for those involved in beef and sheep production. Obviously, this impact was especially 
severe where UTL was combined with removal of direct payments (UTL-). In that situation grazing 
livestock farms, on average, had negative margins even when defined on a Cash Income basis. This 
highlighted the specific vulnerability of beef and sheep enterprises to greater international 
competition in a trade liberalisation scenario. Moreover, the particular dependence of beef/sheep 
farm incomes on Pillar 1 support makes them acutely vulnerable to any reductions in those payments 
as highlighted in Figure 6.8. 
Figure 6.9 shows the simulated income distribution curves for dairy farms under each scenario. The 
extreme range between the highest (WTO+) and lowest (UTL-) income distribution curve highlights 
the degree of uncertainty around potential Brexit outcomes. In the Baseline, less than 10 percent of 
dairy farms were loss-making based on FBI. The dairy income distribution was little impacted by FTA+ 
but shifted downward under FTA- such that close to 20% of UK dairy farms became loss-making under 
FTA when Pillar 1 payments were removed. The WTO+ and WTO- scenarios resulted in a sizeable 
upward shift in the income distribution curve for dairy farms with the greatest gains captured by larger 
more profitable farms at the top of the distribution. In contrast, the UTL scenarios shifted the income 
distributions downward with proportionately larger impacts on farms at the top and bottom of the 
distribution. Some 55 percent of dairy farms became loss-making under UTL- on an FBI basis while 30 
percent became loss-making according to Cash Income. 
Projected income distribution curves for cereal farms under each scenario are shown in Figure 6.10 
The simulated income distributions were more sensitive to removal of Pillar 1 payments than to the 
trade scenario price projections. This was highlighted by the two clusters of income curves for 
scenarios with (“+”) and without (“-“) Pillar 1 direct payments. According to the Farm Business Income 
measure, UTL+ increased the proportion of loss-making cereal farms to 25 percent compared to 18 
percent under the Baseline and FTA+. In contrast, with removal of Pillar 1 payments the proportion of 
loss-making cereal farms increased to between 45 percent (WTO+) and 55 percent (UTL-) based on 
FBI. On a Cash Income basis, the worst scenario (UTL-) resulted in 25 percent of cereal farms losing 
money compared to 5 percent loss-making (in Cash Income terms) under the Baseline. 
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Figure 6.11 displays the simulated income distribution curves for grazing livestock farms. The FTA+ 
and WTO+ scenarios resulted in income distribution curves that were almost identical to the Baseline. 
Under these scenarios, approximately 16 percent and 5 percent of grazing livestock farms were loss-
making according to the FBI and Cash Income definitions, respectively. 
FTA-, WTO- and UTL+ each resulted in similar income distribution curves and the proportion loss-
making businesses increased to around 60 percent according to FBI and 30-35% based on Cash 
Income. The most challenging scenario for grazing livestock farms was UTL- where the proportion of 
loss-making farms increased to 90 percent and 60 percent according to FBI and Cash Income 
measures, respectively. With reference to the population size this would equate to between 22,300 
and 33,500 grazing livestock farm businesses that could become financially unviable under UTL-. 
The simulated income distribution curves for specialist pig farms are shown in Figure 6.12. Pig farm 
businesses appeared less adversely impacted by the Brexit scenarios compared to other farm types. 
This was highlighted by the narrower spread between the income distribution curves. However, the 
WTO scenario was a notable extreme that produced substantially elevated income especially for larger 
businesses at the top of the distribution. This result reflected the strong projected increase in pig meat 
prices with very modest projected increases in feed prices. Given the remarkable increase in 
profitability, reflecting the sensitivity of pig margins to the ratio of pig meat prices to feed prices, the 
WTO estimates should be treated with caution. It is unlikely that such high margins could be sustained 
in the longer term as a likely supply response would be expected to return margins to more ‘normal’ 
levels.  A similar logic also applies when interpreting the extreme increase in profitability of dairy farms 
observed under the WTO scenarios. 
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Figure 6.8. Average Farm Income Estimates by Scenario and Farm Type 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
(b) Cash Income 
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Figure 6.9. Estimated Farm Income Distribution by Scenario (Dairy Farms, N=9,894) 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
(b) Cash Income 
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Figure 6.10. Estimated Farm Income Distribution by Scenario (Cereals, N=11,716) 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
(b) Cash Income 
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Figure 6.11. Estimated Farm Income Distribution by Scenario (Grazing Livestock, N=37,179) 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
(b) Cash Income 
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Figure 6.12. Estimated Farm Income Distribution by Scenario (Specialist Pigs, N=1,331) 
(a) Farm Business Income 
 
(b) Cash Income 
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6.3.3. Analysis of impact quintiles 
 
To evaluate attributes of farms likely to be most vulnerable to Brexit scenarios, businesses were 
grouped into quintiles according to projected percentage changes in Farm Business Income relative to 
the Baseline. Under this classification quintile 1 comprised the fifth of farms that suffered the largest 
declines in FBI under a given Brexit scenario. Similarly, quintile 5 comprised the fifth of farms that 
were least exposed to the scenario. In the following, we focus particularly on UTL- as this scenario 
resulted in the largest impacts on FBI. Figure 6.13 shows the farm type composition of the worst 
impacted quintile under UTL- and highlights the vulnerability of LFA and lowland grazing livestock 
farms. In total grazing livestock farms accounted for two-thirds of farms in the worst impacted quintile.    
 
Figure 6.13. Farm type composition of most adversely impacted quintile for UTL- 
 
 
Figure 6.14 highlights the extent to which individual farm types may be over-represented in the worst 
impacted quintile. This was calculated as the share of a given farm type observed in the quintile 
relative to the share of that same farm type in the population, i.e.  
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Figure 6.14 highlights the extent to which Grazing livestock farms were over-represented in the worst 
impacted quintile under all scenarios except FTA+. Dairy and Pig farm types were less likely to be 
observed in the bottom quintile for all scenarios. 
 
Figure 6.14. Over/under-representation of farm types in worst impacted quintile by scenario 
 
 
Table 6.3 provides a more detailed summary of characteristics of farm businesses in each quintile 
under UTL- as well as for the total population. This highlighted the already noted concentration of 
beef and sheep farms in quintile 1, while quintile 5 (least impacted) tended to be characterised by 
cropping, pigs, poultry and horticulture. The results also identified a greater concentration of English 
farms in the least impacted quintile while Scottish farm were more heavily represented in the worst 
impacted quintile.  
Least affected farms, on average, tended to be much larger in scale with a mean size of 4 SLR compared 
to 2.4 SLR for the worst impacted quintile. LFA farms tended to be more strongly represented in the 
worst impacted quintile and conversely lowland farms tended to predominate the least impacted 
quintile. This reflected the farm-type effects already described with Grazing Livestock being the 
predominant enterprise in LFAs.  
There was little variation in the proportion of rented land across the quintiles and likewise average 
age of farmers was very similar across the quintiles. Farms in the least impacted quintile tended to 
have a higher proportion of hired labour (relative to family labour) which reflected their larger average 
business size. The financial variables showed that farms in the worst impacted quintile tended to have 
lower financial performance in the Baseline with much lower average performance ratio, FBI and Cash 
income. Importantly, they tended to have substantially lower levels of diversification relative to farms 
in the least affected quintile. 
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Table 6.3. Descriptive statistics (means) for impact-quintiles under UTL- 
 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 All
N = 15,837 15,421 14,504 14,961 12,485 73,208
Farm Type (prop. of N)
Dairy 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.14
LFA Grazing 0.39 0.37 0.41 0.26 0.05 0.30
Lowland Grazing 0.27 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.05 0.20
Cereals 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.16
General Cropping 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.05
Mixed 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.07
Pigs 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.02
Poultry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01
Horticulture 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.04
Nation (prop. of N)
England 0.52 0.53 0.49 0.66 0.86 0.60
Wales 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.12
Scotland 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.15
Northern Ireland 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.05 0.13
Farm size
SLR (labour units) 2.37 2.57 2.55 2.80 4.01 2.82
Land
LFA (prop.) 0.44 0.42 0.49 0.36 0.12 0.37
SDA (prop.) 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.24 0.07 0.25
Utilised Agricultural Area (ha) 138.96 159.73 169.93 165.27 130.97 153.49
Adj Area Farmed (Ha) 122.03 140.17 153.50 141.58 108.95 133.85
Rented land (prop of UAA) 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.31
Demographic
Farmer Age (yrs) 59 59 60 59 58 59
Family Labour (hrs/annum) 2,969 2,981 3,251 3,124 3,288 3,114
Hired labour (hrs/annum) 1,413 1,432 1,075 1,674 4,276 1,892
Financial
Performance Ratio (%) 102 112 123 133 138 121
Diversification Revenue (£) 9,659 12,733 11,239 17,644 39,559 17,351
Pillar1 DPs (£) 24,427 26,945 25,855 26,177 22,505 25,270
Pillar2 DPs (£) 6,550 8,083 7,762 8,524 5,649 7,363
Farm Business Income (£ ) 3,072 14,490 26,270 46,114 85,765 32,972
Cash Income (£) 25,464 36,778 46,296 70,414 119,198 57,146
External Liabilities £ '000 131 142 100 138 186 138
Quintile (1 = worst impacted, 5= least impacted)
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6.3.4. Regression analysis of scenario impacts 
 
To decompose the estimated impacts a series of regression equations were estimated for the 
projected change in FBI under each scenario. Specifically, the following regression model was 
estimated for each scenario (s):  
( , , , , , , , , , , )si i ij ij ij i i i ij i i iFBI f Age Crop Lstock Loc LandR Debt Hlab DP Divers PerfR LFA =   
Where  
siFBI  is change (£) in Farm Business Income (cf. Baseline) of farm i under scenario s 
Agei  age of operator of farm i 
Cropij  areas (ha) of crops of type j (j = cereals, oilseeds+pulses, other crop)  
Lstockij numbers of livestock of types j (j = dairy cows, beef cows, other cattle, ewes, sows, 
hens broilers, other poultry) 
Locij indicator variables for location of farm i in nation j (j = Scotland, Wales, NI) with base 
category: England  
LandRi area rented by farm i in hectares 
Debti external liabilities of farm i in £’000 
Hlabi hired labour hours of farm i 
DPij  direct payments (£) of type j (j= Pillar 1, Pillar 2) 
Diversi diversification revenue per annum (£) 
PerfRi  performance ratio (i.e.output (£)/Input (£)) of farm i (%) 
LFAi  indicator variable which takes value 1 if farm i is in LFA, zero otherwise. 
 
The regression estimates are provided in Table 6.4 with each equation explaining around 90% or more 
of the variation in projected scenario impacts across farms. The regression coefficients for the 
livestock and crop variables show the estimated changes in margin per head or per hectare under each 
scenario. For example, under UTL- the margin for cereals declined on average by £29 per hectare while 
suckler beef, sheep and dairy margins per head were reduced by £214, £10, and £193, respectively.  
Impacts on enterprise margins were very modest under FTA while WTO substantially increased most 
enterprise margins. The main exception under WTO was sheep where margins were reduced by 
between £17/ewe (WTO-) and c. £20/ewe (WTO+). This result reflected the potential impact of tariffs 
on UK sheep exports to the EU under that scenario. 
Farmer age was significant in some scenarios with older farmers tending to be less impacted under 
UTL and WTO but the opposite was true under FTA-.  
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The location dummy variables indicated the presence of country-specific factors that further 
conditioned scenario impacts after controlling for other variables that explain FBI. For example, 
relative to England, Scotland was more severely impacted under UTL by an average of £5,400 per farm 
even after controlling for other factors in the equation for FBI. However, the opposite was true for 
Scotland under WTO+ and this suggested that the country-specific effect related to Scotland’s 
particular exposure to the beef sector. 
Performance ratio was significant only under three scenarios and surprisingly the sign on the 
coefficient was negative. This would suggest that higher performing farms were more adversely 
impacted after controlling for other factors that affected FBI. However, the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient suggested that this effect was relatively small. 
Levels of Pillar 2 and Diversification revenues tended to moderate the negative impacts of the 
scenarios but to a very limited extent. For example, under UTL each £1.00 of Pillar 2 support only 
moderated the impact of the scenario by about £0.07 after controlling for other factors related to 
FBI.  
A farm’s presence in a Less Favoured Area (LFA) was not significant after controlling for other variables 
in the farm income equation. Farms with hired labour were more adversely impacted under FTA and 
UTL by between £0.35 and £0.40 per hour employed.   
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Table 6.4. OLS regression estimates for scenario impacts on Farm Business Income 
  
Age (yrs) 0.9 (0.983) -11.165 (4.297)*** 38.25 (16.392)** 30.613 (16.930)* 49.571 (27.290)* 41.832 (28.313)
Cereals (ha) -4.042 (0.872)*** 20.76 (4.191)*** -44.847 (12.359)*** -27.169 (13.480)** -1.459 (12.355) 19.663 (13.276)
Oilseed+Pulses (Ha) -0.607 (2.177) 28.12 (11.083)** 44.203 (32.568) 71.04 (37.308)* 50.499 (36.842) 86.127 (39.208)**
Other Crop (ha) -10.275 (2.748)*** 29.733 (7.435)*** -12.426 (14.265) 25.672 (17.092) -11.86 (26.608) 27.742 (28.572)
Dairy Cows (hd) 19.518 (0.588)*** 33.401 (1.666)*** -206.017 (7.611)*** -193.299 (7.620)*** 624.547 (14.055)*** 639.183 (14.413)***
Beef Cows (hd) 2.892 (0.575)*** 16.667 (2.843)*** -219.516 (17.248)*** -213.657 (17.387)*** 59.971 (13.472)*** 65.832 (14.415)***
Other Cattle (LU) 4.946 (0.494)*** 23.18 (2.161)*** -339.324 (16.460)*** -331.602 (16.918)*** 126.528 (11.085)*** 134.356 (11.144)***
Ewes (hd) -0.535 (0.090)*** 5.617 (0.766)*** -13.292 (1.189)*** -10.281 (1.794)*** -19.779 (1.082)*** -17.018 (1.081)***
Sows (hd) 6.315 (0.429)*** 14.166 (1.796)*** -66.331 (4.227)*** -60.267 (3.439)*** 456.99 (27.308)*** 461.893 (28.107)***
Pigs (hd) 0.202 (0.103)* 0.58 (0.181)*** -2.441 (0.673)*** -2.153 (0.657)*** 15.397 (5.278)*** 15.67 (5.297)***
Hens (no.) -0.036 (0.016)** -0.027 (0.036) -0.596 (0.326)* -0.607 (0.351)* 2.992 (1.447)** 2.971 (1.422)**
Broilers (no.) 0.018 (0.002)*** 0.033 (0.007)*** -0.242 (0.018)*** -0.236 (0.023)*** 1.462 (0.099)*** 1.463 (0.096)***
Other Poultry (no.) -0.004 (0.002) 0.18 (0.077)** -0.135 (0.041)*** 0.041 (0.045) 0.891 (0.298)*** 1.058 (0.368)***
Scotland (D) 121.878 (47.816)** -755.881 (160.869)*** -4,570.46 (754.015)*** -5,443.42 (776.092)*** 1,467.49 (736.742)** 545.194 (752.594)
NI (D) -221.699 (60.247)*** -71.775 (121.924) 947.169 (452.580)** 1,133.34 (478.588)** -1,243.51 (587.925)** -1,068.29 (595.468)*
Wales (D) -53.684 (42.431) -623.198 (168.063)*** 3,278.81 (536.531)*** 2,948.09 (566.440)*** -898.131 (678.263) -1,225.21 (694.757)*
PerfRatiox100 1.817 (0.403)*** -4.267 (1.443)*** -5.561 (5.784) -12.191 (5.952)** -6.621 (13.616) -12.563 (13.788)
Rented Land (Ha) -0.157 (0.103) 3.002 (1.346)** 1.626 (1.013) 4.94 (2.072)** 0.705 (0.939) 3.926 (1.816)**
Debt ('000) 0.215 (0.132) -1.163 (0.516)** 0.061 (1.066) -1.249 (1.194) 0.057 (2.549) -1.299 (2.654)
Pillar1 DP (£) -0.004 (0.002)* -1.017 (0.011)*** -0.051 (0.032) -1.067 (0.032)*** 0.015 (0.043) -1 (0.045)***
Pillar 2 DP (£) 0.001 (0.002) -0.014 (0.012) 0.073 (0.024)*** 0.069 (0.027)*** 0.048 (0.030) 0.043 (0.034)
Diversification Rev (£) -0.003 (0.001)*** 0.002 (0.003) 0.007 (0.005) 0.012 (0.005)** 0.001 (0.011) 0.006 (0.013)
Hired Labour (hrs) -0.412 (0.016)*** -0.364 (0.014)*** -0.4 (0.045)*** -0.35 (0.040)*** -0.184 (0.145) -0.147 (0.148)
LFA (D) 3.921 (42.434) 55.544 (118.886) -277.664 (419.185) -262 (452.207) 608.012 (486.548) 666.551 (493.978)
Constant -125.228 (88.216) 1,148.68 (375.642)*** -362.803 (1,353.958) 745.878 (1,378.507) -3,772.26 (2,504.351) -2,772.18 (2,581.858)
Observations 2,795 2,795 2,795 2,795 2,795 2,795
R-squared 0.97 0.99 0.893 0.953 0.928 0.931
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
WTO-FTA+ FTA- UTL+ UTL- WTO+
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6.3.5. Sensitivity analysis of mitigating factors 
 
We used the budgetary simulation model to evaluate the sensitivity of estimated scenario impacts to 
variation in the value of the Pound, land rental costs, hired labour costs and farm productivity. For brevity, 
we focus on the UTL- and WTO- scenarios. Figure 6.15 shows simulated mean FBI for UK commercial 
farms (N=73,208) under the ‘original’ projections (Table 6.2) versus estimates under alternative 
assumptions about Sterling, land rental costs and labour supply.  Each sensitivity scenario was tested 
independently with reference to the ‘original’ or central set of projections from the sectoral models 
(Table 6.2).    
The first sensitivity test comprised FAPRI price projections for a 20 percent devaluation of Sterling in 2026. 
These projections have been documented in sub Chapter 3.7.2. Compared to our ‘original’ projections, a 
20 percent Sterling devaluation was shown to substantially moderate the projected price reductions or 
elevate projected price increases. For example, beef price changes under UTL- and WTO- were -31% and 
+38% with Sterling devaluation compared to -42% and +18% under the ‘original’ projections for these 
scenarios, respectively.   
Compared to the default projection under UTL- the devaluation increased FBI by almost £19,000 and 
mean FBI went from a loss of almost £12,500 to a small profit of £6,500. However, despite this 
improvement average FBI remained substantially below its Baseline level. In the case of WTO-, the 
devaluation increased average FBI by almost £26,000 compared to the ‘original’ projection. Average FBI 
for UK commercial farm businesses increased to a level where they now exceeded the Baseline by 
£20,300, as higher output prices more than compensated for the assumed removal of Pillar 1 payments. 
Consequently, the future value of the Pound was shown to be a critical factor influencing potential 
scenario effects.              
Brexit trade scenarios and envisaged reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments may have sizeable impacts on 
the UK land market. Accordingly, the second sensitivity scenario tested an 80 percent reduction in land 
rents. This compared to ‘original’ projections of 19% and 11% reductions in land rents under UTL- and 
WTO-, respectively. An 80 percent reduction in land rents increased FBI by an average of £6,600 after 
accounting for loss of income by some farm businesses that were letting land. This equated to a 24% 
increase in FBI under WTO- relative to the ‘original’ projection. Combined with the projected price 
increases under WTO- the reduction in land rents was sufficient to restore average FBI to Baseline level 
despite removal of Pillar 1 payments. However, for UTL- while the reduction in land rents almost halved 
the average farm loss under that scenario, overall FBI remained very substantially below Baseline level. 
The relatively modest impact on mean FBI, from a substantial reduction in rents reflected the fact that 
only one third of farmed area in the UK is rented. However, this situation varies across farms and regions. 
Clearly, tenanted farms or those with a higher shares of rented land experience proportionately greater 
increases in FBI when rents are reduced. 
It is anticipated that Brexit may reduce the supply of migrant labour for farm businesses. The ‘original’ 
projections were based on a 10% reduction in labour supply which resulted in an increase in wage rates 
of c.5% (see Table 6.2). The third sensitivity scenario assumed a 30% reduction in labour supply which 
were projected (CGE model) to increase wage rates by approximately 18 percent. This scenario reduced 
average FBI per farm by approximately £2,500 relative to the ‘original’ projection. Obviously, the effect 
on FBI varies across farms with larger businesses and labour-intensive sectors (e.g. horticulture) being 
relatively more exposed to wage impacts. 
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Figure 6.15. Sensitivity analysis of Sterling devaluation, land rent and labour supply, UTL- and WTO- 
 
 
The financial impacts of Brexit scenarios, especially where support payments are reduced, may be 
mitigated by farm management responses including a renewed focus on productivity and efficiency. In 
Figure 6.16, we present estimates of the effect of a 10% increase in productivity of all grazing livestock 
farms.  
Increasing productivity by 10% across beef and sheep enterprises raised FBI by c.£7,300, c.£5,100 and 
c.£7,500 under FTA, UTL and WTO, respectively. However, this sizeable improvement in productivity of 
grazing livestock farms would not be sufficient to offset the impacts of reductions in Pillar 1 payments 
nor the projected price reductions under UTL. Consequently, for grazing livestock farms, productivity 
improvement seems unlikely be a ‘silver bullet’ solution to the adverse financial impacts of reduced 
support payments. 
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Figure 6.16. Impact of a 10% improvement in productivity of Grazing Livestock farms, all scenarios 
 
  
 
6. Conclusion 
Our farm modelling shows some interesting results regarding the distribution of farm business income 
across the devolved administrations and by farm type and the importance of retaining and eliminating 
direct payments. As with other EU member states, direct payments are a crucial component of farm 
business income in the UK.  Thus, while some farm businesses will survive, many might not. The negative 
impact on farm business income is reflected across all trade scenarios, especially UTL with or without 
direct payments (DPs). Average farm income varies significantly across the devolved administrations and 
by farm type, with most farms worse off (relative to the Baseline) under all scenarios but one, WTO+.  
Noticeably, under this scenario dairy farms will particularly benefit as their average farm income could 
almost triple as compared to the Baseline scenario. Beef and sheep farms will be the most affected under 
UTL-. Indeed, our extreme free trade scenario leads to some striking results regarding farm income 
distribution. Whereas 15-20 percent of the farms were not making any money at all (even in the Baseline 
scenario), this rises to 45 percent under the UTL scenario with direct payments still in place (UTL+). The 
elimination of direct payments further increases this figure to 70 percent (UTL-).  
As expected, UTL combined with the elimination of direct payments (UTL-) was identified to be the most 
challenging for farm businesses. The proportion of loss-making businesses under this specific scenario 
ranged from 62 percent (England) to 90 percent (Scotland). Our regression results also show farms in 
Scotland as the most severely affected under UTL scenario. 
 
-30,000
-20,000
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
Beef+Sheep (current) Beef+Sheep (+10% eff)
Fa
rm
 B
us
in
es
s 
In
co
m
e 
(£
)
FTA+ FTA- UTL+ UTL- WTO+ WTO- Base
111 
 
 
7. Exploring the effects of Brexit scenarios on the welfare of farm 
households30 
      
7.1. A brief introduction to viability analysis  
 
The measurement of farm economic viability provides more comprehensive investigation of welfare 
impacts on farm households. This viability assessment provides further insights into the economic 
assessment of vulnerable and sustainable farms. Farms are deemed to be economically sustainable if the 
farm business is not viable but either the farmer or spouse earns off-farm income while farms are 
economically vulnerable if the farm business is not viable and neither the farmer nor spouse has an off-
farm employment. 
The specific objectives of this second component of Phase 4 are: 
1) To explore the impact of Brexit scenarios on viability, sustainability and vulnerability (hereafter 
Via-Sus-Vul) levels by major UK farm enterprises.  
2) To assess how the major UK farm types are impacted by Brexit scenarios and their Via-Sus-Vul 
levels. 
3) To investigate the impact of Brexit scenarios on farmers demographic characteristics and 
consequently on their Via-Sus-Vul levels. 
To address these objectives, a farm household viability model was employed to estimate the potential 
effects of post-Brexit trade and domestic policy scenarios on the economic viability of farm households 
both at regional and national level.  
 
7.2. Farm household data 
 
As described in Chapter 6, the Farm Business Survey (FBS) data is recognised as the most detailed source 
of financial and physical performance of UK farming businesses. Three years data sample from 2013/14 
to 2015/16 were obtained and averaged in order to control for inter-year variability. The sample was 
weighted to provide statistically representative data for a population of over 100,000 commercial farm 
businesses. These businesses represent around 47 percent of UK holdings in 2015/16 but they account 
for more than 90 percent of total agricultural output. To compare data across UK countries, we restricted 
the sample to commercial farm businesses with output of at least 0.5 Standard Labour Requirement and 
at least €25,000 per annum. The resulting dataset of 2,718 commercial farming businesses forms the 
primary sample used for the Via-Sus-Vul simulation models. This sample was weighted (using FBS 
sampling weights) to be statistically representative of 73,200 commercial farming businesses across all 
main farm enterprise types in the UK.  
While the FBS provides comprehensive data on farm business characteristics (including on-farm 
diversification) and financial performance, its coverage regarding the incidence of off-farm income is 
more limited especially in England. Using the available data, estimation of the impact of Brexit policy 
scenarios on the welfare of farm households by employing a classificatory analysis coupled with viability 
criteria threshold.  To allow for a comprehensive assessment of the demographic characteristics of farm 
                                                          
30 This chapter was extensively written by Mercy Ojo. 
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households, farmers were grouped according to the following age categories: Very Young (<35 years), 
Young (35-44 years), Middle aged (45-54 years), Old (55-64 years), Very Old (>65 years). Due to small 
sample sizes, the very young farmers were excluded from the analysis. The FBS sample for each farm type  
and their corresponding demographic classifications are shown in Annex 7.1. 
 
7. 3. Farm viability model 
 
For each observed farm, farm household analysis was run under each of the six Brexit scenarios with the 
Baseline Scenario as the comparator. The major two components used in the farm household income 
include, Farm Business Income (FBI) and off-farm income. Total non-farming income as a variable used in 
the analysis aggregates self-employment, investments, pensions, social payments and other income.  
The combination of both Farm Business Income and off-farm income determines the extent to which 
household income is adequate to generate a basic standard of living, hence the major focus of the 
household income analysis. A threshold minimum wage is used as a measure below which farm 
households are regarded as non-viable. This is based on the National Living Wage for 2018/19. It also 
follows the UK government criterion for the eligibility for Universal Credit, which aims to support living 
costs for people who have low income or are out of work31. 
Thus, a farm business is deemed to be economically viable if the farm business income is sufficient to 
remunerate family labour at the UK minimum agricultural wage (for persons aged 25 years and older) 
and provide 5 percent return on capital invested in non-land assets (e.g. machinery and livestock) (Table 
7.1).  
Farms that are not economically viable but have an off-farm income, earned by either the farmer or the 
spouse, are considered economically sustainable. Farm households that are operating non-viable farm 
businesses and neither the farmer nor the spouse has an off-farm income are considered economically 
vulnerable. Vulnerable farms are in precarious economic position as the farm business is not producing 
enough profit to sustain itself and there is no other form of income in the household. In this context, Via-
Sus-Vul concepts are summarised in Table 7.1 as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1. Defining Via-Sus-Vul classifications32 
                                                          
31 It is paid monthly (or twice per month for some people in Scotland) and it replaces the following benefits: child tax credit, 
housing benefit, income support, income-based jobseeker’s allowance, income-related employment and support allowance, 
Working tax credit. The maximum standard allowance for Universal Credit for a couple aged over 25 is £498.89 per month 
(approximately £6,000 per year) (https://www.gov.uk/universal-credit, last accessed 13 February 2019).  
 
32 Viability, Sustainability and Vulnerability indices decoded as Via-Sus-Vul indices 
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Concept  
 
Definition 
Viable  A farm business is viable if the farm income can remunerate family labour at the 
minimum agricultural wage33 and provide a 5% return on the capital invested in non-
land assets. 
Sustainable  The farm business is not viable, but the household is still considered sustainable if 
the farmer or spouse has an off-farm income. 
Vulnerable A farm household is considered vulnerable if the farm business is not viable and 
neither the farmer nor spouse has an off-farm income. 
 
Based on O’Donoghue et al., (2016), farm businesses are considered viable if they meet the following 
condition:  
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚
> 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 
 
As seen in the above model, Cost of tenant’s capital is defined as a fixed percentage (5 percent return) 
on all non-land assets. It reflects the farmer’s ability to cover his/her cost of capital, enabling farmers to 
continue to invest in farm operations. Without this specific condition, farming can be interpreted as a 
‘way of life’ rather than a money-making activity. As inspired by O’Donoghue et al., 2016, the minimum 
UK agricultural wage of £7.83/hour is employed as a threshold wage thereby serving as a reference 
income to the income earned by the farmer. Thus, farms having a relatively modest income can be viable 
if they have a small labour input and a low capital investment while farms with high income may be 
classified as being vulnerable if their labour input is high with a significant cost of capital.  
To foster viability levels, a two-tier analysis is suggested which distinguishes between Via-Sus-Vul farms 
with the use of some cut off values as shown in Table 7.2. In a first step, the viability breakdown ensures 
that farms are classified as viable or not viable while in a second step, the non-viable category in the first 
step is classified as either sustainable or vulnerable depending on whether (or not) the farmer has an off-
farm income. This means that loss making farms may be sustained by off-farm income, thereby classifying 
farms as economically sustainable where off-farm is present. In a case where this does not hold true, 
farms then belong to the vulnerability category.  
The presence or absence of off-farm income is applied with a condition of £6,000, the annual maximum 
standard allowance/universal credit (2018/19) for a couple aged 25 years and above. Since many farms 
in the sample recorded rather small amounts of non-farm incomes (e.g. savings interest), it is therefore 
appropriate to apply a lower threshold as a filter. Hence, for each observed farm, if the off-farm income 
is less than £6,000/year, the farm is categorised as economically vulnerable.   
                                                          
33 Minimum UK hourly wage rated at £7.83 
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In contrast, if off-farm income is greater than £6,000 then the farm would be categorised as economically 
sustainable, on the assumption that the presence of off-farm income contributes to the household’s basic 
standard of living. 
The overall, analysis covered the projection period 2017 to 2026, with Brexit scenarios beginning in 2019. 
However, for this analysis, we focus on the final year (2026) of the modelled horizon thereby evaluating 
the longer run impacts of the scenarios. Table 6.2 (Chapter 6) shows the projected price changes for each 
scenario according to farm populations in the UK which forms the basis of our economically Via-Sus-Vul 
assessments. Additionally, using a farm household viability model, the estimates of FBI income under 
each of these scenarios (averages are presented in Annexes 7.2 and 7.3) are employed to explore the 
impact of Brexit policy scenarios on the welfare of farm households. 
Table 7.2. Two-tier Viability Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the methodology used 
for the assessment of our Via-Sus-
Vul ratings, the next section 
summarises the results for farm 
household assessment under each 
scenario, by farm type, country and 
age classifications.  
 
 
 
 
7.4. Results 
 
This section focuses on the impacts of trade and domestic policy scenarios on the economic viability of 
farms. For each farm in the FBS sample, the Via-Sus-Vul rating is assessed under the different scenarios 
which encapsulates with or without direct payment. The viability of farms is categorised into two major 
groups depending on whether they are Definite (High Viability) or Moderate (Low Viability). This 
classification describes the impact of the scenario at individual farm level and this helps to consider 
whether the farms benefit or are negatively impacted by Brexit scenarios in terms of farm income which 
consequently affects farms viability. Farms are deemed to be viable based on the extent to which farm 
households can cover the costs incurred on the farm.   
Viability breakdown  Classification 
Viable  Definite >=50% above threshold 
Moderate < 50% above threshold 
Non Viable  Definite >50% below threshold 
Moderate <=50% below threshold 
 
Non Viability breakdown  
Presence of off-
farm income (>£6 
000) 
Status 
 
>50% below threshold 
Definite Less 
Sustainable 
Moderate More 
Vulnerable 
<=50% below threshold Definite More 
Sustainable 
Moderate Less 
Vulnerable 
  
115 
 
 
It is worthy to state that there is an alignment between the direction of impacts of scenarios and farm 
viability ratings. This connotes that viability ratings increase with an increase in price projection and 
decrease with price reduction. More so, scenarios with and without direct payments increases and 
reduces farm viability ratings respectively. Some farms generally benefit from Brexit scenario by 
improving viability ratings and for some farms the price projections will result in lower viability levels. For 
example, the FTA+ scenario has the least impact compared to the Baseline scenario while a lot of farms 
experience severe reductions under a more extreme scenario such as UTL- with some others having the 
highest viability ratings under WTO+. The outcome shows that differences largely occur between 
countries, farm types and demographic classification. Irrespective of the scenario, farm households with 
off-farm income may have greater resilience against farm income fluctuations (Mishra et al., 2002, 
Hennessy and Moran, 2015). Accounting for off-farm income in farm-household welfare analysis is 
therefore pivotal in safeguarding the sustainability of the farm households. Some further brief 
descriptions of the Via-Sus-Vul results are presented in the graphs below.  
 
7.4.1. Viability assessment by Country and Scenario  
 
Figure 7.1. Viability of farms (%) by scenario for all farms, England 
  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Viability of farms (%) by scenario for all farms, Wales 
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Almost one-third of the farms in 
England are economically viable under 
the baseline scenario. FTA+ has the 
least impact on  viability rates and 
highest (38%) under WTO+ scenario. 
UTL- has the least proportion of viable 
farms and highest proportion of 
vulnerable farms. Some farms that are 
loss making (non viable) can still be 
economically sustianable because of 
off-farm income. For example under 
the UTL- scenario, just 9% of the farms 
were viable and 63% are sustainable. 
 
One-fifth of the farms in Wales were 
deemed economically viable even from 
the baseline scenario. Just 3% were 
viable under the UTL- scenario and 
WTO+ has the highest viability rate of 
26%. FTA+ has the least impact on the 
viability levels of farms with the highest 
viability ratings under WTO+ scenario.  
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Figure 7.3. Viability of farms (%) by scenario for all farms, Scotland 
  
 
 
Figure 7.4. Viability of farms (%) by scenario for all farms, Northern Ireland 
 
 
For simplicity and due to the sizeable number of English farm households, we restrict the tier 2 step of 
the analysis (non-viability breakdown) to only English farms. Hence, figures 7.5 and 7.6 shows the Via-
Sus-Vul breakdown of farms in England thereby unveiling the breakdown of viability and non-viability 
components of each classification. 
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Farms under UTL- scenario have the 
poorest viability rating with no farms 
left as being viable. However, higher 
proportion of the farms were 
sustained with the presence of off-
farm income. When direct payments 
are removed, reduction of viability 
rates are amplified under the FTA-, 
WTO- and UTL- Scenarios. 22% of 
farms are viable under the baseline 
scenario. 
22% of the farms in Northern Ireland 
were viable under the baseline scenario. 
This rate remains the same with FTA+. It 
increased to 34% under WTO+ scenario 
but reduced to 8% under UTL+. Viability 
rates leaves FTA+ with no impact but 
increased under WTO+ due to higher milk 
prices. Lower prices under UTL- reduced 
viability rates drastically.   
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7.1.1.1. Via-Sus-Vul breakdown by scenario 
 
Figure 7.5. Viability of farms (%) by scenario for all farms, England  
 
 
 
Figure 7.6. Non-Viability (>50% BT and <50% BT) breakdown of farms by scenario, England 
 
 
To summarise the results by country, Figure 7.1 shows that English farms has the highest proportion of 
viable farms with almost one third of the farm population (14,687 out of 44,061) classified as 
economically viable while Scottish farms (Figure 7.3) have the poorest viability ratings with just 14 percent 
of viable farms (1,552 out of 11,089) and 27 percent vulnerable farms. Almost 3,000 farm households in 
Scotland are in an economically vulnerable position while 6,542 farm households are sustainable. The 
proportion of farms in Wales (Figure 7.2) and Northern Ireland (Figure 7.4) that achieved the viability 
threshold were 21 and 22 percent, respectively. However, despite these low viability rates, it is evident 
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Under each scenario, the proportion 
of farms in the category >50%AT 
(definite) has higher viability rate than 
those in the <50%AT (moderate) 
viability class. However, the category 
>50%BT (definite-non-viable) has 
lower proportion of non viable farms 
compared to <50%BT (moderate- non 
viable). This shows that farms earning 
less than 50 percent below threshold 
were conspicuously non-viable than 
those earning more than 50 percent 
below threshold. 
 
The figure here shows that higher 
proportions of the farms under each 
scenario were classified as More 
sustainable thus showing how off-
farm income could help in improving 
the economic conditions of the farm 
households.   
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that the much higher sustainability rates strengthen the importance of off-farm income sources, thereby 
improving the economic situation of the farm households in all the regions. Indeed, there is a great 
improvement in the sustainability ratings of farms because of the accessibility to off-farm income. 
However, the sustainability ratings of farms in England, Wales and Scotland are much higher than farms 
in Northern Ireland.  
Regarding the importance of direct payments, our results shows that the removal of direct payment 
amplifies the reduction of viable farms under the FTA-, WTO-, and UTL- scenarios, thereby increasing the 
vulnerability levels of farm households. Under the viability levels of WTO, increases in output prices 
almost fully offset the loss of Pillar 1 DP.  Farms under the UTL- scenario have the poorest viability ratings, 
infact, no farms were found to be viable in Scotland under UTL-.  However, a greater proportion of farms 
were sustained with the presence of off-farm income which is amplified to a greater extent due to the 
removal of direct payments.  Notably, with or without direct payments, one in three farms was vulnerable 
under the UTL scenario in Wales.   
Due to the elevating effects of WTO+ tariffs on most domestic farm prices, viability levels increase across 
all UK devolved administrations while, in contrast, the UTL+ scenario increases the proportion of 
vulnerable farms as liberalised trade expose UK agriculture to reduced commodity prices, hence making 
them less competitive relative to the cheap(er) imports.  Trade liberalisation combined with removal of 
Pillar 1 direct payments (UTL-) was found to be the most challenging with projected vulnerabilty levels 
becoming positive in each of the four nations. This tends to leave households in a worse situation, with 
viability levels below Baseline levels. In each of the four UK countries, the proportion of vulnerable farms 
increases under FTA- with Scotland showing a drastic and more conspicuous reduction in the number of 
viable farms.  
In the next section, the viability levels by farm type is presented, showing how these ratings vary 
substantially by farm types. This reinforces, however, the large differences between countries and 
between UK farming systems. 
 
7.4.2. Viability Assessment for all farm types: UK 
 
Figure 7.7. Viability of farms (%) for all UK farms under the Baseline scenario  
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Under the Baseline scenario, Figure 7.7 displays the Via-Sus-Vul levels of each individual farm types for 
the UK as a whole. The viability of dairy farming is high relative to the other farm types, with 42 percent 
of dairy farm businesses economically viable. In contrast, only 11 percent of specialist beef farm met the 
business viability threshold. Nearly 60 percent of beef and sheep farms are sustainable because of the 
presence of off-farm income. Over 30 percent of beef farms and 23 percent of sheep farms are classified 
as economically vulnerable. However, the number of economically viable farms which declines in farm 
types such as Beef, Sheep, Pigs, Mixed, Lowland Grazing Livestock, LFA and Horticulture were deemed 
sustainable with the presence of off- farm income.  
 
7.4.2.1. Impact of Scenarios on Viable farms by farm types: with Direct Payments 
 
Figure 7.8. Viability Assessment (%) by farm types impacted by Scenario with DP 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8 shows FTA+ has negligible impacts on the viability of farms regardless of the farm types. Higher 
wheat prices under WTO improved the viability rating of cereal farms while lower FTA+ prices reduce the 
percentages of viable farms slightly. The percentages of viable Dairy farms under WTO+ increases (89% of 
viable farms) due to higher milk prices while there is massive reduction in viability levels under UTL+ (11% 
viable farms) scenario due to lower prices.  
In the same vein, the viability ratings in pig farms increased under WTO+ (57% viable farms) due to higher 
prices and reduced under UTL+ (20% viable farms) because of lower pig prices. For the LFA farms, Slight 
price changes have negligible impact on the viability ratings of the farms under FTA+ but higher beef 
prices under WTO+ have modest positive effect on the farm’s viability ratings. 
Regarding the beef and sheep sectors, price changes under FTA+ have negligible impacts on the viability 
levels of both farms but lower sheep prices lead to lower viability level under the WTO+ (12% viable farms 
as against 19% under the Baseline scenario) while on the contrary, higher beef prices under the WTO+ 
scenario lead to 20% increase in viable farms from 11% under the Baseline scenario.  
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7.4.2.2. Impact of Scenarios on Viable farms by farm types: without Direct Payments 
 
Figure 7.9. Viability Assessment (%) by farm types and by Scenario without DP 
 
 
The viability levels of all the farm types reduced substantially due to loss of income support as shown in 
Figure 7.9. Relative to the Baseline scenario, all the other scenarios were greatly impacted without support. 
Most of the farms in the beef and sheep sectors ended up disappearing due to loss of direct payment. 
Without Direct payment, 10% (under WTO-) of the farm households in the dairy sector will end up going 
out their farm business. Since the pig sector is less dependent on support payments, just 3% of the pig farms 
would be impacted by the loss of direct payments.  
 
7.4.2.3. Impact of Scenarios on Sustainable farms by farm types: with Direct Payments 
 
Figure 7.10. Sustainability Assessment (%) by farm types and by Scenario with DP 
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Figure 7.10 shows the incidence of the farm households that were sustainable because of off-farm 
income. For example, the beef and sheep sectors with almost the lowest proportion of viable farms could 
be tagged as having almost a higher proportion of sustainable farms due to the incidence of off-farm 
income. Indeed, it is clear that the future sustainability of many farm households might be dependent on 
farmers and their spouses’ ability to secure employment off the farm. 
 
7.4.2.4. Impact of Scenarios on Vulnerable farms by farm types: with Direct Payments 
 
Figure 7.11. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by farm types and by Scenario with DP 
 
Vulnerability assessment displaying farm household that are economically unviable and neither the 
farmer nor spouse secures off-farm income is shown in Figure 7.11 above. The UTL+ scenario leaves all 
the farms highly vulnerable. 
7.4.2.5 Impact of Scenarios on Vulnerable farms by farm types: without Direct Payments 
 
Figure 7.12. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by farm types and by Scenario without DP  
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Following the loss of direct payments, the incidence of vulnerable farms increased across all farm types 
(irrespective of the scenarios) as displayed in Figure 7.12. Except for pigs and dairy sector with the lowest 
vulnerability levels under WTO-, the remaining sectors were highly vulnerable. The combination of loss 
of direct payment and elimination of import tariff (UTL) amplifies farmers’ vulnerability to Brexit 
scenarios. 
 
7.4.3. Impact of Scenarios on farm households by Age and Country 
 
Figure 7.13. Viability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, ENGLAND 
  
 
Figure 7.14. Viability Assessment (%) by Age classification without DP, ENGLAND  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
35-44yrs 45-54yrs 55-64yrs >64yrs
Baseline FTA+ UTL+ WTO+
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
35-44yrs 45-54yrs 55-64yrs >64yrs
Baseline FTA- UTL- WTO-
Figure 7.13 shows that farm 
households within the age 
group 34-44years have their 
highest viability rating under 
WTO+ Scenario while the 
lowest WTO+ viable farms falls 
within >64 years age group. 
Relative to the baseline and 
across all scenarios, younger 
farm households have higher 
viability ratings than their older 
counterparts. 
  
For each of the age category, loss 
of support payment reduced the 
viability levels of most English 
farms. Even WTO- negatively 
impact all the age category when 
compared to the baseline. Younger 
farm households (Age 35-44 and 
45-54 years) have better viability 
ratings than the older category of 
farm households. This shows that 
older farmers rely more on Direct 
payment than young farmers  
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Figure 7.15. Sustainability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, ENGLAND 
 
Figure 7.16. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, ENGLAND 
 
 
Figure 7.17. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by Age classification without DP, ENGLAND 
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Older farm households (>64 years) 
are most sustainable under each 
scenario. This shows that they earn 
off-farm income more than the 
other age groups. This could be due 
to the money they get from pension 
or benefits. For each age category, 
farms are deemed to be most 
sustainable even under the most 
extreme scenario (UTL+) showing 
the importance of off-farm income. 
 
Apart from older farm households 
(> 64), the incidence of economic 
vulnerability increased with the 
contraction of off-farm income 
across all the other age category 
of the farm households. Thus, 
showing these group of farm 
households does not have access 
to off-farm income compared to 
the >64 age group. 
 
Across each scenario, most farm 
households within the age 
category of 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64  
were economically vulnerable 
without direct payment while the 
older farmers age 64 and above 
would be economically sustainable 
even without farm income 
support.  
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Figure 7.18. Viability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, WALES 
 
Figure 7.19. Viability Assessment (%) by Age classification without DP, WALES 
 
 
Figure 7.20. Sustainability Assessment (%) by Age 
classification with DP, WALES 
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Across all scenarios and age 
categories, UTL+ has the worst 
impact on farm households with 
no viable farms in younger farm 
households (35-44 years). Slight 
price changes under FTA+ have 
negligible impact on the age 
categories of the farm households 
but higher prices under WTO+ 
have positive impact on farm’s 
viability ratings. 
 
Without direct payments, the 
viability ratings of the farm 
households dropped conspicuously 
across all age categories and 
scenarios. In comparison with the 
baseline scenario, farms managed 
by younger farmers were more 
viable as opposed to farms were 
farmers are older. 
 
Farm households with farmers 
age 64 years and above were the 
most sustainable under each 
scenario. For each age category, 
farms are deemed to be most 
sustainable even under the most 
extreme scenario (UTL+). This 
shows the impact of off-farm 
income which improves the 
economic condition of the farm 
households. 
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Figure 7.21. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, WALES 
  
 
Figure 7.22. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by Age classification without DP, WALES 
 
 
Figure 7.23. Viability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, NORTHERN IRELAND 
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The incidence of economic 
vulnerability increased with the 
contraction of off-farm income 
across all the age categories except 
farm households >64 years where 
none of the farms was vulnerable. 
 
Without income support, there is 
no incidence of vulnerability for old 
farmers. This does not hold true for 
the other age categories as there is 
a great increase in Vulnerability 
levels under all scenarios. 
UTL+ scenario has the poorest 
viability ratings on all farm 
households irrespective of the 
age classification. The younger 
farm households have higher 
viability ratings than their older 
counterparts. 
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Figure 7.24. Viability Assessment (%) by Age classification without DP, NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Figure 7.25. Sustainability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, NORTHERN IRELAND 
  
 
 
Figure 7.26. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, NORTHERN IRELAND 
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Without income support, FTA- 
scenario greatly impact the 
viability ratings of the farm 
households. Despite the fact that 
the viability ratings of the farm 
household dropped without farm 
income support, farm households 
aged 35-44 and 45-54 years were 
performing relatively well under 
WTO- scenario.  
 
With farm income support, 
virtually all the farms within 
each classification are 
sustainable because of the 
influence of off-farm income. 
FTA+ scenario has the least 
effect, while UTL- greatly affects 
the sustainability of the farm 
households.  
 
The contraction of off-farm 
income caused the incidence 
of economic vulnerability to 
increase. Most farms are 
vulnerable under UTL+ with 
the least vulnerability levels 
from WTO+.  
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Figure 7.27. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by Age classification without DP, NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
 
Figure 7.28. Viability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, SCOTLAND 
 
 
Figure 7.29. Viability Assessment (%) by Age classification without DP, SCOTLAND 
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Lack of farm income support coupled 
with lack of off-farm income caused 
the incidence of vulnerability to 
increase. This incidence is more 
pronounced in farms age groups 35-
44 and 55-64. 
With income support, the viability 
ratings under the WTO+ scenario 
is higher compared to other 
scenarios. Most specifically, it is 
highest within 45-54 years of age, 
while on the contrary, viability 
levels drastically reduced under 
UTL+ scenario. 
Relative to the baseline scenarios, 
removal of support payments 
amplifies the reduction of viability 
ratings under each scenario. 
Young farmers have better 
viability ratings under the WTO 
scenario compared to their very 
old counterparts with no viability 
ratings. 
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Figure 7.30. Sustainability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, SCOTLAND 
 
Figure 7.31. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by Age classification with DP, SCOTLAND 
 
 
Figure 7.32. Vulnerability Assessment (%) by Age classification without DP, SCOTLAND 
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Irrespective of the age category, 
farm households under the UTL 
scenario are deemed to be 
sustainable thereby showing the 
impact of off-farm income in 
improving the welfare of farm 
households. 
 
Irrespective of the age 
category of farm households, 
the contraction of off-farm 
income caused the incidence 
of incidence of economic 
vulnerability to increase. The 
highest incidence falls within 
age groups 45-54 and 55-64. 
 
 
Across each scenario, most farm 
households within all age classifications 
would be economically vulnerable 
without direct payment, this connotes 
that the incidence of vulnerability 
increase without support payments. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
 
The three broad groups applied to classify farm population are viability, sustianabilty and vulnerability 
which are referred to as Via-Sus-Vul. Farm income are important for farm viabilty while off-farm income 
are important for sustainabilty. Vulnerabilty being the extreme case is when a farm household lacks both 
farm and off-farm income. Studies of farm viability have attempted to understand the criteria for 
vulnerabilty cases at the farm level and identify factors which determine a switch from being viable to 
non-viable as well as the subsequent consequences for underperformance within farm households. 
Vrolijk et al 2010 opined that viability is determined by the level of farm husehold income and the ability 
for the farm households to cover capital investment. The findings in this report explores the impacts of 
brexit scenarios on the Via-Sus-Vul ratings of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and 
consequently investigated the impact of these scenarios by farm types and age. 
The viability general model (as described in this chapter) is used to estimate the effects of various policy 
scenarios across different farm types and age categories in different parts of the UK and our findings are 
consistent with the Baseline results of other studies such as O’Donoghue et al., 2016, Hennessy and 
Moran, 2015 and Vrolijk et al., 2010. Considering the regional classification, large differences in the 
viability ratings of farms exist across the regions in the UK. Under the Baseline Scenario, only 29% of the 
farms in England are viable, 21% in Wales, 14% in Scotland and 22% in NI.  In each of these countries, the 
scenario with income support have more significant impact on farm viabilities while scenarios without 
support leaves most farms in a vulnerable state. However, the presence of off-farm incomes improves 
the economic situation of some farm households since off-farm income is critical in safe-guarding the 
economic wellbeing of a large proportion of farm households. This means that in England for example 
nearly two-thirds of the farms would be vulnerable, if it were not for off-farm income. 
Via-Sus-Vul assessment varies substantially by farm types which are driven by farm and off-farm factors. 
Due to the increase in milk prices, viability rates for dairy farm businesses remain high with 42% of the 
farms being viable. This increased to 89% under WTO+, 43% under FTA+ and reduced to 11% UTL+. In the 
same vein, the increases in pig prices influenced the viability ratings of pig farms in each of the scenario. 
38% of the pig farms are viable under the Baseline scenario, 57% under WTO+, 37% under FTA+ and 20% 
under UTL+. On the other hand, it is obvious that certain farm types are more vulnerable to farmgate 
price reductions than others. For example, if pillar 1 remains, the viability of sheep farms (Baseline 19%, 
FTA+ 18%, WTO+ 12% and UTL+ 10%) would be adversely affected due to price reductions under WTO+ 
and UTL+ while the number of viable (Baseline 11%, FTA+ 11%, WTO+ 20% and UTL+ 1%) beef farms 
would be adversely affected by price reductions under UTL+. It is important to mention that some farms 
would experience higher viability ratings through higher beef, milk and wheat prices under the WTO+ 
scenarios. The UTL+ scenario leaves most farm households in highly devastating and vulnerable 
conditions. Conversely, if support payment is abolished, most livestock farms would be out of business 
because of the reductions in beef cattle and sheep numbers. This suggests that very few viable farms 
would be able to produce profit that is sufficient to reward the labour and capital invested. Off-farm 
income would therefore be critical in safe guarding the economic well-being of a large proportion of farm 
households since just over one third of farm households can be considered economically vulnerable (the 
farm business is not viable and there is no off-farm income present in the household). Off-farm remains 
very important especially for beef and sheep sectors.  
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The viability assessment by demographic classifications shows that with income support, young farmers 
(35-44 years) have higher viability ratings under WTO+ scenario in each of the countries while the old 
farm households (64 years and above) have poor viability ratings. However, since the presence of off-
farm income improves the welfare of farm households, its reliance is particularly pronounced for farmers’ 
in the older age categories.  
 
Without support payment, it is clear that most farms especially in Wales and Scotland would be out of 
business particularly under the UTL+ scenario. In England and Northern Ireland, younger farm households 
have viability ratings than their older counterparts not minding the scenario. Due to large differences 
occuring across regions, systems and demographic characteristics, the future viability and sustainabilty 
of a large number of farm households is dependent on farmers and their spouse’s ability to secure 
employment off the farm. Finally, price projections, direct payments and off-farm income, largely 
influence variability in the levels of viability, sustainability and vulnerability across UK countries, farm 
types and demographic characteristics. Overall, the results show that the economic welfare of farm 
households in the UK is influenced markedly by farmers’ accessibility to off-farm income, but the shape 
of the future domestic agriculture (e.g. retaining/eliminating direct payments) and the trade relations 
with the EU and the rest of the world cannot be ignored, and their farm impact will be far from uniform. 
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8. Model Reconciliation and Modelling Issues34  
 
8.1. Macro (CGE) and Sector (FAPRI) Models 
 
This Chapter seeks to reconcile the results and projections of the macro (Chapter 3) and the sector 
(Chapter 4) models between themselves and with the farm level analysis (Chapter 5, and 6).  This may be 
understood as the difference in effect on the whole of the agricultural sector, as compared with how 
changes are experienced by individual farms.  
As with any models, those deployed for this project necessarily invoke a number of simplifying 
assumptions. These include presumed production objectives (i.e. profit maximisation), consistent 
consumer preferences (e.g., own and cross-price elasticities; Armington origin effects) and domestic and 
international supply-responsiveness (e.g., capacities to meet increased demand). Although these 
assumptions are common to most agricultural production and trade modelling exercises, they will 
influence the model results under different scenarios, hence different modelling frameworks inevitably 
lead to different projected impacts. Nevertheless, the broad policy conclusions arising from the differing 
modelling systems (CGE and PE) employed in this analysis are similar, i.e. a UK-EU FTA results in modest 
market changes, following the loss of access to Single Market (hence the imposed trade facilitation costs), 
while the imposition of WTO tariffs depends on the UK's net trading position (net importer vs net 
exporter).  The impact of trade liberalisation hinges on the degree of trade openness of and 
competitiveness of the UK sectors compared to their international competitors. In addition, both models 
indicate that any depreciation of the pound has a strong inflationary impact on output prices but limited 
production impacts due to offsetting increases in input prices.  
A strength of the CGE model is its ability to capture general macroeconomic feedback effects and provide 
detail on the impact on agricultural factor markets, e.g. decline in wages and land rents following removal 
of Pillar 1 direct payments. It also provides some estimates for the food processing sector and changes 
for food prices (at retail level). In contrast, the PE model provides a more detailed subsector assessment 
within the agricultural sector, for example, sheep versus beef. Nonetheless, the supply and demand 
responses of the agricultural system are modelled somewhat differently in PE and CGE. The former makes 
use of relatively familiar supply and demand functions, typically based on estimation from historic data, 
which may or may not reflect future circumstances and conditions (e.g. those representing substantial 
departure from Baseline, such as the ULT and WTO scenarios). The CGE model, on the other hand, uses 
the framework of production possibility frontiers, based on the availability of factors of production, i.e. 
labour, land and capital (which generate the implicit supply responses), and consumer preferences and 
responses as reflected in utility functions which generate the implicit demand responses to both incomes 
and prices.  
As a consequence, although both models are based on very similar assumptions about the ‘present’ 
condition of the economies and markets, and their supposed development in the future, they generate 
somewhat different projections of the impacts of trade and policy changes. A brief review of the major 
differences between the two models (PE and CGE) under the six scenarios highlights the differences and 
provides a basis for discussion of the potential implications.  
                                                          
34 This chapter was written by Myles Patton, George Philippidis and Andrew Moxey. 
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We first discuss the effects of changing trade relations, while maintaining current direct payments, and 
then consider the effects of removing CAP Pillar 1 direct support. 
 
8.1.1. Trade Scenarios with Direct Payments: FTA+ (1), UTL+ (3) and WTO+ (5) 
 
UK-EU FTA:  Both models show modest price impacts due to higher trade costs, with additional trade 
facilitation costs for UK exports to the EU and imports from the EU broadly cancelling each other. We 
should note, however, that neither of our models deals in any detail with non-tariff barriers, which would 
exist under most FTAs. We justify their exclusion on at least two grounds. The uncertainty concerning the 
extent to which non-tariff barriers may inhibit trade, and the unavailability of robust data. Hence, our 
representation of these measures is restricted to imposing relatively modest but arbitrary trade 
facilitation costs, which do not and cannot include all the issues associated with non-tariff barriers (e.g. 
sanitary and phytosanitary rules, labelling, compliance with different regulatory regimes, custom checks 
and rules of origin). Some observers (e.g. House of Lords, 2017) have suggested that non-tariff barriers 
will add to farmers’ cost and these might be higher than tariffs. However, care needs to be taken about 
making generalisations based on specific barriers between individual pairs of countries.  For example, 
while there may be specific issues concerning non-tariff barriers between the EU and the US (e.g. 
chlorine-washed chicken and hormone-fed beef), Mercosur countries already export significant volumes 
of agriculture produce to the EU through tariff rate quotas. These exports already comply with UK/EU 
requirements and production standards.   
Unilateral Free Trade:  The major difference between the two models is that in the PE model consumers 
do not differentiate between products from the domestic market and those from the rest of the world 
(as the PE model assumes perfect substitutability between domestic produce and imports). In contrast, 
the CGE model allows for imperfect substitutability (e.g. apple from Spain versus apple from Brazil) using 
the conventional Armington assumption, which incorporates, to some extent, a reflection of domestic 
consumers’ preferences for products from different sources (different varieties). The Armington 
assumption is a form of product differentiation explicitly linked to country/region of origin, hence it 
exogenously differentiates products either based on their physical properties or on consumers’ 
perceptions attached to products from a particular region (e.g., ethnocentric attitudes (‘Buy British’); 
brand quality (PDO/PDI wines from France or Spain)). These are also considered as non-tariff measures, 
and their presence varies dramatically depending on the product under consideration. The resulting 
quantity and price impacts are therefore very difficult to ascertain, a priori, and hence are not modelled 
here.  
Both models show a significant price decline for 'red meat'. The CGE generates an 11% fall for ‘red meat’ 
at the retail level, while the PE model shows falls of 42% and 19% in beef and sheep producer prices, 
respectively. An attempt to transform retail prices into producer prices implies larger price declines using 
the PE model. The price falls from both models reflect the current price differences between the UK and 
elsewhere in the world, especially the most competitive world producers.  
The CGE model also yields a marked decline in 'red meat' production under UTL (-27%).   This compares 
to more modest decreases in production projected by the PE model (-12% for beef and -5% for sheep). 
This is partly attributable to dynamic effects, which mean that the declines in production are not fully 
captured at the end of the projection period by the PE model, for example illustrated by the marked 
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decline in suckler cow numbers.  Our models generally assume that there is sufficient capacity within the 
rest of the world to meet the expansion in UK imports in the beef and sheep sectors under this trade 
liberalisation scenario.  Within the beef sector this assumption is regarded as plausible since the increase 
in the level of imports to the UK is relatively small compared to the global level of trade, and imports are 
sourced from various countries.  In contrast, the potential of the rest of the world to meet the expansion 
in UK imports in the sheep sector is questionable, hence a sensitivity analysis was undertaken to explore 
the importance of this assumption (see Chapter 4). The CGE model structure is, however, centred on the 
availability of land, labour and capital to meet consumer (market) demands through the production 
possibility frontier, therefore the supply functions are implicit rather than explicit.      
CGE yields a negligible fall in the price of 'white meat' (-0.1% - pork and poultry are grouped together 
within this category). Similarly, the PE model yields modest declines for pig meat and poultry (-3% and -
4% respectively). 
There are some divergent price impacts in the dairy sector. The CGE model yields an overall price increase 
for the dairy sector, while the FAPRI PE model yields price declines for cheese and butter. The projected 
price increases arising from the CGE model result from the combined impact of trade facilitation costs 
and increased access to non-EU markets.  The part-worth results from the CGE model suggest that the 
elimination of tariffs on imports for the rest of the world does not fully offset these other effects. In 
contrast, within the FAPRI analysis the elimination of tariffs dominates the other policy changes since the 
increased inflow of imports from the rest of the world results in market prices falling to world levels. It 
should also be noted that these results depend on the definition and specification of the base line for 
‘world prices’, which cannot easily be fully reconciled between the two models. Within the beef sector 
the Brazilian price is used as the reference world price in the PE model, as it is the most competitive.  The 
differential between the UK and Brazilian beef prices within the PE modelling system is reasonably 
consistent with Irish Bord Bia international datasets.  It should, however, be borne in mind that the 
magnitude of the estimated policy changes is dependent on the evolution of world markets and exchange 
rates. Both models show similar price impacts for wheat, while the PE model shows a specific negative 
impact for barley.  
 
A fall back to WTO MFN tariff schedule  
Both models show differential impacts across sectors depending on import trade dependency.  
The CGE model yields a 7% increase for 'red meat' at the retail level, while the PE model shows a 17% 
increase for the beef producer price and a 23% decrease for sheepmeat producer price at the farm gate. 
The aggregate price impact for beef and sheepmeat is similar, although the PE projections identify the 
particular vulnerability of the sheep sector to both WTO and UTL.    
Both models show a price increase for 'white meat', with a strong production response in these sectors 
reflecting the significant output price increases but limited input price increases.  
Both models yield price increases in the dairy sector, which are primarily driven by high tariffs on imports 
from the EU. The disaggregation of the PE model across the devolved administrations demonstrates 
different price impacts for milk producers, particularly for Northern Ireland.    
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Both models yield equivalent price impacts for wheat (+1%). The PE model provides specific projections 
for barley, with the price declining by 5% due to surplus net exports in the Baseline.  
 
8.1.2. Trade scenarios with the Direct Payments Removed: FTA- (2), UTL- (4) and WTO- (6) 
 
Despite different modelling frameworks both models show fairly modest declines in production following 
the removal of CAP direct payments. These results are especially sensitive to the assumptions made about 
the extent to which decoupled payments actually increase domestic production from what it otherwise 
would have been. Although direct payments (officially decoupled from production) are considered as 
non-trade distorting (included in the Green Box) by the WTO, there is still considerable debate regarding 
their effects on production. While the negative livestock production impact is slightly more marked in the 
CGE model, this reflects the fact that the PE model does not capture the full production impact. This is 
mainly due to livestock dynamics as indicated by the significant falls in livestock numbers, the implications 
of which are not fully worked through within the time period of the analysis.  
The additional positive impact of the removal of Pillar 1 direct payments on price arising from the CGE 
model is similar across the different trade arrangements. This reflects the equivalent per unit cost 
increase to the farmer resulting from the elimination of per unit (direct) subsidies on agricultural land, 
capital and labour factors.  In contrast, the removal of direct payments within the PE model has a positive 
impact on price under the FTA scenario, but not under the other two trade scenarios. In both, UTL and 
WTO scenarios, the UK domestic prices are essentially bounded by world prices (with added tariff in the 
case of WTO) and therefore there is no price response from the removal of direct payments.  Again, the 
differential trade effects in the CGE versus the PE model reflect that lack of consumers’ preferences as 
well as the differential effects of world prices and exchange rates. 
In addition, it is important to recognise that the assumed extreme policy changes (i.e. UTL-) represent 
significant shifts from existing policies. For example, price changes go beyond the variation experienced 
historically, upon which the models are calibrated.  Furthermore, the strong reliance on direct payments 
within some sectors means that the elimination of direct payments may lead to major structural changes 
(e.g. rationalisation and potential concentration of farms, and changes in land use and production 
patterns) that are difficult to capture in our present models.  Neither of our models (PE or CGE) capture 
the frictions and dynamic adjustment costs likely to be associated with these changes, including the 
calibration of adjustment rates to historic data. 
 
8.1.3. Concluding remarks on the CGE and PE modelling assumptions  
 
The critical issue in the modelling of agriculture’s ability to cope with policy changes and thrive after Brexit 
is the effect of direct payments (DPs). The macro (CGE) and sector (FAPRI PE) models assume that these 
payments have some effects on production, enabling the domestic farm sector to produce more than 
otherwise would, hence their elimination would reduce domestic production. This will also exert some 
upward pressure on domestic producer prices, which might or might not offset any downward pressure 
resulting from the changes in trade conditions.  
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Legitimate questions have been raised in workshop discussions of our results about the reflection of the 
effects of direct payments, especially in the CGE model. In particular, the assumption used in the present 
version of the CGE model is that only 8% of direct payments are ‘capitalised in farm land rents. This 
assumption is based on earlier and independent research (Michalek et al., 2014) which looked at rents 
paid by farmers as recorded in farm business survey (FADN) data over the period 2004 – 2007 (spanning 
the introduction of the current direct payment regime).  Without any more reliable estimates available, 
this assumption was retained for the analysis we report in this study. However, there are good reasons 
to suppose that the estimate of the effects of direct payments on land rents is too small. In particular, 
the single payment scheme (SPS) introduced in 2004 (or 2005 in some EU countries) replaced a set of 
area payments (also considered effectively de-coupled) which already had some effects on land rents 
which are not included in the Michalek et al. (2014) estimates. More importantly, land rents do not adjust 
immediately to changes in expected revenue streams, while the mechanics of the transition to the SPS 
itself also mean that the effects of the scheme on actual (or estimated) farm rents in the farm survey data 
will not have been fully realised over this time period. Our conclusion is that the price effects of policy 
and trade changes following Brexit are probably more robustly projected by the FAPRI PE model, and 
these are the changes used in the farm level analysis, although we do make use of the projected changes 
in input costs and factor prices from the CGE results, with the caveat that these are indications of direction 
rather than robust estimates of probable effects. 
 
8.2. Farm-level modelling Key Issues 
 
Although the ScotFarm model allows for some dynamic optimisation under different scenarios, the 
production possibility frontier is restricted to that already observed on a farm. That is, the model can 
change the level and mix of activities, but not introduce new ones. This reflects practical constraints 
imposed on farms by, for example, the suitability of land or credit availability which limit opportunities 
to adopt new enterprises.  However, whilst such constraints may be binding for some farms, they will not 
be for all farms.  Consequently, ScotFarm results under-estimate the longer-term scope for adjustment 
to farming systems.  This explains to some extent why the ScotFarm results are bleaker than the national 
or sectoral results. However, beyond splitting the UK into four parts, the national and sectoral results are 
non-spatial per se. Yet farming activities and structures display considerable spatial heterogeneity, with 
local conditions and markets exerting significant influence on farming practices.  Hence, the national and 
sectoral models may misrepresent the ease with which resources can be transferred between different 
agricultural uses (or indeed the wider economy), and consequent adjustment.  For example, rough grazing 
land released by cessation of extensive sheep grazing is unlikely to be utilised for other agricultural 
activities; an eastern arable farming looking to expand will have no interest in redundant western grazing 
land. On the other hand, the macro and sector level models do assume substantial structural adjustment, 
which cannot be included in existing farm level models. 
 
Spatial heterogeneity of land quality also means that land prices and rental values vary considerably. 
Moreover, price and land rents also vary with size and location/accessibility and whether it comes with 
buildings and equipment. Consequently, whilst reductions in (especially) rental values may be 
anticipated, the use of averages estimated across the UK, or even across each of the four devolved 
administrations will misrepresent local conditions.  Unfortunately, addressing such modelling weaknesses 
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would require better data plus explicit linkages between the different modelling levels – neither of which 
were available within this project, nor yet to the analytical community in the UK. 
 
The ScotFarm results presented here also reflect fixed efficiency levels35 rather than allowing for 
productivity improvements. Again, this is likely to under-estimate the scope for adjustments to offset 
some of the impact of removing direct payments.  However, the Simulated Income Distribution analysis 
has explored efficiency gains to some extent (through sensitivity analysis), revealing that even ambitious 
target improvements were insufficient to mitigate farm income loss impacts in many cases.  The same 
applied to reductions in land rental values. 
 
8.3. Overall Modelling Concluding Remarks  
 
There is a clear and substantial disconnect between the projections of the macro (CGE) and sector (PE- 
FAPRI) models and the farm level analysis. Both the CGE and PE estimates imply that UK Agriculture and 
its sectors can certainly survive, and in some cases clearly prosper under Brexit, even under the harshest 
(WTO) conditions. However, we should note that they do not model any short-run adjustment and 
adaptation costs; rather they reflect the effects of these changes on an on-going and more or less fully 
adjusted basis (with the caveats noted above). On the other hand, the farm level analysis clearly 
demonstrates that Brexit, especially the removal of direct payments, would be harmful for many farms, 
especially beef and sheep. The principal explanation of this critical difference is that the macro and sector 
level models reflect the major elements of structural adjustment within the industry (PE) and between 
the industry and the rest of the economy (CGE). In contrast, the farm level analysis ignores this structural 
adjustment and focuses on the impacts on existing farms. It is a critical shortfall in the analytic and 
simulation capacity of the applied economics profession, especially in the UK, that we do not have any 
computable models to bridge this gap, i.e. directly incorporating farm level impacts with consequent 
adjustment and structural changes in regional and national markets, both for factors of production (land, 
labour, management and capital), and inputs and outputs.36 As a consequence, we are obliged to use a 
more traditional discursive approach to identifying and interpreting the implications, as in the following 
Chapter. 
  
                                                          
35 Relaxation of this assumption is possible, but not within the life time of this project.  
36 At the EU level, the CAPRI model does attempt this bridge, capable of further development to include agent-based modeling 
approaches. 
137 
 
 
9. Historical changes in the UK Agriculture’s Aggregate Accounts37  
 
As a background to considering both the robustness and implications of our results for the development 
of future UK and devolved policies, it is instructive to remember the extent to which technical and 
structural change in UK agriculture (during our membership of the EEC/EU), and the outcomes 
(production revenues and returns) have shown substantial variations in the past.  Figure 9.1 focuses on 
the economic accounts for UK agriculture as a whole, and shows the constituent parts of UK Agriculture’s 
total revenues in real terms (Defra, Table 4.1 Production and income account in real terms; United 
Kingdom). 
 
Figure 9.1:  UK Agriculture’s Total revenues and disposition, 1974-2016 
 
 
Two obvious features of this history stand out. First, the substantial variation in the real value of total 
revenues, and thus, to a lesser extent, the constituent parts, but exaggerated in the residual  ‘total income 
from farming’ (TIFF). Second, an apparent general downward trend in total revenues, albeit with more or 
less erratic peaks and troughs, which again tends to be exaggerated in the trend in TIFF. However, this 
trend is also exaggerated by the starting date as 1973 was not only the beginning of the UK’s accession 
to the EEC and the CAP, but also a period of unprecedentedly high world prices. These spiked massively 
as a consequence of the coincidence of several compounding events: the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate regime in 1971 and the collapse of the $ (and £); the spike in world grain 
prices following unexpectedly large USSR purchases of grain from North America in 1972; the OPEC oil 
crisis in 1973. In real terms, 1973 saw the post war record in UK agriculture’s total revenues. The 
coincidence of the UK’s entry to the EEC in the same year arguably led to an over intensification and 
capitalisation in the agricultural industry, which may still be unwinding. 
 
                                                          
37 This section was written by David Harvey.  
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At least more recently, one of the key factors explaining the variation in total revenues, exaggerated in 
TIFF, is the exchange rate. In particular, the notable spike in the real value of revenues and TIFF in the 
mid-1990s coincides with the (temporary) collapse of sterling following its exit from the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) in September 1992. Figure 9.2, shows how TIFF per farmer, accounting for the 
change in farmer numbers as well as changes in the overall total, has varied with the £/€ exchange rate 
since the 1990.38 
 
Figure 9.2 
 
 
The exchange rate conditions both input and output prices, since the UK is completely open to product 
and input trade influences from the EU over this period, while the protection afforded by EU tariffs on 
trade with the rest of the world has also been declining to relatively low levels over this period. The 
exchange rate also conditions the value of the DPs, albeit with a lag, since the total value of the DPs is set 
in €, but paid in sterling. While there are also variations in both yields and quality of products, as well as 
in the real costs of producing and marketing, which also contribute to the variations in revenues and 
costs, and hence in exaggerated form, in TIFF, these tend to be of second order to the variation in world 
prices, as reflected through the exchange rate, especially since the removal of many of the CAP’s product 
tariffs and replacement with, first area and headage payments in 1994/5, and subsequently with DPs in 
2004/5.  As Figure 9.1 illustrates, the real value of subsidies under the CAP increased substantially in the 
1990s, mostly reflecting the exchange rate. The import protection offered by substantial EU import levies 
was largely removed in 1994 under the MacSharry reforms (except, notably, for dairy products and beef, 
albeit that these are also subject to considerable TRQs, allowing preferential imports without tariff 
protection).  
                                                          
38 Redman, G. (2016), the Andersons Centre, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/536626/AUK2016_presentationsam11jul16.
pdf, 
 
 
139 
 
 
These early CAP reforms coincided with the eventual conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations, to be largely replaced with fixed area and headage payments, subsequently replaced with 
the Single Payment Scheme (DPs) in 2003/4. The history of the development of UK Agriculture, 
encapsulated in Figure 9.1, is instructive in considering the consequences of the removal of Direct 
Payments (DPs). However, the period between 2007 and 2016 may be taken as reasonably representative 
of the current condition of the industry (Table 9.1). 
 
Table 9.1. Relative levels and variations in UK Agriculture’s Revenues & Disposition 2007-16 
 2007/16 average (£bn, real) St. Dev 
Total Output 24.00 2.4 (10%) 
Variable Costs 15.36 1.3 (9%) 
Gross Value Added 8.45 1.1 (13%) 
Subsidies 3.48 0.4 (11%) 
GVA at Factor cost 11.93 1.0 (9%) 
Depreciation 4.00 0.2 (5%) 
Labour Costs 2.47 0.06 (2%) 
Rents paid 0.52 0.04 (9%) 
Interest Charges 0.36 0.08 (22%) 
Total Income from Farming (TIFF) 4.48 0.87 19%) 
 
 
The GVA at factor cost (including subsidies) is, in effect, the realised gross margin of the UK farm, which 
over this 10 year-period has varied by +/- 9%.  The average real value of subsidies over this period is 
£3.5bn, +/- £0.4bn, (of which £2.5bn Direct Payments). Notice that the value of the direct payments is 
practically equivalent to the variation in the value of total output over this period, at +/- £2.4bn, which 
might suggest that UK agriculture is already well able to cope with removal of these payments. However, 
there is a considerable difference between plus or minus and simply minus (which is what removal of DPs 
means). Nevertheless, it is apparent that UK agriculture has managed to cope with, if not thrive, in the 
face of very substantial variations, and reductions in total gross margins over time, which needs to be 
borne in mind when considering the possible effects of the removal of DPs. In particular, while the claims 
on the industry’s gross margin from hired labour, landlords and creditors have to be settled immediately, 
the capital depreciation charges are more notional than actual. The depreciation figure in Table 9.1. is 
estimated on the basis of ‘normal’ replacement periods for the different forms of physical capital and 
breeding livestock. While some of these costs need to be met on a regular basis for the survival of the 
business, many can be postponed until financial conditions are better. The depreciation charge of £4bn 
is more than enough to cope with swings in the gross margin of +/-£1.1bn. 
 
Furthermore, we also need to consider the extent to which UK agriculture is already under pressure to 
adapt, adjust and innovate to meet future market conditions. The total income from farming at an 
average of £4.5bn (+/- 19%) is what remains after allowance for the replacement of live and deadstock 
capital (depreciation), after paying for hired labour, paying rents and interest charges. As such, it 
represents returns to farmers’ own labour and management, owned (rather than borrowed) capital and 
owned (rather than rented) land. But is it enough?  
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The industry’s labour cost of £2.47bn is paid to 72k full time, 42k part time and 63k casual or seasonal 
workers39. Assuming that part-time means half time, and casual averages 20%, average annual wages per 
worker are £23,300. On the same basis, there are 217,000 full time equivalent farmers (including 
partners) trying to earn a living from farming, which implies that they need in total just over £5bn to earn 
as much as their own workers, cf. £4.5bn as their total income from farming, without considering any 
return to management. In effect, farmers’ own equity capital, excluding land, which should earn about 
£6bn if it is to match the interest payments on borrowed non-land capital, is earning nothing. Owned 
land, which should also be earning rents equivalent to those being paid to landlords (approximately 
£1.2bn) is also being farmed for nothing, apart from any capital gains. 
In other words, UK Agriculture is currently running at a substantial economic loss, of the order of £7.7bn 
a year, 65% of its gross margin (gross value added), even with the current level of subsidy. This is not 
sustainable, and is already resulting in substantial structural and technical change as farmers and their 
households seek to secure their own futures.  Hence, fewer people will be able to earn a full time living 
from farming in the future, whatever happens to policy or markets, and that structural change will 
continue to occur.  
Removal of direct payments, and increased opportunities to provide and be paid for environmental 
management will reinforce existing competitive pressures on the industry and redirect its efforts towards 
products and services demanded by both the public and private sectors. Indeed, it is probable that 
farmers’ support for Brexit, despite the apparent levels of support provided by the EU’s CAP, stems for 
the realisation that both the level and the mechanism for support (the DPs) are frustrating plans for 
improving the viability and prosperity of their business. Not only do these payments encourage some to 
remain in farming rather than seek other ways of making a living, but they also encourage landlords, 
suppliers of capital goods and inputs and others to take advantage of the apparent ‘cushion’ that these 
payments provide, while also reducing the pressure on the marketing chains to ensure a sustainable living 
and business returns to their suppliers (the farmers).  
In short, pumping £2.5bn a year into a competitive agricultural sector inevitably results in these payments 
being dissipated up and down the supply and marketing chains, rather than remaining in farmers’ 
pockets. Adjustment and adaptation to the removal of these payments will similarly be dissipated up and 
down the supply and marketing chains. While comparing the total payments to the total income from 
farming suggests that their removal will be a traumatic ‘hit’ of 50%, a more appropriate comparison is 
with the total output, where a 10% reduction is well within the ‘normal’ variation in revenues. 
It is often supposed that exposing the agricultural industry to purely competitive forces, without any 
protection and support (as an extreme Brexit scenario approximated here as the unilateral free trade 
without any DPs) would necessarily lead, on one hand, to concentration in fewer and much larger farms, 
intensification and industrialisation or, in more remote and less favourable areas, either ranching or 
abandonment, with a residual of hobby farms on the other hand.  
 
 
                                                          
39  Average numbers from 2010 to 2015, from: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/agriculture-in-the-
united-kingdom 
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10. Policy Implications and Conclusion40 
 
10.1 Key implications of selected trade and domestic policy scenarios  
 
1. Brexit would have significant implications for UK agriculture, a sector with strong trade links to 
the EU and reliance on CAP income support.  Moreover, the impact will be far from uniform, with 
large variation across the sectors and the devolved administrations.  
 
2. The consequences of Brexit for UK agriculture will depend upon (at least) two major factors: trade 
agreements or the lack of them and changes in domestic policy agricultural policy, i.e. changes in 
domestic agricultural policy, i.e. retaining or maintaining of direct payments. 
 
3. Trade negotiations with the EU and the RoW will be paramount, and the impact of trade 
agreements on the sector is conditioned by the degree of trade competitiveness (i.e. relative 
tariffs) and trade openness. It also depends on the status of the sub-sector concerned (e.g., beef, 
sheep, dairy, pigs, poultry, wheat and barley) and whether the UK is a net importer or net 
exporter of specific commodities.  
 
4. The trade effects, however, might be overshadowed by the exchange rate and possible labour 
market changes and other non-tariff barriers (not addressed here). However, the lack of concrete 
policy decisions and the uncertainty that surrounds the terms of negotiations with the EU (at the 
time of writing this report) make it very difficult for farm business planning. 
 
5. Across all the scenarios considered Brexit has a negative impact on UK Gross Domestic Product.  
A reversion to WTO under most favoured nation (MFN) tariff schedules reduces it the most, circa 
0.4 percent per annum on average, whereas UTL reduces it the least, 0.22 percent per annum on 
average. The removal of direct payments is beneficial to the UK economic growth, although 
negligible.  
 
6. In macroeconomic terms the impacts that arise from the scenarios are relatively small. This is 
because average tariffs in the wider economy between the UK and EU, as well as the assumed 
trade cost increases, are only moderate for the majority of UK economic activities. In those 
scenarios where larger tariffs and/or trade cost shocks occur, these effects are typically restricted 
to agrifood industries, which constitute only a small share of the UK GDP.   
 
7. At the sector level, different sectors will be affected in various ways according to the different 
trade scenarios. Even a relatively ‘soft’ Brexit, a free trade agreement with the EU close to current 
arrangements (i.e. FTA+), would create some disruption to trade flows, albeit with estimated 
market impacts that are relatively small. The market impacts are mainly due to the introduction 
of an assumed increase in UK and EU trade facilitation costs (to capture the UK’s loss of access to 
the single market), which leads to changes in the UK terms of trade.  
 
                                                          
40 This chapter was written by Andrew Moxey, David Harvey and Carmen Hubbard. 
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8.  These are, however, mitigated by the removal of UK-RoW tariffs (UTL scenario) or amplified by 
the adoption of the current EU schedule of WTO MFN tariffs (WTO scenario). In the case of 
products where the UK is a net importer (e.g. beef) the imposition of tariffs reduces the 
competitiveness of the imported product resulting in higher domestic producer prices in the UK. 
The converse applies for products where the UK is a net exporter (e.g. lamb) to the EU. 
 
9. Given the dependence of many UK farms on direct payments, their removal, predictably, worsens 
the negative impacts of new trade arrangements and off-sets positive impacts. The elimination 
of direct payments will affect most farm businesses but the magnitude varies by farm type and 
devolved administration. 
 
10. The negative impact on farm business income is reflected across all trade scenarios, especially 
UTL with or without direct payments. Average farm income varies significantly across the 
devolved administrations and by farm type, with most farms worse off (relative to the Baseline) 
under all scenarios but one, WTO+. Noticeably, under this scenario dairy farms will particularly 
benefit as their average farm income could almost triple as compared to the Baseline scenario. 
Beef and sheep farms will be the most affected under UTL-.  
 
11. Our extreme free trade scenario (UTL) leads to some striking results regarding farm income 
distribution. Whereas 15-20 percent of the farms were not making any money at all (even in the 
Baseline scenario), this rises to 45 percent under the UTL scenario with direct payments still in 
place (UTL+).   The elimination of direct payments further increases this figure to 70 percent under 
UTL-. 
 
12. Subsidies are a crucial component of farm business income across the UK and removal of direct 
payments could have significant implications for the sector as a whole. For example, there could 
be land use changes and restructuring, involving some farms, particularly smaller enterprises, 
going out of business. There may be particularly significant effects for upland farms which depend 
on subsidies to a greater extent. 
 
13. Price projections, direct payments and off-farm income, largely influence variability in the levels 
of viability, sustainability and vulnerability across farm types and between the devolved 
administrations. Especially, given the substantial contribution of CAP direct payments to farm 
income, their removal amplifies farm vulnerability. Furthermore, the combination of trade 
liberalisation and removal of Pillar 1 direct payments increases the proportion of vulnerable 
farms. Hence, the presence of off-farm income is critical in safe-guarding the economic welfare 
of most UK farm households. 
 
14. Brexit, under any scenario, could have significant effects for UK agricultural producers, exporters 
and consumers.  
 
15. For producers, removal of agricultural subsidies will affect most farm businesses, but effects will 
vary by sector, region and devolved governments. Arable and dairy farms may be relatively 
unaffected whereas sheep and beef producers in more remote locations such as the Scottish 
uplands most likely to be affected and many may struggle to survive. Under Free Trade 
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Agreement with the EU agricultural impacts are modest but by contrast under UTL there are 
significant.  Adoption of the World Trade Agreement tariff schedule favours some net importer 
sectors such as dairy.  
 
16. For exporters, any exports from the UK to the EU and Rest of the World would be required to 
meet the product and provenance standards of the importing country. Adoption of the WTO 
current EU tariff schedule harms some export sectors such as sheep.  
 
17. For consumers, prices will depend not only on the tariff schedule put in place in the UK, but also 
the value of the pound in foreign exchange markets. A fall back to WTO MFN terms would 
increase significantly domestic food prices which would particularly affect those with least 
disposable income. For example, under WTO+, estimates for the meat sector and food processing 
are particularly high compared with the Baseline, e.g. 7.3 percent and 3.7 percent increase in 
retail prices, respectively. Lower (or no) tariffs could leave food prices unchanged or lower, so 
benefiting consumers, at least in the short term. While the UK would be free to negotiate new 
trade deals worldwide this is a complex process that could be a lengthy and disruptive. 
 
 
10.2. Overarching Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
18. British farming has been shaped by policy interventions since well before joining the CAP in 1973.  
Measures have included various forms of price support and input subsides plus knowledge 
transfer and public research and development activities.  As a result, the diverse patterns of 
resource allocation, production and countryside management are different from what they 
would have otherwise been. Critics have frequently cited, on the one hand, poor 
productivity/competitiveness and low farm incomes, and on the other hand, environmental 
degradation, as evidence of market distortions and perverse policy outcomes.  
 
19. Continuing reform of the CAP, typically with strong support from the UK, has gone some way 
towards addressing such criticisms. However, the UK’s position on CAP reform has generally been 
that these reforms have not gone nearly far enough. Brexit provides a great opportunity for 
change. This is reflected in policy consultations and statements from each agricultural 
administration across the UK, albeit with some differences of emphasis.  Cardiff and London have 
signalled a clear intent to abolish direct payments and instead to focus attention on raising 
productivity (on-farm but also along supply-chains) and enhancing the delivery of wider 
ecosystem services, by rewarding farmers for the provision of ‘public goods’. Belfast and 
Edinburgh also seek to enhance competitiveness and environmental performance, but are more 
cautious about completely and rapidly abandoning direct payments.    
 
20. To a certain extent, these differences in emphasis reflect geographical variation in the structure, 
composition and relative importance of agriculture and associated supply-chains.  For example: 
agriculture and food manufacturing account for lower shares of GVA and employment in England 
than elsewhere; arable farming is more prevalent in England than elsewhere; Scotland has more 
extensive rough grazing land than elsewhere. 
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21. These differences also reflect variation in the perceived effectiveness of policy instruments 
and/or what is regarded as tolerable transitional disruption between current and future 
positions. For example, removal of direct payments will expose farm incomes to full market 
pressures, which may encourage structural adjustment. However, if too rapid or unassisted, such 
adjustments may cause unwelcome volatility in supply-chains, discontinuity in environmental 
land management, undesirable changes across rural communities, and unnecessary, perhaps 
even inefficient, structural change. Any choice of policy instruments among the devolved 
administrations will also be constrained by available budgets and acceptability to trading 
partners.   
 
22. Indeed, the EU represents all member states in all WTO affairs. However, the UK is a member of 
the WTO and does not have to renegotiate its membership once outside the EU. But it will need 
to negotiate its “own commitments” (e.g. access to imports of goods and services from other 
WTO members and farm subsidies) which currently are embodied within the EU as a whole.41  
However, this process provides an opportunity for other WTO members to exert pressure on the 
UK to adjust domestic and trade policies – as a precursor to bilateral negotiations for any 
subsequent free-trade agreements.  Likely points of concern include the allocation and treatment 
of TRQs for agricultural products, and also the applicability and size of the UK’s Amber, Blue and 
Green boxes42.  
 
23. Governing the budgetary size of Amber box policies in particular will be crucial. For example, 
whilst it is possible that the UK will be granted an Amber Box proportionate to its share of the 
current EU level, this is not guaranteed.  Nor indeed is the willingness of other WTO members to 
accept an increase in coupled support even if still within Amber box levels, since this would not 
be in the spirit of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).  
 
24. The WTO focus is on reducing trade distortions.43  Consequently, even if any part of the UK 
wanted to, the scope for using coupled support may well be constrained by WTO, with even the 
split of the present implicit UK ceiling between the four administrations possibly proving 
controversial. 
 
25. Significant use of the Amber Box has not been proposed by any part of the UK, but could 
nonetheless be required if policy instruments are viewed by other WTO members as incompatible 
with Green Box classification. However, given evidence that they are not entirely decoupled, the 
UK’s use of continued Pillar 1-type direct payments could be subject to challenge. This may well 
                                                          
41 Ungphakorn, P (2018), Chapter 2: In the event of a no deal Brexit, can the UK just fall back on WTO terms? in UK in Changing 
Europe’s Report on ‘ What would ‘trading on WTO terms’ mean for the UK?, available at https://ukandeu.ac.uk/new-report-
explains-what-trading-on-wto-terms-would-mean/, last accessed 24th February 2019. 
42 Amber Box includes support measures (e.g. price support, input subsidies and export subsidies) that are production and 
trade distortive. They are subject to limits: ‘de minimis’ or minimal supports are allowed, generally 5% of agricultural 
production for developed countries, 10% for developing countries. The Blue Box includes amber-type support measures that 
distort production (e.g. payments per unit of land or number of animals). The Green Box includes subsidies that do not distort 
trade and are decoupled from production, e.g. direct income support for farmers and environmental payments; 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm, last accessed 26th February, 2019.  
43 Whilst intra-EU trade flows are beyond WTO scrutiny, once the UK has left, the volume of some trade flows (e.g. sheep and 
beef) between the UK and EU27 could become viewed as trade distortionary, hence attracting challenges from other WTO 
members. 
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be encouraged by the reduced heft of an independent country relative to that of the EU, with an 
independent UK being an inviting ‘stalking horse’ for WTO members to pursue in their continued 
efforts to change the CAP and associated support systems and continued trade protection. 
Similarly, the Green Box eligibility of agri-environmental schemes may also be questioned. 
 
26. Under AoA, payments for agri-environmental schemes are restricted to cover costs incurred or 
income foregone, and schemes cannot be trade distorting.  Release from the CAP does not 
remove the need to comply with these obligations. Yet policy statements (especially from Cardiff 
and London) suggest that these payment rates will be increased beyond those currently used.  
Whilst it is possible that some payment inflation might be achieved through more creative 
interpretation44 of AoA rules, demonstrably moving beyond income foregone or costs incurred 
will attract challenges, particularly if a significant degree of joint agricultural production is 
involved. 
 
27. Moreover, examples of existing schemes with relatively high payment rates may not necessarily 
signal scope for the expansion of such an approach.  For instance, schemes under the CAP may 
have been protected from challenge by the EU’s negotiating weight in the WTO.  Equally, existing 
generous schemes (mainly under the new payment-by-results (PBR) model) are relatively small-
scale and may not have attracted the attention of WTO members, or if they did have been judged 
too small to be trade distortionary: scaling them up across the UK could well alter their perceived 
relevance. 
 
28. If Green Box eligibility was challenged, deployment of stated policy support might need to fall 
wholly or partially under the Amber Box.  For example, agri-environmental payments might 
comprise a basic payment calculated under AoA rules, but with an area45 or headage top-up 
under the Amber Box. If use of the Amber Box is constrained, the Blue Box could possibly be 
utilised through imposing some form of scheme membership quota. The current UK share of the 
EU’s ‘de minimis’ WTO provisions (on Amber Box) seems sufficient for covering future spending 
on agriculture at levels currently envisaged. Ungphakorn (2018:28) points out that for its ‘own 
separate WTO commitments on goods, the UK is proposing a trade-distorting limit of support of 
€5.9 billion’.  
 
29. Within the UK, agriculture is a devolved policy area.  Consequently, despite currently all being 
under the CAP, the four UK constituent nations have adopted slightly different policy approaches.  
This applies both to how Pillar 1 support (e.g. direct payments) have been implemented but also 
to how Pillar 2 support (e.g. environment, structural support and rural development) has been 
distributed. For example, decoupled area payment rates and the use of capping/tiering vary, as 
do compliance requirements, whilst the level and focus of agri-environmental funding differs.  
This reflects variation in available budgets but also differences in regional priorities.  For example, 
Scotland has retained Less Favoured Area funding and has deployed coupled headage payments. 
                                                          
44 For example, whole-farm costs or transfer wages from off-farm employment, or simply just more generous allowances for 
materials, effort and displaced output; again, however, WTO acceptance of such creativity would probably have been easier as 
part of the EU than in isolation.  
45 An area payment might remain Green Box, depending on what WTO members choose to challenge and what the EU chooses 
to defend alongside the UK. 
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30. Different political priorities and visions are apparent in published policy statements and 
consultation documents, but the extent to which responsibility will continue to be devolved 
remains unclear.  In particular, at least in the first instance, the allocation of funding and the 
scope for deploying particular forms of support (e.g. coupled payments) may be determined 
centrally by London in an attempt to retain a common framework (level playing field) across the 
UK. This may well be necessary to avoid possible internal market distortions conferring 
competitive advantage to one region. 
 
31. The UK Agriculture Bill provides little detail on the common framework, but the continuing 
standoff between Edinburgh and London over how devolved powers should be repatriated from 
Brussels means that these issues add a further layer of uncertainty to policy formulation (as 
illustrated by Scotland’s absence from the UK Agriculture Bill). 
 
32. Irrespective of the international or domestic constraints on their adoption, our modelling results 
suggest that different policy options raise a number of issues.   In particular, our farm-level 
analysis implies significant pressure for structural adjustment as and when direct payments are 
eliminated.  The immediate impacts on farm income are such that farm businesses and 
households would be expected to react by seeking to improve on-farm efficiency and/or search 
for alternative income sources, in some cases by leaving farming.   
 
33. Although our models do not provide any explicit outcomes about the likely nature of structural 
change, the national (CGE) and sectoral (FAPRI) models imply that structural adjustment will 
continue to occur, leading to resource reallocations and changes in the level and composition of 
output.  Such structural adjustment has implications in terms of the availability of raw materials 
for food manufacturing, levels of local economic activity and environmental impacts, all of which 
may lead to demands for further policy responses.  
 
34. For example, reduced volumes of sheep and beef cattle might undermine the viability of the red 
meat processing sector. Conversely, increased dairying, or an increased availability of cheaper 
imported raw materials, may enhance opportunities in other sectors.  In either case, the process 
of shifting resources between uses may require policy action to mitigate (social) disruption and 
encourage new development (both of which extend beyond the reach of agri-environmental 
policy alone).   
 
35. Similarly, changes in agricultural land use may relieve environmental pressures, such as over-
grazing, in some locations whilst increasing pressures, such as air and water pollution, in others.  
Again, this suggests that policy action may be needed to manage such transitions.  Indeed, the 
theme of “public money for public goods” in the Agriculture Bill implies that (agri-environmental) 
policy might be expected to guide change processes (but, as noted above, this may be constrained 
by WTO rules). 
 
36. The demand (and supply) for agricultural labour will change, possibly increasing in some sectors 
under a WTO scenario but declining overall under a unilateral scenario.  Given that the capacity 
of farmers and farm workers to switch between different agricultural enterprises or into non-
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farm activities may be constrained by skills and location-specific opportunities, there may be a 
policy need to assist labour reallocations and restructuring, for example, through advice and 
training or assistance with commuting/relocation or retirement. Again, this extends beyond the 
remit of agricultural policy alone. 
 
37. However, the dynamics of how adjustment might be achieved have not been modelled explicitly 
in this research. That is, whilst the national and sectoral results reflect changes to resource 
allocation and production patterns, the processes by which change comes about are not 
considered. The implicit changes in allocation (structural adjustment) are reflected in these 
macro and sector level models by their internal logical specification and trend responses based 
on historical data.  Similarly, although ScotFarm allows for some resource adjustment at the farm 
level, and some of our income-distribution analysis includes changes in efficiency and factor 
prices, the farm-level analysis takes no account of (local) availability of resources or markets.  
 
38. Yet, in addition to the ease with which labour can be redeployed, structural adjustment also 
depends upon the ease with which other resources, such as land, can switch between uses and, 
again, encouragement may be required from wider policy support. For example, planning 
regulations may slow land transfers out of agriculture and the availability of land to farmers 
wishing to expand their operations may be impeded by other influences on land markets, such 
as taxation regimes and tenancy laws.   
 
39. It is also the case that land varies considerably in terms of its suitability for different uses 
(agricultural or otherwise) and hence the opportunity for redeployment varies. This highlights the 
importance of the uneven geographical distribution of impacts, both between and within the four 
nations of the UK, and the associated implications for rural communities in different locations.   
 
40. Raising agricultural productivity closer to the all-economy average will require reallocating less 
productive resources (e.g., poor quality land, unskilled labour) to other uses including provision 
of public goods) and utilising remaining resources more effectively. Our sensitivity analysis at the 
farm level shows that, for example, by increasing productivity by 10 percent across beef and 
sheep will indeed lead to a sizeable increase to in farm business income under all trade scenarios.  
However, this improvement in productivity would not be sufficient to offset the removal of direct 
payments nor the projected price decline under UTL.  
 
41. Nevertheless, the capacity of the farming industry to adjust depends critically on both the 
confidence and the capability of farmers and their businesses to adapt and innovate. Confidence 
depends on expectations about the future, which ongoing Brexit negotiations currently seriously 
undermine. While the future direction of domestic policy has been reasonably signalled with the 
publication and current parliamentary and public scrutiny of the Agriculture Bill, the UK 
agriculture and food sectors’ future trading relations remain highly uncertain.  
 
42. The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (EFRA) has also 
been scrutinising the Agriculture Bill, in parallel with the Committee stage of the Bill through 
Parliament. EFRA’s report echoes and amplifies the concerns that phased reduction of DPs should 
not begin until both trade arrangements and future Environmental Land Management Schemes 
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are in place, in order to establish the necessary confidence to adjust and adapt, and stresses the 
need for a multiannual financial framework to further assist in confidence building. 
 
43.  The EFRA report also notes that insufficient attention has yet been paid to the balance between 
agricultural production and the environment, and that the prioritisation of the several and 
various public goods to be supplied with the payment of public money is not either specified or 
provided with clear ‘control’ mechanisms, which reduces both the confidence and capability of 
the industry to respond appropriately. EFRA, echoing the NFU, is also concerned that the Bill 
makes no reference to the defence of current UK quality and production standards in any future 
trade agreements, especially since this is not (yet) incorporated in the Trade Bill. 
 
44. Similarly, EFRA notes that the intention to ensure fairness along the food supply chains is 
welcome, but strongly suggests that this should be entrusted to the existing Groceries Code 
Adjudicator (with sufficiently widened remit, resources and powers), rather than, as in the Bill, 
to the Rural Payments Agency, whose competence and reliability does not claim any confidence 
amongst producers. 
 
45. There is an obvious contrast between our farm level analysis and the analysis at the sector and 
macro level. The former implies considerable hardship for many farm families and their rural 
communities, especially from the discontinuation of direct payment support without any 
offsetting payments for public goods (or penalties for public bads). The impacts of removal of DPs 
is also, in some cases, exaggerated by the projected price changes arising from changes in trade 
relations following Brexit. The latter, however, notwithstanding rather modest differences 
between the sector (PE) and industry/macro (CGE) projections. 
 
46. As noted above, the explanation of this critical difference is that the sector and macro models 
include some reflection of structural adjustment, based on historic patterns and calibration to 
historic trends, while the farm level analysis ignores structural adjustment and adaptation. Many 
of these adjustments are difficult to identify, though agricultural rents are often advanced as a 
salient example of the potential effect of removal of direct payments. As also noted above, there 
is considerable debate, and hence uncertainty, about the extent to which DPs have already been 
‘capitalised’ in farm rents, though this has probably been underestimated in our CGE model 
specification.  
 
47. It is often supposed that exposing the agricultural industry to purely competitive forces, without 
any protection and support (as an extreme Brexit scenario approximated here as the unilateral 
free trade without any DPs) would necessarily lead, on one hand, to concentration in fewer and 
much larger farms, intensification and industrialisation or, in more remote and less favourable 
areas, either ranching or abandonment, with a residual of hobby farms on the other hand.  
 
48. This, indeed, tends to be the outcome of textbook economic models of maximising profits in 
purely competitive markets, where all products are essentially homogeneous (as commodities) 
and more or less perfectly substitutable from whatever source of provenance, supplemented by 
a recognition that farming lifestyle is sufficiently attractive that some people are content to be 
‘farmers’ as a way of life, rather than a way of making a living. Our CGE model, through its 
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Armington assumption, recognises that the domestic demand for commodities exhibits some 
differentiated preferences for one source over another, at least at the international level. 
Nevertheless, within the domestic economy, no allowance is made for the differentiation of 
commodities into products. 
 
49. However, there are other areas that cannot be fixed by increased spending from the UK 
government, e.g. rules of origin, organic certification, geographical indications, if the UK will fall 
back on WTO terms. For example, a certification black hole is a key problem for UK farming 
flagged up by the first tranche of the Government’s technical papers. Only organic food and drink 
exporters certified by an organic control body approved by the European Commission would be 
legally allowed to export to EU countries. But a certification process usually takes up to nine 
months to complete. This disruption could be substantial and, for some export businesses heavily 
reliant on trade with the EU, potentially existential. Regarding geographical indications, UK 
producers were warned that they may have to re-apply for protection if the EU requires, but 
there is no guarantee that this will be an easy and straightforward process. These topics were 
beyond the remit of this research.   
 
50. We are confident that UK Agriculture can and will generally survive, and that parts of it will be 
able to thrive after Brexit. But we are also certain that Brexit and taking back control of UK (and 
devolved administrations) agricultural, food and rural environment policies presents major 
challenges to our policy making machinery and procedures, and to the research communities 
responsible for generating the necessary evidence on which to base sustainable policies.  
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